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iAbstract
The capacity to learn to associate sensory perceptions with appropriate motor actions underlies
the success of many animal species, from insects to humans. The evolutionary significance of
learning has long been a subject of interest for evolutionary biologists who emphasize the bene-
fit yielded by learning under changing environmental conditions, where it is required to flexibly
switch from one behavior to another. However, two unsolved questions are particularly impor-
tant for improving our knowledge of the evolutionary advantages provided by learning, and are
addressed in the present work. First, because it is possible to learn the wrong behavior when
a task is too complex, the learning rules and their underlying psychological characteristics that
generate truly adaptive behavior must be identified with greater precision, and must be linked
to the specific ecological problems faced by each species. A framework for predicting behavior
from the definition of a learning rule is developed here. Learning rules capture cognitive features
such as the tendency to explore, or the ability to infer rewards associated to unchosen actions.
It is shown that these features interact in a non-intuitive way to generate adaptive behavior in
social interactions where individuals affect each other’s fitness. Such behavioral predictions are
used in an evolutionary model to demonstrate that, surprisingly, simple trial-and-error learn-
ing is not always outcompeted by more computationally demanding inference-based learning,
when population members interact in pairwise social interactions. A second question in the
evolution of learning is its link with and relative advantage compared to other simpler forms
of phenotypic plasticity. After providing a conceptual clarification on the distinction between
genetically determined vs. learned responses to environmental stimuli, a new factor in the evo-
lution of learning is proposed: environmental complexity. A simple mathematical model shows
that a measure of environmental complexity, the number of possible stimuli in one’s environ-
ment, is critical for the evolution of learning. In conclusion, this work opens roads for modeling
interactions between evolving species and their environment in order to predict how natural se-
lection shapes animals’ cognitive abilities.
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Résumé
La capacité d’apprendre à associer des sensations perceptives à des actions motrices appropriées
est sous-jacente au succès évolutif de nombreuses espèces, depuis les insectes jusqu’aux êtres hu-
mains. L’importance évolutive de l’apprentissage est depuis longtemps un sujet d’intérêt pour
les biologistes de l’évolution, et ces derniers mettent l’accent sur le bénéfice de l’apprentissage
lorsque les conditions environnementales sont changeantes, car dans ce cas il est nécessaire de
passer de manière flexible d’un comportement à l’autre. Cependant, deux questions non réso-
lues sont importantes afin d’améliorer notre savoir quant aux avantages évolutifs procurés par
l’apprentissage. Premièrement, puisqu’il est possible d’apprendre un comportement incorrect
quand une tâche est trop complexe, les règles d’apprentissage qui permettent d’atteindre un com-
portement réellement adaptatif doivent être identifiées avec une plus grande précision, et doivent
être mises en relation avec les problèmes écologiques spécifiques rencontrés par chaque espèce.
Un cadre théorique ayant pour but de prédire le comportement à partir de la définition d’une
règle d’apprentissage est développé ici. Il est démontré que les caractéristiques cognitives, telles
que la tendance à explorer ou la capacité d’inférer les récompenses liées à des actions non ex-
périmentées, interagissent de manière non-intuitive dans les interactions sociales pour produire
des comportements adaptatifs. Ces prédictions comportementales sont utilisées dans un modèle
évolutif afin de démontrer que, de manière surprenante, l’apprentissage simple par essai-et-erreur
n’est pas toujours battu par l’apprentissage basé sur l’inférence qui est pourtant plus exigeant en
puissance de calcul, lorsque les membres d’une population interagissent socialement par pair.
Une deuxième question quant à l’évolution de l’apprentissage concerne son lien et son avantage
relatif vis-à-vis d’autres formes plus simples de plasticité phénotypique. Après avoir clarifié la
distinction entre réponses aux stimuli génétiquement déterminées ou apprises, un nouveau fac-
teur favorisant l’évolution de l’apprentissage est proposé : la complexité environnementale. Un
modèle mathématique permet de montrer qu’une mesure de la complexité environnementale –
le nombre de stimuli rencontrés dans l’environnement – a un rôle fondamental pour l’évolution
de l’apprentissage. En conclusion, ce travail ouvre de nombreuses perspectives quant à la mo-
délisation des interactions entre les espèces en évolution et leur environnement, dans le but de
comprendre comment la sélection naturelle façonne les capacités cognitives des animaux.
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Chapter1
Introduction
1.1 Learning as a form of phenotypic plasticity
This thesis addresses the problem of the adaptive value of learning as it pertains to animal be-
havior. Learning, defined as the change in behavior in reaction to environmental information,
is widespread across biological species. Animals learn to search for food, learn to find mating
partners, or learn to socially interact with conspecifics (Dickinson, 1980; Shettleworth, 2009;
Dugatkin, 2010). Seen as a process of adaptation during lifespan to external environmental con-
ditions, learning is just a particular form of phenotypic plasticity (Pigliucci, 2001). Phenotypic
plasticity concerns not only animals but all biological organisms. Mameli and Bateson (2006)
convincingly claim that it is hard to find a biological trait whose expression is not somehow
affected by the environment. Taken as a form of plasticity, learning does not need any particular
evolutionary justification, because the selective advantage of plasticity over purely genetically de-
termined phenotypes is already a well-established fact in evolutionary biology (West-Eberhard,
1989; Gavrilets and Scheiner, 1993; Pigliucci, 2005) .
Why then would this thesis focus on the adaptive value of learning? The reason is that there
are actually different levels of plasticity, and each level of plasticity is adapted to different envi-
ronmental conditions. Learning is one level of plasticity, and as such it is adapted to specific
environmental conditions. In order to explain the concept of levels of plasticity, consider the
reaction norm of an organism. The reaction norm of an organism of a given genotype is the
function that describes the mapping from environmental conditions (which can be depicted on
the x-axis of a two-dimensional plot) to phenotype (the y-axis). When describing, for example,
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the plastic phenotype of a plant in relation to light, drawing a reaction norm function seems
relatively easy: the x-axis would represent the quantity of light under which growth takes place,
and the y-axis would represent the size of the plant. It is more difficult to draw the reaction
norm corresponding to learning. What should one put on the x-axis? Learning refers to the
change of response to stimuli as a function of experience, so one would actually need to draw
several reaction norm functions (with the “quantity” of stimulus on the x-axis and the behav-
ioral response on the y-axis), one for each time point during the learning experience. In other
words, the “environment” in the description of the reaction norm of learning comprises the
time dimension as a fundamental one, while it is not the case for other simpler norms of reac-
tion. In animal behavior, an example of a norm of reaction that is simpler (or at a lower level)
than learning is what are usually called innate behaviors, which correspond to the fact that the
response to a particular stimulus is genetically determined and does not change as a function of
experience. Since purely innate responses to stimuli are always somehow modified by experi-
ence, it might be preferable to call these behaviors “predispositions” or innate tendencies. In this
introduction the phrase “innate behavior” will be kept, but it should be remembered that it does
not mean that the interaction between innateness and learning in shaping ontogeny of behavior
(Mery and Kawecki, 2004) is denied here (see also Shettleworth, 2009 on the use and misuse of
the expression “innate behavior”). Under what environmental conditions does natural selection
favor learning over innate behaviors?
1.2 Environmental conditions favoring learning
Without acknowledging explicitly the above distinction between different forms or levels of
plasticity, students of behavioral ecology have tried to find the ecological circumstances favor-
ing a learning ability over innate behaviors (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Feldman et al., 1996;
Wakano et al., 2004; Borenstein et al., 2008). Their conclusion is that learning is selected for un-
der temporally variable environments. More precisely, there is a Goldilocks principle (Stephens,
1991; Kerr and Feldman, 2003; Dunlap and Stephens, 2009): for learning to provide a selective
advantage, the environment should change between generations (so that it is pointless to express
the behaviors genetically inherited from parents), but should not change too fast within a gen-
eration, so that individuals have time to learn before the consequences of actions change again.
While they provide much insight, these models contain some conceptual and theoretical prob-
lems. The most important theoretical problem has to do with the assumption of optimality of
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the learned actions. Indeed, in most models of the evolution of learning, one generally assumes
that learners reach the optimal behavior in every type of new environment (with some cost due
to, e.g. errors during exploration or augmented risk of predation, Boyd and Richerson, 1988;
Feldman et al., 1996; Wakano et al., 2004; Borenstein et al., 2008).
However, empirical findings show that animals may learn the wrong behavior in complex
tasks (Shettleworth, 2009). In fact, different tasks have different solutions and may require dif-
ferent uses of information. Animals that are learning vary in their tendencies to use different
quantities and types of information, have different memory capacities, and employ different
amounts of exploration. These different features lead to different behavior and have been cap-
tured under the idea that learning and, more generally, decision-making mechanisms have been
shaped by natural selection to solve the specific set of ecological problems that each species
must face (Hammerstein and Stevens, 2012). Hence, more work is needed in the direction of
understanding the specificities of learning systems in relation to environmental patterns. The
conditions under which learning generates truly adaptive behavior must be identified in a more
precise way.
1.3 Psychological mechanisms underlying learning and ecological optimality
Because species vary in their ecological conditions, their psychological and cognitive needs
vary as well. It is reasonable to think that natural selection should favor cognitive abilities that
allow individuals to perform adapted actions under their species’ own ecology. Accordingly,
there is a long and very fruitful tradition in behavioral ecology of designing separate optimal-
ity models for each type of decision problem animals may face (Charnov, 1976; Mcnamara and
Houston, 1985; Shettleworth et al., 1988; Krebs et al., 1993; Houston and McNamara, 1999) .
However, taking into account cognitive economy, this is probably not what happens in reality
when natural selection acts to favor individuals who express the fittest phenotypes. Rather than
having a set of separate “modules”, each one dedicated to solve a particular problem (e.g. one
for foraging, another one for fighting, another one for social cooperation, etc.), it is more likely
that general principles of decision-making that work well on average are implemented inside
animals’ brains to allow finding approximate solutions under a variety of circumstances (McNa-
mara and Houston, 2009; Dijker, 2011; Fawcett et al., 2013; Lotem, 2013). Learning is one such
general principle and, as explained above, the specific details of how an animal learns about its
surrounding environment are critical for the animal to perform appropriate behavior.
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1.4 Learning rules
The way in which an animal gathers and uses environmental information in the course of
learning has been coined under the expression of “learning rule”. Learning rules are conceptual
ways of describing the probability distribution over actions of an animal at a given decision step
depending on the combination of previous experience and newly gathered information. An
example of a learning rule that captures the law of effect (Thorndike, 1911; Herrnstein, 1970) is
the so-called “linear operator” rule (Bush and Mostelller, 1951; McNamara and Houston, 1987;
Bernstein et al., 1988; Stephens and Clements, 1998) that stipulates that the probability to take
an action at a given time step is a linear combination of the previous probability and the reward
received at the current time step.
The behavioral dynamics of the linear operator rule and of various other learning rules have
been studied by game theorists in the context of human social decision-making (Jordan, 1991;
Erev and Roth, 1998; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999; Hopkins, 2002;
Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002; Young, 2004; Sandholm, 2011). As a consequence of the focus
on humans, some of these rules probably rely on excessively high cognitive demands (Hart and
Mas-Colell, 2000; Foster and Young, 2003) to be applied in the field of animal behavior. But
many other rules are in fact perfectly applicable to animal species because they are mainly based
on the simple and universal principle of the law of effect (or reinforcement learning): rewarded
actions (i.e. actions associated with positive payoffs, increasing biological fitness) tend to be
repeated, and punished actions (negative payoffs decreasing fitness) tend to be avoided.
Biologists and psychologists also proposed possible learning rules that may describe animals’
behavior (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Niv, 2009) but only few studies have considered to what
extent the behavior produced by these rules provides a fitness advantage in natural environ-
ments. Some recent work takes this approach (Groß et al., 2008; Josephson, 2008; Hamblin
and Giraldeau, 2009; Arbilly et al., 2010, 2011a,b; Katsnelson et al., 2011) and there is a need to
pursue this avenue for a better integration of realistic accounts of psychological learning mecha-
nisms and evolutionary arguments.
1.5 Evolution of learning rules for social interactions
Because learning rules in economics and game theory were primarily developed to under-
stand the behavior of humans in social interactions, it is tempting to apply these results to
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the field of evolutionary game theory, i.e. the study of natural selection on social behaviors
(Maynard-Smith, 1982; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998). Indeed, it was claimed above that gen-
eral decision-making mechanisms and learning rules must work in a wide range of situations,
but when considering social situations, many complications arise. In biology, when population
members interact and affect each other’s fitness (which is the case for a large fraction of the
world’s biodiversity), there is frequency dependence, i.e. the performance of a strategy depends
on the composition of the population.
A famous example is given by the evolution of conflict (Maynard-Smith and Price, 1973;
McElreath and Boyd, 2007), captured by the “Hawk-Dove” game in which it is predicted that
natural selection leads to the coexistence in the population of aggressive (“Hawks”) and non-
aggressive individuals (“Doves”). In the classical Hawk-Dove game, frequency dependence just
leads to polymorphism in strategies of conflict, but the frequency dependence due to individuals
having different learning rules interacting in a population may generate very complex stochastic
processes (Lahkar and Seymour, 2013) that are difficult to analyze. Thus, while it is natural to
ask what would be the evolutionary outcome of the Hawk-Dove game under the more realistic
assumption that individuals learn to play this game rather than having innate strategies, the
answer is far from being easy.
More generally in evolutionary game theory, the traditional assumption of behavioral ecol-
ogy is almost always used. Namely, one assumes that natural selection shapes organisms to have
innate strategies for each social game individuals are facing. Another important example is the
paradox of cooperation that is also studied under this simplifying assumption, even if a larger
set of strategies has been considered by including, for instance, automata strategies like Tit-for-
tat or Win-stay-lose-shift (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006). But these strategies are
still specifically designed for cooperation problems, e.g. captured by the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Social games may involve many interactants and complex reward dependence, and it is crucial
to understand how general learning rules can be applied in these situations, because after all,
individual decision problems (e.g. foraging, nest building) are only special cases of social deci-
sion problems (in terms of mathematical optimization, Luce and Raiffa, 1989). Understanding
sociality might be more ambitious than understanding individual decision tasks, but the former
imply the latter, and biology would gain by continuing to build on game theory and economics
to achieve this long standing goal.
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1.6 Thesis outline
The three chapters presented in this thesis are formatted as scientific articles. Chapter 2 is a
published paper (Dridi and Lehmann, 2013), Chapter 3 is a manuscript ready for submission,
and Chapter 4 is another manuscript.
An important part of this thesis (Chapter 2) is dedicated to predicting how different learning
rules can generate different behaviors in social interactions. Since a learning rule refers to how
neurons process information in an animal’s brain, it has proven difficult to empirically test
whether a given rule describes accurately the psychological characteristics of animals or humans
(for humans, see Camerer, 2003 and references therein; for animals, an example is given by
Herrnstein, 1970). A first goal of Chapter 2 is then to give an intuition about the relations
between the psychological characteristics underlying a learning rule with produced behavior.
Another goal of Chapter 2 is to provide a basis in evolutionary theory for building models of
the evolution of learning rules: knowing what behavior is produced by the learning rules, one
can construct models of natural selection in order to find the learning rules that generate truly
adaptive behavior.
In Chapter 3, the behavioral predictions of Chapter 2 are used to address one major problem
in the evolution of learning rules and cognition: can animals infer, by reasoning, the rewards of
actions that they do not necessarily try? This ability may underlie advanced cognition such as
the capacity to form beliefs about the world. Humans are known to formmental representations
(i.e. beliefs) of their world and of others’ behaviors (theory of mind) but it remains controversial
whether other animal species can also do it (Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Emery and Clayton,
2009). By comparing a simple form of learning, which is trial-and-error learning, with a model
of inference-based learning, a contribution to finding an answer to this question is developed.
In particular, the idea that the ability to infer missed payoffs (i.e. payoffs yielded by actions an
individual did not explicitly try) gives an advantage in social interactions is tested.
The main work during this thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) was concerned with trying to distin-
guish the behavior produced by various learning rules, so a natural question linked to the above
discussion is: what do all these learning rules share in common? In other words, what is the
distinguishing feature of learning? In particular, from an evolutionary viewpoint, does learning
provide an advantage over other simpler forms of plasticity? For some, it is not even a question
that deserves attention as they claim that learning is just an emerging property of neural sys-
tems (Hollis and Guillette, 2011). With this view, learning is just a specific form of phenotypic
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plasticity. However, this argument is not satisfying because animals do have innate preferences:
some predetermined responses to particular stimuli, and these responses cohabit and interact
with learning abilities (e.g. Mery and Kawecki, 2004; Gong, 2012). Why then are not all ecolog-
ically relevant situations encoded in an animal’s brain? It seems obvious that such a proposition
is computationally intractable: the world contains so many different situations that it is impos-
sible to encode them all in a single brain. In Chapter 4, it is argued that learning helps dealing
with the world’s complexity, in particular thanks to the ability to forget past information.
8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter2
On learning dynamics underlying the
evolution of learning rules
Abstract
In order to understand the development of non-genetically encoded actions during an animal’s lifespan,
it is necessary to analyze the dynamics and evolution of learning rules producing behavior. Owing to the
intrinsic stochastic and frequency-dependent nature of learning dynamics, these rules are often studied
in evolutionary biology via computer simulations. We show here that stochastic approximation theory
can help to qualitatively understand learning dynamics and formulate analytical models for the evolu-
tion of learning rules. Individuals repeatedly interact during their lifespan, where the stage game faced
by the individuals fluctuates according to an environmental stochastic process. Individuals adjust their
behavioral actions according to learning rules belonging to the class of experience-weighted attraction
learning mechanisms, which includes standard reinforcement and Bayesian learning as special cases. We
use stochastic approximation theory in order to derive differential equations governing action play prob-
abilities, which turn out to have qualitative features of mutator-selection equations. We then perform
agent-based simulations to find the conditions where the deterministic approximation is closest to the
original stochastic learning process for standard 2-action 2-player fluctuating games, where interaction
between learning rules and preference reversal may occur. Finally, we analyze a simplified model for the
evolution of learning in a producer-scrounger game, which shows that the exploration rate can interact
in a non-intuitive way with other features of co-evolving learning rules. Overall, our analyses illustrate
the usefulness of applying stochastic approximation theory in the study of animal learning.
9
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2.1 Introduction
The abundance of resources and the environments to which organisms are exposed vary in
space and time. Organisms are thus facing complex fluctuating biotic and abiotic conditions to
which they must constantly adjust (Shettleworth, 2009; Dugatkin, 2010).
Animals have a nervous system, which can encode behavioral rules allowing them to adjust
their actions to changing environmental conditions (Shettleworth, 2009; Dugatkin, 2010). In
particular, the presence of a reward system allows an individual to reinforce actions increas-
ing satisfaction and material rewards and thereby adjust behavior by learning to produce goal-
oriented action paths (Thorndike, 1911; Herrnstein, 1970; Sutton and Barto, 1998; Niv, 2009). It
is probable that behaviors as different as foraging, mating, fighting, cooperating, nest building,
or information gathering all involve adjustment of actions to novel environmental conditions
by learning, as they have evolved to be performed under various ecological contexts and with
different interaction partners (Hollis et al., 1995; Chalmeau, 1994; Villarreal and Domjan, 1998;
Walsh et al., 2011; Plotnik et al., 2011).
In the fields of evolutionary biology and behavioral ecology there is a growing interest in
understanding how natural selection shapes the learning levels and abilities of animals, but this is
met with difficulties (McNamara and Houston, 2009; Hammerstein and Stevens, 2012; Fawcett
et al., 2013; Lotem, 2013). Focusing on situation specific actions does not help to understand the
effects of natural selection on behavioral rules because one focuses on produced behavior and
not the rules producing the behavior (e.g., Dijker, 2011). In order to understand the dynamics
and evolution of learning mechanisms and other behavioral rules, an evolutionary analysis thus
has to consider explicitly the dynamics of state variables on two timescales. First, one has to
consider the timescale of an individual’s lifespan; that is, the behavioral timescale during which
genetically encoded behavioral rules produce a dynamic sequence of actions taken by the animal.
Second, there is the generational timescale, during which selection occurs on the behavioral rules
themselves.
It is the behavioral timescale, where learning may occur, that seems to be the most reluctant
to be analyzed (Lotem, 2013). This may stem from the fact that learning rules intrinsically en-
compass constraints about the use of information and the expression of actions (in the absence
unlimited powers of computation), which curtails the direct application of standard optimality
approaches for studying dynamic behavior such as optimal control theory and dynamic pro-
gramming. Indeed, the dynamics of even the simplest learning rule, such as reinforcement learn-
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ing by trial-and-error, is hardly amenable to mathematical analysis without simplifying assump-
tions and focusing only on asymptotics (Bush andMostelller, 1951; Norman, 1968; Rescorla and
Wagner, 1972; Börgers and Sarin, 1997; Stephens and Clements, 1998; but see Izquierdo et al.,
2007 for predictions in finite time).
Further, the difficulty of analyzing learning dynamics is increased by two biological features
that need to be taken into account. First, varying environments need to be considered because
learning is favored by selection when the environment faced by the individuals in a population is
not absolutely fixed across and/or within generations (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Rogers, 1988;
Stephens, 1991; Feldman et al., 1996; Wakano et al., 2004; Dunlap and Stephens, 2009). Second,
frequency-dependence needs to be considered because learning is likely to occur in situations
where there are social interactions between the individuals in the population (Chalmeau, 1994;
Hollis et al., 1995; Villarreal and Domjan, 1998; Giraldeau and Caraco, 2000; Arbilly et al., 2010,
2011b; Plotnik et al., 2011).
All these features taken together make the analysis of the evolution of learning rules more
challenging to analyze than standard evolutionary game theory models focusing on actions or
strategies for constant environments (e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Maynard-Smith, 1982;
Binmore and Samuelson, 1992; Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; McElreath and Boyd, 2007; An-
dré, 2010). Although there has been some early studies on evolutionarily stable learning rules
(Harley, 1981; Houston, 1983; Houston and Sumida, 1987; Tracy and Seaman, 1995), this re-
search field has only recently been reignited by the use of agent-based simulations (Groß et al.,
2008; Josephson, 2008; Hamblin and Giraldeau, 2009; Arbilly et al., 2010, 2011a,b; Katsnelson
et al., 2011). It is noteworthy that during the gap in time in the study of learning in behavioral
ecology, the fields of game theory and economics have witnessed an explosion of theoretical
studies of learning dynamics (e.g., Jordan, 1991; Erev and Roth, 1998; Fudenberg and Levine,
1998; Camerer andHo, 1999; Hopkins, 2002; Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002; Foster and Young,
2003; Young, 2004; Sandholm, 2011). This stems from an attempt to understand how humans
learn to play in games (e.g., Camerer, 2003) and to refine static equilibrium concepts by in-
troducing dynamics. Even if such motivations can be different from the biologists’ attempt to
understand the evolution of animal behavior, the underlying principles of learning are similar
since actions leading to high experienced payoffs (or imagined payoffs) are reinforced over time.
Interestingly, mathematicians and game theorists have also developed tools to analytically
approximate intertwined behavioral dynamics, in particular stochastic approximation theory
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(Ljung, 1977; Benveniste et al., 1991; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Benaim and Hirsch, 1999a;
Kushner and Yin, 2003; Young, 2004; Sandholm, 2011). Stochastic approximation theory allows
one to approximate by way of differential equations discrete time stochastic learning processes
with decreasing (or very small) step-size, and thereby understand qualitatively their dynamics
and potentially construct analytical models for the evolution of learning mechanisms. This
approach does not seem so far to have been applied in evolutionary biology.
In this paper, we analyze by means of stochastic approximation theory an extension to fluc-
tuating social environments of the experience-weighted attraction learning mechanism (EWA
model, Camerer and Ho, 1999; Ho et al., 2007). This is a parametric model, where the parame-
ters describe the psychological characteristics of the learner (memory, ability to imagine payoffs
of unchosen actions, exploration/exploitation inclination), and which encompasses as a special
case various learning rules used in evolutionary biology such as the linear operator (McNamara
and Houston, 1987; Bernstein et al., 1988; Stephens and Clements, 1998), relative payoff sum
(Harley, 1981; Hamblin and Giraldeau, 2009) and Bayesian learning (Rodriguez-Gironés and
Vásquez, 1997; Geisler and Diehl, 2002). We apply the EWAmodel to a situation where individ-
uals face multiple periods of interactions during their lifetime, and where each period consists of
a game (like a prisoner’s dilemma game, a hawk-dove game), whose type changes stochastically
according to an environmental process.
The paper is organized in three parts. First, we define themodel and derive by way of stochas-
tic approximation theory a set of differential equation describing action play probabilities out
of which useful qualitative features about learning dynamics can be read. Second, we use the
model to compare analytical and simulation results under some specific learning rules. Finally,
we derive an evolutionary model for patch foraging in a producer-scrounger context, where both
evolutionary and behavioral time scales are considered.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Population
We consider a haploid population of constant size N . Although we are mainly interested
in investigating learning dynamics, we endow for biological concreteness the organisms with a
simple life cycle. This is as follows. (1) Each individual interacts socially with others repeat-
edly and possibly for T time periods. (2) Each individual produces a large number of offspring
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according to its gains and losses incurred during social interactions. (3) All individuals of the
parental generation die andN individuals from the offspring generation are sampled to form the
new adult generation.
2.2.2 Social decision problem in a fluctuating environment
The social interactions stage of the life cycle, stage (1), is the main focus of this paper and
it consists of the repeated play of a game between the members of the population. At each
time step t = 1,2, . . . ,T , individuals play a game, whose outcome depends on the state of the
environment !. We denote the set of environmental states by ⌦, which could consist of good
and bad weather, or any other environmental biotic or abiotic feature affecting the focal organ-
ism. The dynamics of environmental states {!t }Tt=1 is assumed to obey a homogeneous and
aperiodic Markov Chain, and we write µ(!) for the probability of occurrence of state! under
the stationary distribution of this Markov Chain (e.g., Karlin and Taylor, 1975; Grimmett and
Stirzaker, 2001).
For simplicity, we consider that the number of actions in the game stays constant across
environmental states (only the payoffs vary), that is, at every time step t , all individuals have a
fixed behavioral repertoire that consists of the set of actionsA = {1, . . . ,m}. The action taken
by individual i at time t is a random variable denoted by ai ,t , and the action profile in the
population at time t is at = (a1,t , . . . ,aN ,t ). This process generates a sequence of action profiles
{at }Tt=1. The payoff to individual i at time t when it takes action ai ,t and the game is in state!t
is denoted ⇡i (ai ,t ,a i ,t ,!t ), where a i ,t = (a1,t , . . . ,ai 1,t ,ai+1,t , . . . ,aN ,t ) is the action profile
of the remaining individuals in the population (all individuals except i ). Note that this setting
covers the case of an individual decision problem (e.g., a multi-armed bandit), where the payoff
⇡i (ai ,t ,!t ) of individual i is independent of the profile of actions a i ,t of the other members of
the population.
2.2.3 Learning process
We assume that individuals learn to choose their actions in the game but are unable to detect
the current state !t of the environment. Each individual is characterized by a genetically de-
termined learning rule, which prescribes how its current actions depend on its private history.
The learning rules we consider belong to the class of rules defined by the so-called experience-
weighted-attraction (EWA) learning model (Camerer and Ho, 1999; Camerer, 2003; Ho et al.,
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2007). The reason why we use EWA is that it encapsulates many standard learning rules and
translates well the natural assumption that animals have internal states, which are modified dur-
ing the interactions with their environment, and that internal states have a direct (but possibly
noisy) influence on action (Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2005). In EWA learning, the internal states
are attractions or “motivations” for actions, and the mapping from internal states (motivations)
to action choice is realized via a probabilistic choice rule.
Dynamics of motivations
We first describe the dynamics of motivations. To each available action a of its action setA ,
individual i has an associated motivation Mi ,t (a) at time t that is updated according to
Mi ,t+1(a) =
ni ,t
ni ,t+1
 i ,t Mi ,t (a)+
1
ni ,t+1
{ i + (1  i ) (a,ai ,t )}⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ), (2.1)
where
ni ,t+1 = 1+⇢i ni ,t . (2.2)
is individual i ’s count of the number of steps of play. The initial conditions of eq. 2.1 and eq. 2.2
are the values of the state variables at the first period of play (t = 1); that is, Mi ,1(a) and ni ,1.
The updating rule of motivations (eq. 2.1) is a weighted average between the previous motiva-
tion to action a,Mi ,t (a), and a reinforcement to that action, { i+(1  i ) (a,ai ,t )}⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ),
which itself depends on the payoff ⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ) that would obtain if action a was played at t .
Eq. 2.1 is equivalent to eq. 2.2 of Camerer and Ho (1999) with the only difference that the payoff
depends here on the current state of the environment, !t , so that individuals face a stochastic
game.
The first term in eq. 2.1 weights the previous motivation by two factors:  i ,t , a positive
dynamic memory parameter that indicates how well individual i remembers the previous moti-
vation; and the experience weight ni ,t/ni ,t+1, which is the ratio between the previous experience
count to the new one. Eq. 2.2 shows that the experience count is updated according to another
memory parameter, ⇢i 2 [0,1]. If ⇢i = 1, the individual counts the number of interactions
objectively, i.e., ni ,t = t (if ni ,1 = 1), otherwise subjectively.
The reinforcement term to action a in eq. 2.1 is weighted by 1/ni ,t+1 and depends on  i ,
which varies between 0 and 1. This captures the ability of an individual to observe (or mentally
simulate) non-realized payoffs, while (a,ai ,t ) is the action indicator function of individual i ,
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given by
(a,ai ,t ) =
8<:1, if ai ,t = a,
0, otherwise.
(2.3)
With these definitions, we can see that depending on the value of  i , an individual can reinforce
an unchosen action according to the payoff that action would have yielded had it been taken.
Indeed, when individual i does not take action a at time t [ (a,ai ,t ) = 0], the numerator of
the second term is  i⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ). If  i = 0, this cancels out and the payoff associated to
the unchosen action a has no effect on the update of motivational states. But if  i = 1, the
numerator of the second term is ⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ), and the motivation is updated according to the
payoff individual i would have obtained by taking action a. All values of  i between 0 and 1
allow to reinforce unchosen actions according to their potential payoff.
On the other hand, if action a is played at time t ; namely, (a,ai ,t ) = 1, the numerator of
the second term reduces to the realized payoff ⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ), irrespective of the value of  i .
Hence,  i plays a role only for updating motivations of unchosen actions, which occurs when
individuals are belief-based or Bayesian learners as will be detailed below, after we have explained
how the actions themselves are taken by an individual.
Action play probabilities
The translation of internal states (motivations) into action choice can take many forms. But
it is natural to assume that the probability pi ,t (a) = Pr{ai ,t = a} that individual i takes action a
at time t is independent of other individuals and takes the ratio form
pi ,t (a) =
f (Mi ,t (a))P
k2A f (Mi ,t (k))
, (2.4)
where f (·) is a continuous and increasing function of its argument (this ratio form could also be
justified by appealing to the choice axiom of Luce, 1959, p. 6).
The choice rule (eq. 2.4) entails that the action that has maximal motivation at time t is
chosen with the greatest probability. This is different from choosing deterministically the action
that has the highest motivation. Indeed, this type of choice function allows one to model errors
or exploration in the decision process of the animal (an action with a low motivation has still a
probability of being chosen).
Errors can be formally implemented by imposing that
pi ,t (a) = P{a = argmaxb2A [Mi ,t (b )+ "(b )]} (2.5)
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where ("(b ))b2A are small perturbations that are independently and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) among choices. The idea is here to first perturb motivations by adding a small random
vector " of errors and then choose the action that has the biggest motivation. The probabil-
ity that action a has maximal perturbed motivation defines the probability pi ,t (a) with which
action a will be chosen.
The maximizing assumption in eq. 2.5 restricts the possibilities for the form taken by f . In
fact, the only function satisfying at the same time both eqs. 2.4-2.5 is f (M ) = exp( iM ) for 0<
 i <1 depending on the distribution of perturbations (Sandholm, 2011, Chap. 6). Replacing
this expression for f in eq. 2.4, we obtain that an organism chooses its actions according to the
so-called logit choice function
pi ,t (a) =
exp[ iMi ,t (a)]P
k exp[ iMi ,t (k)]
, (2.6)
which is in standard use across disciplines (Luce, 1959; Anderson et al., 1992; McKelvey and
Palfrey, 1995; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Sutton and Barto, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999;
Achbany et al., 2006; Ho et al., 2007; Arbilly et al., 2010, 2011b).
The parameter  i can be seen as individual i ’s sensitivity to motivations, errors in decision-
making, or as a proneness to explore actions that have not been expressed so far. Depending on
the value of  i , we can obtain almost deterministic action choice or a uniform distribution over
actions. If  i goes to zero, action a is chosen with probability pi ,t (a)! 1/m (where m is the
number of available actions). In this case, choice is random and individual i is a pure explorer. If,
on the other hand,  i becomes very large ( i !1), then the action a⇤ = argmaxb2A [Mi ,t (b )]
with the highest motivation is chosen almost deterministically, pi ,t (a⇤) ! 1. In this case, in-
dividual i does not explore, it only exploits actions that led to high payoff. For intermediate
values of  i , individual i trades off exploration and exploitation.
Learning rules in the EWA genotype space
In the EWA model, individuals differ by the value of the four parameters  i ,t ,⇢i , i , i and
the initial values of the state variables, Mi ,1(a) and ni ,1. These can be thought of as the geno-
typic values of individual i , and particular choice of these parameters provide particular learn-
ing rules. In Table 2.1, we retrieve from the model (eq. 2.1) some standard learning rules, which
are special cases of the genotype space. The Linear Operator rule (Bush and Mostelller, 1951;
Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; McNamara and Houston, 1987; Bernstein et al., 1988; Stephens and
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Clements, 1998; Hamblin and Giraldeau, 2009), Relative Payoff Sum (Harley, 1981; Houston,
1983; Houston and Sumida, 1987; Tracy and Seaman, 1995), Cournot Adjustment (Cournot,
1838), and Fictitious Play (Brown, 1951; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Hofbauer and Sandholm,
2002; Hopkins, 2002) all can be expressed as special cases of EWA.
One of the strengths of EWA is that it encompasses at the same time both reinforcement
learning (like the linear operator or relative payoff sum) and belief-based learning (like fictitious
play) despite the fact that these two types of learning rules are usually thought of as cognitively
very different (Erev and Roth, 1998; Hopkins, 2002; van der Horst et al., 2010). Reinforcement
learning is the simplest translation of the idea that actions associated to high rewards are more
often repeated, while belief-based learning relies on updating beliefs (probability distributions)
over the actions of other players and/or the state of the environment, which occurs in Bayesian
learning. In the EWAmodel, belief-based learning is made possible thanks to the ability to imag-
ine outcomes of unchosen actions (Emery and Clayton, 2004); this is captured by the parameter
 i , which is the key to differentiate reinforcement from belief-based learning models.
Belief-based learning is captured in the EWA model since motivations can represent the ex-
pected payoff of action over the distribution of beliefs of the actions of other players (Camerer
and Ho, 1999), and the logit choice function further allows an individual to best respond to
the actions of others. It then turns out that the Smooth Fictitious Play (FP) rule (Table 2.1) is
equivalent to Bayesian learning for initial priors over the actions of others (stage game t = 1)
that follow a Dirichlet distribution (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998, p. 48–49).
In EWA, the learning dynamics of an individual (eqs. 2.1–2.4) is a complex discrete time
stochastic process because action choice is probabilistic and it depends on the (random) actions
played by other individuals in the population, and on the random variable !t . In Fig. 2.1,
we show a simulation of a typical learning dynamics of two interacting individuals who learn
according to the EWA model (eqs. 2.1–2.4) in a repeated Hawk-Dove game, and with actions
play probabilities following the logit choice rule (eq. 2.6). Is it possible to approximate this
dynamics in order to obtain a qualitative understanding of the change of play probabilities?
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Figure 2.1: Example of learning dynamics for two interacting individuals (1 and 2) in a 2⇥2 Hawk-Dove
game with ⇡(1,1) = B/2, ⇡(1,2) = 0, ⇡(2,1) = B , ⇡(2,2) = B/2  C , where B = 5 and C = 3. The
blue line represents the probability p1,t to play Dove for individual 1 and the red line the probability p2,t
to play Dove for individual 2 when the learning rule is characterized by  i ,t = 1+ 1/t , ⇢i = 1,  i = 1,
ni ,1 = 1 for both players (rule called Pure Reinforcement Learning, PRL in Table 2.1). Parameters values
for player 1 are  1 = 0, M1,1(Dove) = 1, and M1,1(Hawk) = 0 (hence p1,1 ⇡ 0.73), while for player 2 they
are  2 = 0, M2,1(Dove) = 0, and M2,1(Hawk) = 1 (hence p2,1 ⇡ 0.27).
2.2.4 Stochastic approximation
Differential equations for motivations
We now use stochastic approximation theory (Ljung, 1977; Benveniste et al., 1991; Benaim,
1999; Kushner and Yin, 2003) in order to derive a system of differential equations (ODE) for the
motivations and choice probabilities, which produces qualitative and quantitative results about
learning dynamics.
The idea behind stochastic approximation is to write eq. 2.1 under the form of a difference
equation with decreasing step-size, which then allows one to compute the expected change of the
dynamics over one time step. These expected dynamics give rise to differential equations, which
describes very closely the long-run stochastic dynamics of the motivations (see Benaim, 1999,
for a standard reference, and Hopkins, 2002, for an application of this principle to learning). To
that aim, we write eq. 2.1 as
Mi ,t+1(a) Mi ,t (a) =
1
ni ,t+1
h
 ✏i ,t Mi ,t (a)+Ri (a,ai ,t ,a i ,t ,!t )
i
. (2.7)
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where
✏i ,t = 1+ ni ,t (⇢i   i ,t ) (2.8)
is a decay rate and
Ri (a,ai ,t ,a i ,t ,!t ) =
î
 i + (1  i ) (a,ai ,t )
ó
⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ) (2.9)
can be interpreted as the net reinforcement of the motivation of action a.
In order to use stochastic approximation theory, we need that the step-size of the process
satisfies
P1
t=1(1/ni ,t ) =1 and limt!1(1/ni ,t ) = 0 (Benaim, 1999, p. 11), where the first con-
dition entails that the steps are large enough to eventually overcome initial conditions, while
the second condition entails that the steps eventually become small enough so that the process
converges. This is ensured here by setting ⇢ = 1 in eq. 2.2. We further assume a constant value
of ✏i from now on (this is the case for all rules in Table 2.1, but a slowly varying ✏i ,t is still
amenable to an analysis via stochastic approximation). Note however that the assumption that
⇢ = 1 reduce to some extent the number of learning rules that one can analyze in the EWA
model, but the approximation can still be useful for small constant step-sizes, for instance if one
considers a Linear Operator Rule (Table 2.1) with  i close to 1 (see Benaim and Hirsch, 1999b;
Izquierdo et al., 2007, for results on processes with constant step-sizes).
With these assumptions, we show in Appendix A.1 (eqs. A.1–A.12) that the differential equa-
tion arising from taking the expected motion of the stochastic dynamics in eq. 2.7 is
M˙i (a) = ✏iMi (a)+ R¯i (a), (2.10)
where
R¯i (a) = [pi (a)+ i (1  pi (a))]
X
a i2A N 1
p i (a i )⇡¯i (a,a i ) (2.11)
and
⇡¯i (a,a i ) =
X
!2⌦
µ(!)⇡i (a,a i ,!). (2.12)
Here, a dot accent is used to denote a derivative, i.e., dx/dt = x˙, R¯i (a) is the expected reinforce-
ment to the motivation of action a of individual i over the distribution of action probabilities
in the population (whereA N 1 is the set of action profiles of individuals different than i ), and
⇡¯i (a,a i ) is the average payoff over the distribution of environmental states. Because the action
play probabilities of the focal individual, pi (a), and the remaining individuals in the population
p i (a i ) =
Q
i 6= j p j (aj )(eq. A.2), depend on the motivations, eq. 2.10 is a differential of the form
2.2. MODEL 21
M˙i (a) = Fi (M), for all actions a and individual i in the population, whereM denotes the vector
collecting the motivations of all actions and individuals in the population. Hence, eqs. 2.10–2.12
define a bona fide autonomous system of differential equations.
Eq. 2.11 shows that the deterministic approximation rests on the “average game” with payoffs
given by ⇡¯i (a,a i ), i.e., a game where each payoff matrix entry (eq. 2.12) is a weighted average of
the corresponding entries of the stage games over the distribution of environmental states µ(!).
Hence, if one wants to consider a situation where the stage game fluctuates, one does not need
to specify a series of stage games, but only the average game resulting from taking the weighted
average of the payoffs of the original stage games.
Differential equations for action play probabilities
Using the logit choice rule (eq. 2.6) and the dynamics of motivations (eq. 2.10), we can derive
a differential equation for the choice probability for each action a of individual i
p˙i (a) = pi (a)
24✏i X
k2A
log
Ç
pi (k)
pi (a)
å
pi (k)+ i
 
R¯i (a) 
X
k2A
R¯i (k)pi (k)
!35 , (2.13)
(Appendix A.1, eqs. A.13–A.20). Because R¯i (a) depends on the action play probabilities, eq. 2.13
also defines a bona fide autonomous system of differential equations, but this time directly for
the dynamics of action. The first term in brackets in eq. 2.13 describes a perturbation to the
choice probability. This represents the exploration of action by individual i (it is an analogue
of mutation in evolutionary biology), and brings the dynamics back into the interior of the
state space if it gets too close to the boundary. The second term in the brackets takes the same
form as the replicator equation (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Tuyls et al., 2003); that is, if the
expected reinforcement, R¯i (a), to action a is higher than the average expected reinforcement,P
k R¯i (k)pi (k), then the probability of expressing action a increases.
Eq. 2.13 is the “final” point of the stochastic approximation applied to our model. We now
have a system of differential equations [of dimensionN⇥(m 1)], which describes the ontogeny
of behavior of the individuals in the population. Standard results from stochastic approximation
theory guarantee that the original stochastic dynamics (eqs. 2.1–2.4) asymptotically follows very
closely the deterministic path of the differential equation 2.13. For instance, if the limit set of
eq. 2.13 consists of isolated equilibria, the stochastic process (eqs. 2.1–2.4) will converge to one
of these equilibria almost surely (Benaim, 1999; Borkar, 2008).
More generally, the differential equations for the action probabilities are unlikely to depend
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only on the probabilities as is the case in eq. 2.13. For instance, when the choice rule is the
so-called power choice, i.e., f (M ) =M  i in eq. 2.4, which gives rise to
p˙i (a) =
⇥
 i pi (a)/Mi (a)
⇤24R¯i (a) X
k2A
R¯i (k)pi (k){pi (a)/pi (k)}1/ i
35 ,
(eq. A.22), the dynamics of actions will also depend on the dynamics of motivations. This is one
of the reasons why the logit choice rule is appealing; namely, it yields simplifications allowing
one to track only the dynamics of choice probabilities (eq. 2.13).
2.3 Applications
2.3.1 Pure reinforcement vs. Payoff-Informed Learning
We now apply our main result (eq. 2.13) to a situation where two individuals (N = 2) are
interacting repeatedly and can express only two actions during the stage game, action 1 and
2. In this case, only three generic symmetric stage games are possible; namely a game with a
dominant strategy (e.g., a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, PD), a game with two pure asymmetric
Nash Equilibria (e.g., a Hawk-Dove game, HD), and a game with two pure symmetric NE (e.g.,
a Coordination Game, CG) so that the set of games can be taken to be ⌦ = {PD,CG,HD}
(Weibull, 1997, Chap. 1). We callR! the payoff obtained when the game is! and both players
play action 1 (see Table 2.2 for the description of the payoffs for each game !), so that the
average payoff obtained when both players play action 1 is R = µ(PD)RPD +µ(CG)RCG +
µ(HD)RHD. Likewise, one can evaluate the payoffs S , T , and P of the average game, when,
respectively, player 1 plays action 1 and player 2 plays action 2, player 1 plays action 2 and player
2 plays action 1, and both players play action 2 (Table 2.2).
We assume that individuals playing this stochastic game use the learning rules characterized
by
 i ,t = 1+
1
t
and ⇢i = 1 (2.14)
so that when  i = 0 we obtain a form of reinforcement learning, which we call Pure Rein-
forcement Learning (PRL: see Table 2.1) because motivations are updated only according to
realized payoffs and there is no discounting of the past. When  i = 1 we obtain a rule we call
Payoff-Informed Learning (IL: see Table 2.1) since in that case an individual updates motiva-
tions according not only to realized but also to imagined payoffs. The individual has here all
information about possible payoffs at each decision step t , hence the name of the learning rule.
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Substituting eqs. 2.14 into eq. 2.8 gives ✏i ,t = 0 (since nt = t ) and thus ✏i = 0 in eq. 2.13.
Letting p1 = p1(1) be the probability that individual 1 plays action 1 and p2 = p2(1) be the
probability that individual 2 plays action 1, we then obtain from eq. 2.8, the above assumptions,
and Table 2, that the action play probabilities satisfy the dynamics
p˙1 = p1(1  p1) 1[{p2R + (1  p2)S }{p1+ 1(1  p1)}
  {p2T + (1  p2)P }{ 1 p1+ (1  p1)}], (2.15)
p˙2 = p2(1  p2) 2[{p1R + (1  p1)S }{p2+ 2(1  p2)}
  {p1T + (1  p1)P }{ 2 p2+ (1  p2)}]. (2.16)
In order to compare the dynamics predicted by eqs. 2.15–2.16 to that obtained from iterating
eq. 2.1 with logit choice function (eq. 2.6; agent-based simulations), we assume that the average
game is a Hawk-Dove game (Maynard-Smith and Price, 1973; Maynard-Smith, 1982). Hence,
action 1 can be thought as “Dove” and action 2 as “Hawk”. We now focus on two specific
interactions in this Hawk-Dove game: PRL vs. PRL, and PRL vs. IL, and in order to carry out
the numerical analysis, we also assume that the probability µ(!) that game ! obtains in any
period obeys an uniform distribution, which gives µ(PD) =µ(CG) =µ(HD) = 1/3.
PRL vs. PRL
When two PRL play against each other (eqs. 2.15–2.16 with  i = 0 for both players) in the
average Hawk-Dove game, we find that the deterministic dynamic admits three locally stable
equilibria (Fig. 2.2A): the two pure asymmetric Nash equilibria, (Dove, Hawk) and (Hawk,
Dove), and the Pareto efficient outcome where both individuals play Dove (Appendix A.2).
Which outcome is reached by the differential equations depends on the initial conditions, and
we characterized a region of the state space of initial conditions that always lead to the (Dove,
Dove) equilibrium (the gray region in Fig. 2.2A).
In Fig. 2.3, we compare the deterministic model to the original stochastic learning dynamics
by graphing the distance between the probability of playingDove obtained from the equilibrium
of eqs. 2.15–2.16 to that obtained from eq. 2.6 under agent-based simulations for various values
of the duration of the game, T . The correspondence between the two processes is affected by
the sensitivity to payoff,  , and the initial difference in motivations to a player between playing
Dove and Hawk:  Mi ,1 = Mi ,1(1) Mi ,1(2). If this difference is positive ( Mi ,1 > 0), player i is
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Figure 2.2: Solution orbits for the deterministic dynamics (panels A and B) and sample paths for the
stochastic dynamics (panels C and D) for two learners in the average Hawk-Dove game (B = 5 andC = 3),
where the x and y axis represent the probabilities of playingDove by player 1 and 2, respectively. In panels
A and C players 1 and 2 both use the PRL rule, while in panels B and D player 1 uses PRL and player 2
uses IL. The gray shaded area in A represents the initial conditions for which all trajectories go to the (1,1)
equilibrium (Dove, Dove). In panels A and B a white-filled dot denotes an unstable node (both associated
eigenvalues are positive), a gray-filled dot is a saddle, and a black dot is a locally stable equilibrium. For the
stochastic trajectories (C, D), each color designates a given simulation run (with  i = 0.5 for both players
and T = 2000) describing a sample path ending in a different equilibrium predicted by the deterministic
dynamics. We started all simulations runs from the center of the state space (i.e., p1 = p2 = 1/2 and
 M1,1 =  M2,1 = 0), and each point denotes an interactions round, t . We observe that points are far
from each other at the beginning of a simulation run but accumulate near a stable equilibrium at the end
of a simulation run. This is because the stochastic shocks are large at the beginning (when the step-size is
big), but are smaller as the step-size decreases.
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Table 2.2: Payoff matrices for the average Hawk-Dove game and the three associated sub-games. In each
matrix, the rows correspond to the actions of player 1 (first row gives action 1, while second row gives
action 2) and the columns correspond to the actions of player 2 (first column gives action 1, while second
column gives action 2). Payoffs are to row player (player 1). The matrix at the top shows the payoffs in
the average Hawk-Dove Game (denoted G¯), and the three matrices below contain the payoffs of the sub-
games! (PD, HD, and CG). In the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Left), we assume TPD >RPD >PPD >SPD and
(TPD +SPD)/2 <RPD. In the Hawk-Dove (Middle), we have THD >RHD,SHD > PHD,PHD >RHD.
In the Coordination Game (Right),RCG >SCG,RCG =PCG,SCG = TCG.
G¯ Dove Hawk
Dove R = B/2 S = 0
Hawk T = B P = B/2 C
PD Cooperate Defect
Cooperate RPD SPD
Defect TPD PPD
HD Dove Hawk
Dove RHD SHD
Hawk THD PHD
CG Left Right
Left RCG SCG
Right TCG PCG
more likely to play Dove initially since pi ,1 > 0.5, while the player is more likely to play Hawk
if the difference is negative ( Mi ,1 < 0, which entails pi ,1 < 0.5).
We observe that when   is very small, the probability of playing an action in the stochastic
dynamics remains far from the equilibrium predicted by the deterministic dynamics even if T is
large. But when  i becomes larger, the match between simulation and approximation becomes
very good even for moderate T , unless the difference in initial motivations between actions is
close to zero ( Mi ,1 = 0). In this case, the initial probability of choosing actions is about 1/2 for
both players and one cannot predict which equilibrium is reached in the deterministic dynamics
because the stochastic dynamics may go to any of the three locally stable equilibria (Fig. 2.2C).
These features were generally observed when the initial motivations of the players in the stochas-
tic simulations concord with the predicted equilibrium; namely, if the motivations entail initial
play probabilities that are closer to the equilibrium than random choice of actions (e.g., if play-
ing Dove is an equilibrium, then we say that pi ,1 > 0.5 concords with the equilibrium).
When the initial motivations of an individual do not concord with an equilibrium, it has to
revert his initial preferences. This may for instance be the case when the initial play probabilities
of both player favor the equilibrium (Hawk, Hawk), so that Mi ,1(1) < Mi ,1(2), which entails
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pi ,1 < 0.5. But (Hawk, Hawk) is an unstable equilibrium for the deterministic dynamics, and we
know that reinforcement learners cannot learn a behavior that yields a strictly negative payoff
as is the case when the equilibrium (Hawk, Hawk) is played. This means that at least one of
the players will have to revert its initial preferences in order to reach one of the three stable
outcomes, (Dove, Dove), (Hawk, Dove) or (Dove, Hawk).
If preferences need to be reversed and one further has a large   value, the initial play proba-
bility of Dove is close to 0 pi ,1(1) ⇡ 0, which is very close to the lower-left corner of the state
space in Fig. 2.2A. Preference reversal may then take a very long time, and Fig. 2.4 shows that
the time t ⇤ of such a reversal to occur is an increasing function of the magnitude of Mi ,1. Con-
sequently, while the value of T did not have an important influence on the correspondence be-
tween deterministic and stochastic dynamics when the initial preferences were concordant with
the predicted equilibrium and   is not too small (Fig. 2.3), T becomes very important when this
is not the case. In effect, when preferences need to be reversed under small T and large  Mi ,1
and  , one can predict that the difference in play probability observed under the deterministic
and stochastic dynamics will be important (as in the lightly shaded regions in Fig. 2.3).
PRL vs. IL
When a PRL plays against an IL (eqs. 2.15–2.16 with  1 = 0 for PRL and  2 = 1 for IL), we
find that asymptotically both players will learn one of the two pure asymmetric Nash equilibria,
(Hawk, Dove) and (Dove, Hawk), of the average game, depending on the initial preferences of
the players (Appendix A.2, eq. A.24).
As was the case for PRL vs. PRL, the match between deterministic model and stochastic
simulation for finite time depends on  i and  Mi ,1 (Fig. 2.3B,D,F). However, in this case the
region around  Mi ,1 = 0, where the analysis gives poor predictions of the real behavior seems
larger. Otherwise, the same caveat that we observed for PRL vs. PRL also apply to PRL vs. IL.
In summary, we observed that the deterministic dynamics (eqs. 2.15–2.16) generally approxi-
mates qualitatively well the quasi-equilibrium probabilities of playing action obtained under the
stochastic learning processes (eqs. 2.1–2.4), but there are extreme cases which are not captured by
the deterministic approximations. These are the cases where   and Mi ,1 are very small (actions
are random) or   and  Mi ,1 are too big (the dynamics get stuck in suboptimal equilibria). In
particular, when Mi ,1 is too big, the time t for which the stochastic learning process gets close
to the deterministic approximation becomes very large (Fig. 2.4). Now that we have a feeling
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Figure 2.3: Density plot of the average distance between the probability of playing Dove obtained from
the equilibrium of the deterministic model (eq. 2.15–2.16) and the stochastic learning dynamics, as a
function of  i and  Mi ,1. Each data pixel is the average over 5 simulation runs. Lightly shaded regions
indicates a big euclidean distance (⇠p2) between simulations and analytic prediction, while dark regions
indicates a small distance (⇠ 0). We have  1 =  2, but motivations are set to opposed values in both
individuals:  M1,1 =   M2,1. Parameters of the average Hawk-Dove game are B = 5 and C = 3. (A)
PRL vs. PRL and T = 100. (B) PRL vs. IL and T = 100. (C) PRL vs. PRL and T = 500. (D) PRL vs. IL
and T = 500. (E) PRL vs. PRL and T = 1000. (F) PRL vs. IL and T = 1000.
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about the conditions under which the stochastic approximation can be applied, we turn to the
analysis of an evolutionary model of the competition between two different learning rules.
2.3.2 Coevolution of learning and scrounging
Arbilly et al. (2010) explored using agent-based simulations an evolutionary model of forag-
ing where individuals learn to find patches with high quality food. These producers can then
be followed by scroungers with which they compete over resources found in the patches. In
the same spirit as Arbilly et al. (2010), we analyze here a model for the coevolution between
learning and scrounging. Our aim, however, is not to reproduce the results of this earlier model.
Rather, it is to analyze a simplified model that is amenable to an illustrative application of the
stochastic approximation method in a context where there are two time scales: behavioral and
generational.
Biological setting
We consider a population of very large size (say N ! 1), whose members are facing the
problem of foraging in an environment consisting of two patch types, labeled 1 and 2. The
resource value to an individual foraging in a patch of type a is written V (a) (a = 1,2) and we
assume that V (1) > V (2)   0. In such an environment, learning is necessary if the location of
the optimal patch type changes from one generation to the next.
At each decision step t (1  t < T ) during its lifetime, a learner has to make a choice on
whether to forage on patch type 1 or 2 so that the two available actions to a learner are feeding
on patch 1 or 2 and its action set can be written {1,2}. The payoff from feeding on a given
patch depends on the number of other individuals on that patch. We assume that there can be
no more than two individuals on a patch, so the payoff, ⇡i (ai ,t ,a i ,t ) to individual i taking
action ai ,t 2 {1,2} at time t is either V (ai ,t ) or V (ai ,t )/2, where a i ,t is the random indicator
variable representing the presence of another individual on the patch of individual i at time
t . If individual i is alone on the patch (which we write a i ,t = 0), it gets the whole resource:
⇡i (ai ,t , 0) = V (ai ,t ). If there is another individual on the patch (which we write a i ,t = 1),
individual i shares the value with him so its payoff is ⇡i (ai ,t , 1) =V (ai ,t )/2.
We assume that there are three types of individuals in this population: Scroungers (S), Ficti-
tious Players (FP), and Exploratory Reinforcement Learners (ERL, see Table 2.1), where both
learners (ERL and FP) are exploratory (✏ = 1 in eq. 2.13). The life-cycle of these individuals is
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A
Figure 2.4: Preference reversal for two PRL playing the average Hawk-Dove game with same initial pref-
erences for Hawk ( Mi ,1 < 0) and a high sensitivity to motivations ( i = 1000). In panel A, we graph
the first time t ⇤ that a preference reversal occurs (i.e., first time that  Mi ,t ⇤ > 0 for at least one of the
players) as a function of the magnitude of Mi ,1. Each point in A is the average over 100 simulation runs.
In panel B, we graph the motivations for individual 1 to play Hawk (brown line) and Dove (green line)
when  M1,1 =  3 (M1,1(Dove) = 0, M1,1(Hawk) = 3). The individual has a larger but decreasing moti-
vation for playing Hawk for approximately 2000 rounds, where the motivations reverse to favor Dove.
In panel C, we have the corresponding motivations for individual 2 with same parameter values, and this
shows that the motivation for Hawk first decreases (same trend as individual 1), but then increases again
when its opponent has reversed his preferences. In panel D, we have the Dove action play probabilities
for individual 1 (blue line) and 2 (red line).
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as described above (section 2.2.1). Note that PRL and IL in the Hawk-Dove game model were
characterized by ✏= 0 (no explicit exploration). Here, FP and ERL can be thought respectively
as an extension of PRL and IL to the case of exploratory learning, because the only difference
between the rules of the previous Hawk-Dove model (IL and PRL) and the ones in this foraging
model (FP and ERL) is the value of ✏, which determines the presence of explicit exploration
(see Table 2.1 for a comparison of these rules). Scroungers do not learn but only follow learners
(ERL and FP) and we now describe the learning dynamics of these two types. For simplicity, we
do not consider innates (e.g., Feldman et al., 1996; Wakano et al., 2004) as these are likely to be
replaced by learners if the latter visit patch type 1 with a probability larger than that obtained
by encountering patches at random, and learning is not too costly.
Fictitious Play
Substituting ✏= 1 into eq. 2.13, and letting pF = pF(1) be the probability that an individual
of type FP visits patch 1, we obtain that the learning dynamics of FP obeys the differential
equation
p˙F = pF
ñ
log
Ç
1  pF
pF
å
(1  pF)+ F
Ä
R¯F(1) 
î
R¯F(1)pF+ R¯F(2)(1  pF)
óäô
. (2.17)
For this model of patch choice, the expected reinforcement to an FP (eq. 2.11) when foraging
on patch type a is
R¯F(a) = (1  s )V (a)+ s
V (a)
2
=
Å
1  s
2
ã
V (a), a = 1,2, (2.18)
where s denotes the frequency of scroungers in the population. Setting p˙F = 0 one obtains the
probability of visiting patch 1 at steady state of learning as
pˆF =
1
1+ exp
⇣
 F[2 s][V (2) V (1)]
2
⌘ . (2.19)
Fig. 2.5A shows that the agreement between predicted equilibrium and that obtained in
agent-based simulations is outstanding even if T is not too large, which stems from the fact
that the dynamics has a single equilibrium.
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Figure 2.5: Panel A: equilibrium probability pˆF of visiting patch 1 for a FP (eq. 2.19) graphed as a
function of the value of patch 1,V (1), for different values of  i . We fixed the value of patch 2 atV (2) = 5,
the frequency of scroungers to s =
Ä
3 p5ä/2 and  1 = 0.03 for the blue line,  1 = 0.15 for the red
line, and  1 = 0.3 for the green line. Dots of corresponding colors were obtained from simulations of
the original stochastic learning dynamics after T = 1000 decision steps in the environment. Panel B:
equilibrium probability pˆE of visiting patch 1 for a ERL (obtained by solving for the equilibrium of
eqs. 2.20–2.21) graphed for the same parameter values as in panel A. Triangles of corresponding colors
give the average over 1000 runs of stochastic simulations with different initial conditions (pE,1) ranging
from 0 to 1.
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Exploratory Reinforcement Learning
For exploratory reinforcement learning, substituting ✏ = 1 into eq. 2.13, we obtain that the
probability that an ERL visits patch 1 obeys
p˙E = pE
ñ
log
Ç
1  pE
pE
å
(1  pE)+ E
Ä
R¯E(1) 
î
R¯E(1)pE+ R¯E(2)(1  pE)
óäô
, (2.20)
where the expected reinforcements (eq. 2.11) of going on patch types 1 and 2 are, respectively,
given by
R¯E(1) = pE
Å
1  s
2
ã
V (1),
R¯E(2) = (1  pE)
Å
1  s
2
ã
V (2). (2.21)
The equilibria of eq. 2.20 cannot be solved analytically (this is a transcendental equation in
pE). We thus relied on a numerical analysis to obtain its fixed points ( p˙E = 0) and focused on
the variation of  E values by performing a bifurcation analysis (with Newton’s method using
Mathematica, Wolfram Research, Inc., 2011). Fig. 2.6 shows that the phase line passes through
three different regimes as  E increases. These regimes are separated by two critical values of  E,
which we will call  crit1E and  
crit2
E , and provide the following cases.
(I) When 0<  E <  
crit1
E , the learning dynamics admit one stable interior equilibrium, which
is close to 0.5 when  E is close to 0 and increases as  E increases, until  E reaches  
crit1
E .
(II) When  crit1E <  E <  
crit2
E , there are three interior equilibria. The “completely interior”
equilibrium is unstable and the two other interior equilibria are stable. As  E increases,
the two stable equilibria get closer to 0 and 1 and finally collapse when  E approaches
 crit2E .
(III) When  E >  
crit2
E , there is only one interior equilibrium that is unstable. As  E gets bigger,
this equilibrium approachesV (2)/[V (1)+V (2)]. In this case, the learner visits only patch
1 when the initial condition is above this value, and visits only patch 0 when the initial
condition is below that value.
We also ran simulations of the original stochastic learning dynamics to test the robustness
of this numerical analysis and observed that simulations agree very well on average with our
numerical analysis based on the stochastic approximation results (Fig. 2.5B).
In the two cases where there are two stable equilibria (cases II and III), which equilibrium is
reached depends on the initial conditions of the system (the initial motivations). We postulate
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that the initial preference for the patch types is drawn at random from a uniform distribution
(Appendix A.3, eq. A.27), which allow us to obtain an expected equilibrium probability that an
ERL visits patch 1. When  E becomes large, this expectation is the average over visiting only
patch 1 or 2, which gives
pˆE =
V (1)
V (1)+V (2)
(2.22)
(Appendix A.3). This gives the matching law (Herrnstein, 1970), if one rescales V (1) and V (2)
between 0 and 1 so that they describe the probability to find food at all in the respective patches
rather than measuring the “value” of the patches.
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Figure 2.6: Bifurcation diagram for the differential equation 2.20 that describes the learning behavior
of ERL in the producer-scrounger model as a function of  E. The thin curves describe the equilibrium
values of pˆE and the the thick vertical lines are phase lines at the corresponding values of  E. Dots on the
phase lines denote interior equilibria. Our numerical exploration suggests that there are three possible
phase lines depending on the value of  E (indicated by I, II, and III). Parameter values: s =
Ä
3 p5ä/2,
V (1) = 5.3, V (2) = 5.
Payoff functions
In order to derive the fecundity (or payoff) functions of the three types (ERL, FP, and S),
we make the assumption that learners have reached the equilibrium behavior described in the
previous section ( pˆF given eq. 2.19 for FP and pˆE given by the expectation over the various
equilibria like in eq. 2.22). We further denote by q the frequency of FP, so that 1  q   s gives
34 CHAPTER 2. EVOLUTION OF LEARNING RULES
the frequency of ERL. With probability pˆi (i 2 {E,F}), a learner goes to patch 1, while with
probability 1  pˆi , it goes to patch 2. The fecundity (or payoff) of the two learners is then given
by
bF = ↵+ pˆF
✓2  s
2
◆
V (1)+ (1  pˆF)
✓2  s
2
◆
V (2)  k ,
bE = ↵+ pˆE
✓2  s
2
◆
V (1)+ (1  pˆE)
✓2  s
2
◆
V (2)  k , (2.23)
where k is the cost of individual learning and we assumed that all individuals have a baseline
reproductive output of ↵.
Because we assumed that only a single scrounger can follow a producer, the expected fre-
quency of interactions of a scrounger with a producer is proportional to (1   s )/s , and the
fecundity of a scrounger is assumed to be given by
bS = ↵+
1  s
s
ñ
q
1  s
Ç
pˆF
V (1)
2
+ (1  pˆF)
V (2)
2
å
+
1  q   s
1  s
Ç
pˆE
V (1)
2
+ (1  pˆE)
V (2)
2
åô
. (2.24)
This entails that scroungers have no preference for FP or ERL. They follow an FP with a prob-
ability q/(1  s ) and follow an ERL with the complementary probability (1  q   s )/(1  s ).
When a scrounger follows a learner of type i on patch a, the scrounger gets half of the value of
the patch, V (a)/2. This learner goes to patch 1 with a probability pˆi , or goes to patch 2 with
probability 1  pˆi , hence the expected payoff to a scrounger conditional on the event that it
follows a learner of type i is pˆi[V (1)/2]+ [1  pˆi][V (2)/2].
ESS analysis
With the above assumptions, the change in frequencies of the types after one generation is
given by
 q = q
Ä
bF  b¯
ä
/b¯
 s = s
Ä
bS  b¯
ä
/b¯ , (2.25)
where b¯ = qbF+ s bS+(1 q  s )bE is the mean reproductive output in the population. The evo-
lutionary dynamics (eq. 2.25 with eqs. 2.23–2.24) displays five stationary states, which we write
under the form (q⇤, s⇤, 1 q⇤ s⇤). There are the three trivial equilibria [(1,0,0),(0,1,0), (0,0,1)],
one equilibrium with a coexistence between FP and scroungers, ( 12
Äp
5  1ä , 12 Ä3 p5ä , 0),
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and one with a coexistence between ERL and scroungers at the same frequency as in the previ-
ous case: (0, 12
Ä
3 p5ä , 12 Äp5  1ä). Because the payoff to scroungers exceeds that of produc-
ers when they are in low frequency s ! 0 (for V (1) > 0 and/or V (2) > 0), the two equilibria
where there is a mix between scroungers and producers are stable in a reduced 2-strategy dynam-
ics (on the faces of the simplex). Hence, the three trivial equilibria are unstable. The question
then is which one of the two other equilibria obtains. Because the fecundity of each type of pro-
ducer does not depend on the other type and in the same way on the frequency of scroungers
(eq. 2.23), the mix between scroungers and FP is invaded by ERL if they produce more resources.
Namely, if the latter visit more often the optimal patch, which obtains if
pˆE > pˆF. (2.26)
This invasion condition is not necessarily satisfied when  E >  F, and in Fig. 2.7 we display
the regions of values of  F and  E where it is satisfied. These regions seem to alternate in a
non-trivial way. Interestingly, the region where ERL outcompetes FP looks fairly large for our
parameter values. When  E becomes very large, it is possible to have an exact invasion condition
by substituting eq. 2.19 and eq. 2.22 into eq. 2.27, which implies that ERL invades the stable mix
of FP and S if and only if
 F <
2 log
⇣
V (1)
V (2)
⌘
[V (1) V (2)]Ä1+p5ä/2. (2.27)
Summing up the above analysis, there is a globally stable state for the 3-strategy replicator
dynamics in this producer-scrounger model that is the mix between scroungers and the most
performant producer. In this unique evolutionarily stable state, producers are in frequencyÄp
5  1ä/2. Which of the producer type will be maintained in the population (FP or ERL)
critically depends on the exploration rate ( F and  E). It is noteworthy that it is not the learner
with the highest value of  i that will invade. The main reason for this is that increasing  E for
ERL does not always leads to a higher probability of visiting patch 1. When  E is relatively
small, this is actually true (in regime I of the learning dynamics of ERL, Fig. 2.6) but when  E
grows (regimes II and III), ERL suddenly becomes prone to absorption in a state where it visits
patch 2 with a probability greater than 0.5 ( pˆE < 0.5). This makes ERL less performant than
FP for high values of  i (the upper-right region in Fig. 2.7). Further, when  i is very small (the
lower-left region in Fig. 2.7), ERL seems to be less sensitive than FP to an increase in  i .
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Figure 2.7: Solution orbits of the evolutionary dynamics (eq. 2.25) in the producer-scrounger model on
the 3-strategy simplex as a function of  E and  F. In the light shaded region, ERL is the most performant
( pˆE > pˆF), while in the dark shaded region, FP is the most performant ( pˆF > pˆE). The simplex drawn
in the light region is plotted for pˆE > pˆF and hence verifies that the mix between ERL and scroungers
is the unique ESS. The simplex in the dark region corresponds to the case where the unique ESS is the
mix between FP and scroungers. At the corner labeled FP on the simplices, we have (q = 1, s = 0),
at the corner ERL we have (q = 0, s = 0) and at the corner S we have (q = 0, s = 1). A white-filled
dot denotes an unstable node, a gray-filled dot is a saddle, and the black dot corresponds to the unique
ESS. These simplices were produced using the Baryplot package (McElreath, 2010) for R (R Development
Core Team, 2011). Parameter values for the shading: s =
Ä
3 p5ä/2, V (1) = 5.3, V (2) = 5.
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2.4 Discussion
In this paper, we used stochastic approximation theory (Ljung, 1977; Benveniste et al., 1991;
Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Benaim, 1999; Kushner and Yin, 2003; Sandholm, 2011) in order
to analyze the learning of actions over the course of an individual’s lifespan in a situation of
repeated social interactions with environmentally induced fluctuating game payoffs. This setting
may represent different ecological scenarios and population structures, where interactions can
be represented as an iterated N -person game or a multi-armed bandit. The learning dynamics
was assumed to follow the experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning mechanism (Camerer
andHo, 1999; Ho et al., 2007). This is a motivational-based learning process, which encompasses
as special cases various learning rules used in biology such as the linear operator (McNamara
and Houston, 1987; Bernstein et al., 1988; Stephens and Clements, 1998), relative payoff sum
(Harley, 1981; Hamblin and Giraldeau, 2009) and Bayesian learning (Rodriguez-Gironés and
Vásquez, 1997; Geisler and Diehl, 2002).
When a behavioral process has a decreasing step-size (or a very small constant step-size),
stochastic approximation theory shows that the behavioral dynamics is asymptotically driven
by the expected motion of the original stochastic recursions. Stochastic approximation is thus
appealing because once the expected motion of the stochastic learning process is derived, one
is dealing with deterministic differential equations that are easier to analyze. Further, the dif-
ferential equations governing action play probabilities under the EWA model that we have ob-
tained (eq. 2.13) have a useful interpretation. They show that learning is driven by a balance
between two forces. First, the exploration of actions that tends to bring the dynamics out of
pure states, which is analogous to mutation in evolutionary biology. Second, the exploitation of
actions leading to higher expected reinforcement, which is analogous to selection in evolution-
ary biology. This second part actually takes the same qualitative form as the replicator equation
(eq. 2.13), since actions leading to an expected reinforcement higher than the average expected
reinforcement will have a tendency to be played with increased probability. Although it may be
felt in retrospect that this result is intuitive, it is not directly apparent in the original stochastic
recursions of the behavioral rule, which encompasses parameters tuning the levels of cognition
of individuals (eq. 2.1).
Our model is not the first where analogues of replicator dynamics appear out of an explicit
learning scheme (e.g., Börgers and Sarin, 1997; Hopkins, 2002; Tuyls et al., 2003; Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 2003). But, apart from Hopkins (2002), we are not aware of results that link the repli-
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cator dynamics to reinforcement learning and belief-based learning at the same time, which was
extended here to take fluctuating social environments into account. Although we considered
only individual learning without environmental detection in our formalization (i.e., individuals
learn the average game), the reinforcement of motivations could take social learning into account
(e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 1983; Schlag, 1998; Sandholm, 2011), and/or individuals may
detect changes in the environment so that the motivations themselves may depend on environ-
mental states (e.g., evaluate the dynamics of motivations Mt (a,!) for action-state pairs). The
consequences of incorporating these features for action ontogeny may be useful to analyze in
future research.
We applied our results to analyze the dynamics of action play probabilities in a situation
of repeated pairwise interactions in a 2 ⇥ 2 fluctuating game with average Hawk-Dove pay-
offs, where we investigated interactions between different learning rules, a situation that is very
rarely addressed analytically (but see Leslie and Collins, 2005; Fudenberg and Takahashi, 2011).
Comparison with stochastic simulations of the original learning dynamics indicate that the de-
terministic dynamics generally approximates qualitatively well the quasi-equilibrium of action
play probabilities obtained under the original stochastic process. Even if the theory can only
prove that the stochastic approximation of processes with decreasing step-sizes “works” when
time becomes very large (the differential equation are guaranteed to track the solutions of the
stochastic process only asymptotically, Benaim, 1999), our simulations suggest that stochastic
approximation can, under good circumstances, give fair predictions for finite-time behavior (in
our case, for T = 100, 500, and 1000), and also for the ontogeny of behavior (Fig. 2.8). This may
be useful in the context of animal behavior, when lifespan is short.
We also observed one limitation associated with using stochastic approximation in our ex-
amples. Namely, there are situations that are not captured by the deterministic approximation.
These involve the cases where the sensitivity to payoff ( ) and the difference between initial mo-
tivations ( Mi ,1) are very small so that actions are random, and the cases where   and Mi ,1 are
very big so that the dynamics get stuck in suboptimal equilibria. In particular, when  Mi ,1 is
very large, individuals may have to reverse their initial preferences and this makes very large the
time for which the stochastic learning process gets close to its asymptotic approximation.
Finally, we applied our results to analyze the evolutionary competition between learners
and scroungers in a producer-scrounger game, where we considered that learners are produc-
ers (who search and find good patches of food) and scroungers follow the producers. Three
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types were present in the population: individuals who learn according to Exploratory Rein-
forcement Learning, individuals who learn according to Stochastic Fictitious Play (Table 2.1),
and scroungers. This evolutionary model leads, at the ESS, to the co-existence of scrounger with
themost performant of the two learning rules. In particular, we showed that the exploration rate
( i ) influences which is the most performant producer, but the effect of  i is non-linear. This
shows that different learning rules are very differently affected by varying the exploration rate.
The exploration rate and the choice rule (eq. 2.4) thus makes part of the definition of a learning
rule, and  i may interact in a non-intuitive way with the other parameter of the process that
affect motivation updating.
While in this paper we analyzed certain learning rules with decreasing step-size, it remains
an open empirical question to document how common this type of learning rules are in nature.
It seems that previous work in animal psychology and behavioral ecology focused more on
rules with constant step-sizes (e.g., the linear operator, Bush and Mostelller, 1951; Rescorla and
Wagner, 1972; Hamblin and Giraldeau, 2009; Arbilly et al., 2010) because the step-size has here a
clear interpretation in terms of a discount factor (or learning rate) and takes into account known
phenomena such as habituation or forgetting. But it will be relevant to determine howwell rules
with decreasing step-size fit animal behavior. In particular, we suspect that such behavioral rules
could describe accurately learning processes where early experience is critical to shape general
behavior and where further information is used only to fine tune actions (e.g., developmental
processes) and where preference reversal becomes unlikely.
In summary, although we illustrated some shortcoming of applying stochastic approxima-
tion, we showed that it can be a useful approach to learn about learning dynamics and to avoid
“the behavioral gambit" (Fawcett et al., 2013; Lotem, 2013). But even if action play probabili-
ties can be approximated by differential equations, there are many aspects of the concomitant
dynamics that we did not analyze here, and that are likely to be relevant in the context of an-
imal learning. This opens paths to future work, which could for instance analyze rules with
constant step-size, produce finite-time predictions for play probabilities, evaluate the effect of
learning speed on payoff under different patterns of environmental fluctuations, or investigate
state-dependent motivations. Studying these aspects may be relevant to better understand learn-
ing dynamics and behavioral ontogeny.
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Figure 2.8: Comparison between the deterministic (thin, plain lines) and the stochastic (thick, dashed
lines) time dynamics of playing Dove for a PRL meeting an IL, and for different values of  i and  Mi ,1.
The blue line is for the PRL while the red line is for the IL. We always set opposed initial motivations to
the players ( M1,1 =   M2,1) and  1 =  2, while the parameters of the game are B = 5 and C = 3. (A)
 M1,1 = 1 and  i = 1. (B)  M1,1 = 10 1 and  i = 1. (C)  M1,1 = 1 and  i = 10 1. (D)  M1,1 = 10 1
and  i = 10. We simulated the process for T = 500 interactions and the time on the x-axis is measured
on the timescale of the interpolated stochastic process (the ⌧n in Benaim, 1999), which is used to plot the
numerical solution of the differential equations.
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Chapter3
Does selection favor the use of inferred
payoffs over reinforcement learning in
social interactions?
Abstract
Different species are able to learn to associate behaviors with rewards as this gives fitness advantages in
changing environments. However, social interactions might require more cognitive abilities than simple
reinforcement learning, in particular the capacity to infer the material payoff consequences of different
action combinations. It is unclear whether natural selection necessarily favors individuals that are able
to use inferred payoffs as opposed to simple reinforcement of realized payoff (using trial-and-error) when
social interactions occur between population members. Here we develop an evolutionary model where
individuals are genetically determined to use either reinforcement learning or inference-based learning,
and ask what is the evolutionarily stable rule in a situation of pairwise symmetric two actions stochas-
tic games played during lifespan. We analyze through stochastic approximation theory and simulations
the learning dynamics at the behavioral timescale, and derive conditions where reinforcement learning
outcompetes inference-based learning at the evolutionary timescale when repeated interactions occur be-
tween pairs of individuals. By contrast, we find that inference-based learners tend to be favored under
random interactions, but stable polymorphisms can also obtain where reinforcement learners are main-
tained at a low frequency. We conclude that specific game structures can select for trial-and-error even in
the absence of cost of cognition, which hints at none gradual fitness benefits of “complex” cognition.
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3.1 Introduction
Many species have a learning ability because this allows an individual to adapt, within its
lifespan, to the currently fitness-relevant features of its environment (e.g., by tracking the loca-
tion of food patches; Charnov, 1976; Mcnamara and Houston, 1985; Shettleworth et al., 1988).
Hence, learning is likely to provide a selective advantage (Johnston, 1982; Stephens, 1991; Mery
and Kawecki, 2002; Wakano et al., 2004; Dunlap and Stephens, 2009).
In terms of behavior, learning can be defined as the process of gathering information about
the biotic and abiotic environment and using it to choose actions. It is commonly accepted that
the simplest way of learning a behavior is through trial-and-error, which is also called instru-
mental or reinforcement learning (Thorndike, 1911; Bush and Mostelller, 1951). This consists
in trying different actions, experiencing the rewards associated to each action, and repeating
more often the actions yielding higher rewards (or, equivalently, avoiding actions that yield
negative payoffs, or punishments). For example, rats in the Skinner box learn that pressing a
lever is associated with obtaining food, and various instances of reinforcement learning in other
mammals, birds, fish, and insects have been demonstrated (Shettleworth, 2009; Dugatkin, 2010).
Although reinforcement learning is the main paradigm for describing the learning of actions
in animals (Dickinson, 1980; Shettleworth, 2009; Dugatkin, 2010), it cannot solve all decisions
problems. In effect, with this behavioral rule, an individual has to physically try (or experience)
an action to get the knowledge of the reward (or payoff) associated to it. Thus, an animal
who uses only reinforcement learning risks to spend all its time trying and exploring without
ever finding a good (rewarding) action. It also risks to face the dangers inherent to imprudent
explorations (e.g., to meet a predator). This problem of reinforcement learning in an uncertain
environment is often called the exploration-exploitation trade-off and has been investigated by
students of learning for a long time (Arnold, 1978; Mcnamara and Houston, 1985; Shettleworth
et al., 1988; Krebs et al., 1993; Sutton and Barto, 1998; Achbany et al., 2006).
Certain species circumvent the exploration-exploitation problem through cognitive abilities
allowing them to mentally simulate and reason about potential solutions to the ecological prob-
lems they are facing (Emery and Clayton, 2004; Taylor et al., 2012). Mental simulation, or
imagination, is the ability an organism has to represent in its own brain the outcome of a situ-
ation that is not physically present. With mental simulations, one can try solutions and infer
material consequences without spending energy and time, or taking the risk of getting caught by
a predator. Humans use imagination to plan courses of actions, or to better anticipate the behav-
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ior of others (theory of mind); chimpanzees are able of role taking behaviors, so that they can
find a solution to a problem in which another individual is involved (Premack and Woodruff,
1978); scrub jays display sophisticated food caching, where they hide food only if they are sure
that no other conspecific is observing, which implies that they expect that others can steal their
food (Emery and Clayton, 2001). According to Emery and Clayton (2004), the ability to men-
tally simulate outcomes of possible actions is one of the features that characterize species with
“complex cognition”, among which we find Corvids, Apes, and Humans.
The examples provided above all involve social interactions. While the usefulness of a learn-
ing ability in social interactions is well documented across species (Chalmeau, 1994; Hollis et al.,
1995; Villarreal andDomjan, 1998; Plotnik et al., 2011), some authors go even further by arguing
that the evolution of “complex” learning and cognition may have been a response to the emer-
gence of “complex” social interactions (Humphrey, 1976; Alexander, 1979; Gavrilets and Vose,
2006; see also the references in Emery and Clayton, 2009). This hypothesis is to take with care
(how should we define “complex” interaction and cognition? Shettleworth, 2009, Chap. 12), yet
there is an intriguing related and simpler question: is reinforcement learning sufficient to learn
in social interactions or will a learning rule based on payoff inference be necessarily favored by
natural selection?
Since inference would allow an individual to have a mental representation of the payoff con-
sequences of its own actions and that of its interacting partners, it may be felt that this ability
should necessarily have a selective advantage over simple reinforcement learning, since it can lead
to a better anticipation and response to opponents’ actions. However, this intuition has never
been given empirical or theoretical support as the effect of natural selection on cognition in a
social context is rarely addressed (for exceptions see Heller, 2004; Arbilly et al., 2010; Mohlin,
2012). Our aim in this paper is then to determine under what conditions does natural selection
favors inference-based learning versus trial-and-error in pairwise social interactions where the
social environment is itself changing.
We will consider two learning rules, the first of which is standard reinforcement learn-
ing (Thorndike, 1911; Bush and Mostelller, 1951; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Stephens and
Clements, 1998). The second rule we call inference-based learning and it allows an individual
to infer forgone payoffs given its actions and that of its partners, and it is related to the class of
belief-learning rules that have been extensively studied and is a special case of the experience-
weighted attraction learning mechanisms (Fudenberg and Levine, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999;
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Hopkins, 2002; Camerer, 2003). Inference-based learning allows an individual to infer from
realized actions, the payoffs consequences of alternative courses of actions to maximize new re-
wards accordingly. For instance, an inference based learner interacting with a cooperator in the
context of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game will infer the forgone payoffs of playing defect instead of
cooperate, and thus learn to play defect. Inference-based learning relies on imagination because
an individual must be able to compute the payoff of an action it did not explicitly try given
the belief. In other words, for a given action taken by an opponent, an inference-based learner
must be able to mentally represent what is his payoff for each action it can take. This poten-
tial payoff can be termed an hypothetical or inferred reinforcement, and it has been shown that
belief-based learning can be derived from amodel where individuals are able to compute inferred
reinforcements (Camerer and Ho, 1999; Ho et al., 2007).
The behavior of individuals learning according to reinforcement or inference-based learning
have been studied in isolation (i.e., either interactions between reinforcement learners only or
between inference-based learners only, Börgers and Sarin, 1997; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998;
Hopkins, 2002; Young, 2004) but, few studies have pitted these rules agains each other. A no-
table exception is Josephson (2008) who let compete belief-based with reinforcement learning
in an evolutionary model with different standard games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma or the
Coordination game, and found that belief-based learning almost always outcompete reinforce-
ment learning. Interestingly in Josephson’s work, reasonably often both rules did not lead to
fundamentally different behavior but the main difference was in the speed of learning: reinforce-
ment learners were slower than belief-based learners (see also Hopkins, 2002). Using a different
approach, Dridi and Lehmann (2013) found that the evolutionarily stable learning rule in the
context of a producer-scrounger game depended on the exploration tendency of the learners
and, surprisingly, it was not the rule that explored less that was the evolutionarily stable one,
even in a very simple task only requiring the identification of a best action among two options.
These contrasting results indicate that there is a need to better understand the environmental
and social conditions that favor inference-based over reinforcement learning, and where these
cognitive mechanisms can lead to different behavior.
Models studying the evolutionary competition between individual learning rules in social in-
teractions are rare (Harley, 1981; Josephson, 2008; Hamblin and Giraldeau, 2009; Arbilly et al.,
2010), and often do not consider the evolution of the learning rules under the very conditions
where they are selected for: fluctuating environments (Stephens, 1991;Wakano et al., 2004; Dun-
lap and Stephens, 2009). In this paper, we extend the approach of Josephson (2008) and study the
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evolutionary stability of reinforcement learning or inference-based learning in a situation where
the payoffs of these social interactions (games) fluctuate during lifespan. We also study variants
of reinforcement learning and inference-based learning that rely on the same dichotomy between
trial-and-error and ability to mentally simulate non-realized payoffs. For three different types of
fluctuating games, we study the evolutionary stability of these two learning rules. We analyze
two ways of forming pairs of opponents from the population. In the first one, individuals are
randomly paired at the beginning of lifespan and each formed pair interacts for the rest of lifes-
pan. In the second matching scheme, there is randommatching at each time step during lifespan
so the individuals learn to play against the whole population. Because the underlying model is
stochastic, we use, when possible, a deterministic approximation to analyze the equations and
then compare this with individual-based simulations.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Setting the stage
Population
We consider a haploid population of constant size N . The main life cycle stages are the fol-
lowing. (1) Each individual interacts socially with others for T time periods. (2) Each individual
reproduces according to its gains and losses incurred during social interactions. (3) All individ-
uals of the parental generation die and N individuals from the offspring generation are sampled
to form the new adult generation.
Repeated game affected by environmental fluctuations
During stage (1), individuals play a game at each time period t = 0,1,2, . . . ,T , where the
game that is played is determined by some environmental state, !, which itself belongs to a set
of environmental states, ⌦. The environment can be anything that alters the payoffs associated
to actions taken by individuals. We assume that the environmental process follows an ergodic
Markov chain (Karlin and Taylor, 1975), and denote by µ(!) the stationary probability that
state! obtains.
For example, one can consider an environment in which individuals play alternatively two
games, e.g., a Prisoner’s Dilemma and aHawk-Dove game; the set of environmental states is then
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⌦= {Prisoner’s Dilemma, Hawk-Dove}. In this example, one could setµ(Prisoner’s Dilemma) =
µ(Hawk-Dove) = 1/2, meaning that it is as if we toss a fair coin at each time t to determine the
game to be played. If the current environmental state is ! = Prisoner’s Dilemma, then all indi-
viduals in the population will have to choose between cooperating and defecting.
More generally, we consider that all the games in⌦ consist of the same number of actions, say
m (in our previous example we had m = 2). Hence, in every period of time, each organism in
the population chooses its action from a fixed finite set of actionsA = {1, . . . ,m}, and we denote
by !t the game played at time t , which is a random variable. The action taken by individual i
at time t is also a random variable denoted by ai ,t (we will allow individuals to use probabilistic
action choice) and the action profile in the population is at = (a1,t , . . . ,aN ,t ) (this is the collection
of the actions of all individuals in the population at time t ). The payoff to individual i at time
t when it takes action ai ,t and the game is !t is denoted ⇡i (ai ,t ,a i ,t ,!t ), where a i ,t is the
action profile of the remaining individuals in the population (all individuals excluding i ).
With this, we define the fecundity, bi , of individual i as its mean payoff obtained during the
whole sequence of interactions:
bi =
1
T
TX
t=1
⇡i (ai ,t ,a i ,t ,!t ), (3.1)
which provides its number of offspring produced during stage (2) of the life cycle.
3.2.2 Learning actions
In order to evaluate the fecundity, bi , of individual i , we need to know how actions are taken
by learning. We now present a model of learning that takes both reinforcement learning and
inference-based learning into account.
Action choice
Our way of modeling learning is shared by many previous studies and relies upon two com-
ponents: (1) dynamic preferences for action, and (2) a rule for choosing action given preferences
(Harley, 1981; Camerer and Ho, 1999; Leslie and Collins, 2005; Ho et al., 2007; Hamblin and
Giraldeau, 2009; Arbilly et al., 2010, 2011b; Dridi and Lehmann, 2013). Specifically, we let indi-
viduals having preferences or motivations for actions that they update through the repeated play
of the game according to payoffs. For each action a in its behavioral repertoireA , individual i
has an associated motivation Mi ,t (a) that represents how much action a is valued by individual
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i . Thus, the motivations can be thought as the states of the organism (Enquist and Ghirlanda,
2005; Niv, 2009) and we assume that action a is chosen at time t by individual i with probability
pi ,t (a) =
exp[ Mi ,t (a)]P
k2A exp[ Mi ,t (k)]
. (3.2)
This is a standard choice rule (Anderson et al., 1992; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Fudenberg
and Levine, 1998; Camerer and Ho, 1999; Ho et al., 2007; Arbilly et al., 2010, 2011b), where the
action that has the highest motivation is chosen with the greatest probability. The parameter
  2 [0,1) represents the sensitivity of an animal to its motivations. If   is near 0, the animal
is not very reactive to its motivations and has a tendency to explore (because pi ,t (a) is close to
1/m). If   is high, we have an animal being “greedy”, taking almost surely the action that has
the highest motivation (if action a⇤ has the highest motivation, pi ,t (a⇤) is close to 1, see Dridi
and Lehmann (2013) and references therein for more justifications underlying the use of eq. 3.2).
Motivations
The motivations of an individual are updated after each interaction stage, t . In order to
achieve this updating, we use a special case of the EWA model of Camerer and Ho (1999) and
its application to stochastically varying environments (Dridi and Lehmann, 2013). Individual i
starts off with some initial preferences over actions at time t = 1 given by the initial motivations
Mi ,1(a) for all actions a. We assume that the motivation Mi ,t+1(a) for action a of individual i at
time t + 1 is given by
Mi ,t+1(a) =
t
t + 1
 i ,t Mi ,t (a)+
1
t + 1
{ i + (1  i ) (a,ai ,t )}⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ). (3.3)
Eq. 3.3 can be seen as a weighted average of the previous motivation Mi ,t (a) and of the new
payoff ⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ). In the first term, the motivation Mi ,t (a) is weighted by  i ,t   0, a
memory parameter, or learning rate, that indicates the relative importance of the last motivation
as opposed to the current payoff (note that  i ,t can change as a function of time and also has an
initial value  i ,1, possibly genetically determined). This first term is also weighted by t/(t + 1),
which entails that the previous motivation is weighted according to the number of interactions
that have occurred up to time t .
The second term can be termed the increment, or reinforcement to the motivation. It has
weight 1/(t+1) and depends on the payoff ⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ) of action a when all other individuals
in the population play a i ,t and the game is in state !t at time t . The expression (a,ai ,t ) is an
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indicator function, which is
(a,ai ,t ) =
8<:1, if ai ,t = a,
0, otherwise,
(3.4)
i.e., if individual i takes action a at time t , then (a,ai ,t ) = 1. We see that if (a,ai ,t ) = 1, the nu-
merator of the second term of eq. 3.3 reduces to⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ). If, on the other hand, individual
i does not play a at time t , then the numerator of the second term reduces to  i⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ).
The parameter  i weights the ability of an individual to infer the payoffs of unchosen actions
(non-realized or foregone payoffs) and reinforce motivations accordingly. If  i = 0, the individ-
ual is not able to infer non-realized payoffs and thus only reinforces actions according to realized
payoff. We will call this Reinforcement Learning (RL). By contrast, if  i = 1, the payoffs as-
sociated to unchosen actions are always perfectly inferred. This will be called Inference-based
learning (IL), where individuals have the capacity to access information about (or compute) non-
realized payoffs. When an Inference-based learner plays action a at time t , it reinforces not only
action a but also all other actions according to the payoffs they would have yielded (see Ap-
pendix B.1). This information about missed payoffs may be available if the organism can infer
its potential payoffs from environmental cues (i.e., it observes the column corresponding to the
action of its opponent in the payoff matrix of the game, but a posteriori) or if it can observe the
payoffs of individuals involved in other interactions. A well-studied special case of IL obtained
when  i = 1 and  i = 1 is Belief-based learning, where the motivations represent expected pay-
offs given the history of play by individual’s i opponents (Brown, 1951; Fudenberg and Levine,
1998; Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002; Hopkins, 2002).
Note that the motivations of all actions are updated by individual i after each time t . Con-
sequently, an Inference-based learner [with  i = 1], who observe foregone payoffs, computes
as many payoffs as there are available actions (m), at each period of time t . On the other hand,
a Reinforcement Learner [with  i = 0] has a much lighter computational task because it com-
putes only the payoff of the action it actually took. Thus, we will postulate in the analysis below
that the cost of additional computations will affect the fitness of IL by an amount k.
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3.2.3 Evolutionary analysis
Assumptions
Equations 3.2–3.3 define the learning dynamics of action a for individual i . Our aim is to
investigate the co-evolution of reinforcement and belief-based learning under these dynamics.
To that aim, we consider that the parameter  i is the genotype of individual i , and that there
can be only two types of individuals in the population, reinforcement learners with  i = 0, and
belief-based learners with  i = 1. We make the following simplifying assumptions in order to
investigate these dynamics.
(a) We consider two special values of  i ,t , the learning rate. First, we are interested in the case
 i ,t = (1/t )+1, where analytical results can be derived about the learning behavior (see next
section). For this special value of the learning rate, we obtain a special special version of RL,
which we call Pure Reinforcement Learning (PRL), and a special version of IL, which we call
Pure Inference-based Learning (PIL). These names follows from the fact that at a behavioral
equilibrium individuals will express essentially only pure actions.
Second, we use a constant value  i = 1 for the learning rate, which entails that individuals
are likely to be more exploratory at a behavioral equilibrium and are likely to express mixed
actions. For this value of the learning rate, we obtain a special special version of RL, which
we call Exploratory Reinforcement Learning (ERL), and a special version of IL, which we
call Exploratory Inference-based Learning (EIL), where the latter strategy corresponds to
Belief-based learning of the game theory literature (it is also called Stochastic Fictitious Play,
as defined in Chapter 2; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998).
In Appendix B.1, we provide more details on the dynamics of the motivations (eq. 3.3) of
these learning rules, and in our analysis we always consider competition between RL and IL
under the same learning rate.
(b) We assume pairwise interactions and we analyze two matching rules. The first we call one-
shot matching, where individuals are randomly paired at the beginning of the game (t =
1) and each pair interacts together for the whole duration of the game (until time T and
reproduction). Second, we consider repeated matching, where individuals are re-matched
during each stage game, i.e., individuals meet different partners at each time t .
(c) All games consist of only two actions (m = 2), that is, individuals play 2⇥ 2 symmetric
games. This means that, at each time t , individuals play one out of three types of games: a
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Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), a Hawk-Dove game (HD), or a (pure) Coordination Game (CG);
i.e., the set of games is ⌦ = {PD,HD,CG}, and the stationary distribution of games thus
satisfyµ(PD)+µ(CG)+µ(HD) = 1. These three games are instances from the three possible
categories of 2 ⇥ 2 games (the PD is a game with a dominant action, the HD is a game
with two pure asymmetric Nash equilibria, and the CG is a game with two pure symmetric
equilibria, Weibull, 1997, Chap. 1). The payoffs for game ! are written R!, S!, T!, and
P!, where ! 2 {PD,CG,HD} and where for example T! is the payoff obtained by both
players when they choose action 2 and the game is !. Similarly,R!, S!, and P! describe
the payoffs for each other possible combination of actions by the players (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1: Payoff matrix for a typical stage game !, where ! 2 {PD,CG,HD}. One player chooses a
row and its opponent chooses a column. Payoffs are to row player. In order to numerically implement
the three possible sub-games (PD,CG,HD) we used the following constraints on the payoffs. In the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game (PD): TPD > RPD > PPD > SPD and (TPD +SPD)/2 < RPD. In the Hawk-
Dove game (HD): THD > RHD,SHD > PHD,PHD > RHD. In the Coordination Game (CG): RCG >
SCG,RCG =PCG,SCG = TCG.
Action 1 Action 2
Action 1 R! S!
Action 2 T! P!
Stochastic approximation
Although eqs. 3.2–3.3 describe a bona fide learning process, this is a non-homogeneous mul-
tidimensional Markov process that is very difficult to analyze (see Fig. 2.1). It is thus necessary
to approximate it in order to obtain analytical results, which is useful to form an intuition about
behavioral dynamics. It turns out that this analysis is possible only under the one-shot matching
scheme and when the learning rate  i ,t takes the dynamic value  i ,t = (1/t )+ 1.
Using the above assumptions (a-c) with  i ,t = (1/t )+1 and stochastic approximation theory
(Appendix B.2; Benveniste et al., 1991; Benaim, 1999), we can write a system of differential equa-
tions that describe the learning dynamics of a given pair of individuals (i , j ) in the population
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for the one-shot matching model as
p˙i = pi (1  pi ) [{pjR + (1  pj )S }{pi + i (1  pi )}
  {pjT + (1  pj )P }{ i pi + (1  pi )}], (3.5)
p˙ j = pj (1  pj ) [{piR + (1  pi )S }{pj +  j (1  pj )}
  {piT + (1  pi )P }{  j p j + (1  pj )}], (3.6)
where a dot accent is used to symbolize a time derivative, i.e., p˙i = dpi/dt , pi is the probability
that individual i plays action 1 and pj is the probability that individual j (the opponent of
individual i ) plays action 1 . Since individuals cannot detect the state of the game !, one must
note that the parameters R , S , T , and P are the payoffs of the average game faced by the
individuals in the fluctuating environment (Table 3.2); that is, the average over the distribution
µ(!) of type of games. For instance when players i and j both choose action 2 they both
obtain the average payoff T = µ(PD)TPD + µ(HD)THD + µ(CG)TCG, and the three other
payoffs R , S , and P , are similarly computed . We see that stochastic approximation shows
that, asymptotically, the probability of playing actions is driven by the average payoff to actions,
which can be thought to determine itself a game (eq. B.9), which we call the average game (see
Dridi and Lehmann, 2013, for more details). Note also that the probability that an individual
takes action a evolves according to the difference between the expected reward of action a and
the average expected reward of all actions (the expected reward of a is the expected value of the
second term of eq. 3.3 over the distribution of environmental states and choice probabilities).
To perform the analysis, we assume that the learning dynamic (eqs. 3.5–3.6) has reached an
equilibrium during an individual’s lifespan in order to evaluate fitness. This is equivalent to say
that we let the time horizon, T , of the game become very large (ideally infinite) so that the
equilibrium of eqs. 3.5–3.6 determines the fecundity of individuals i and j . Then, the fecundity
of individual i is defined as the average (or expected) payoff attained at equilibrium of learning.
That is
bi j = pˆi ( pˆ jR + (1  pˆ j )S )+ (1  pˆi )( pˆ jT + (1  pˆ j )P ), i , j 2 {R, I}, (3.7)
where we subscript bi j by j to emphasize that the fecundity of individual i depends on its single
opponent ( j ), pˆi is the equilibrium probability that individual i plays action 1, and pˆ j is the
equilibrium probability that individual j plays action 1 (i.e., pˆi and pˆ j are the solutions of the
equations p˙i = 0, p˙ j = 0; Appendix B.3). We will use the subscriptR to denote a PRL individual
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and I to denote a PIL. For instance, bRI is the fecundity of a PRL individual if it is paired with a
PIL individual.
In order to use these payoffs to investigate evolutionary dynamics, we make the customary
assumption that the population size is infinitely large so that we can use a deterministic evolu-
tionary model. Calling qi the frequency of type i in the population, the expected reproductive
output of type i is then defined as
Wi = ↵+ qi bi i + qj bi j , (3.8)
where ↵ is a baseline fecundity. In the following, we call qR ⌘ q the frequency of RL in the
population (so that 1  q is the frequency of IL). Hence, the change in frequency  q of PRL
in the one-shot matching model over one iteration of the life-cycle is given by the discrete-time
replicator dynamics,
 q = q(1  q)
✓WR WI
W¯
◆
, (3.9)
where W¯ = qWR + (1  q)WI is the mean reproductive output in the population. In the next
section, we evaluate the replicator dynamics (eq. 3.9) for three different average games: the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma (PD), theHawk-Dove game (HD), and the Coordination game (CG) (Table 3.2).
The details of the analysis are provided in Appendix B.4. Note that we use pi and pj to denote
the probability to play action 1 when both individuals are of the same type (i.e., for the interac-
tions PRL vs. PRL and PIL vs. PIL) but we use pR and pI for the interaction between a PRL and
a PIL.
Table 3.2: Payoff matrices for the average games studied. The rows represent the actions of player 1 and
the columns correspond to the actions of player 2. Payoffs are to row player. The matrix at the top shows
the generic payoffs used in the paper. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Left), we assume B > C > 0. In the
Hawk-Dove (Middle), we have B >C > B/2> 0. In the Coordination Game (Right), B > 0.
G¯ Action 1 Action 2
Action 1 R S
Action 2 T P
PD Cooperate Defect
Cooperate B  C  C
Defect B 0
HD Hawk Dove
Hawk B/2 C B
Dove 0 B/2
CG Left Right
Left B 0
Right 0 B
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3.3 Results: one-shot matching
3.3.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
Equilibrium behavior
The learning dynamics for the Prisoner’s Dilemma is obtained by replacing in eqs. 3.5–3.6 the
payoffs (R ,S ,T ,P ) by the values defined in Table 3.2 for that average game. Hence, action 1
can now be thought as “Cooperate” and action 2 as “Defect”. In order to determine the fate of the
PRL for this case (eq. 3.9), we need to evaluate the payoffs for each possible interaction between
types of learners, which will depend on the equilibrium points of the learning dynamics. In the
population, three types of pairwise interaction can occur: (i) PRL vs. PRL; (ii) PIL vs. PIL; (iii)
PRL vs. PIL.
When a PRL is paired with another PRL we find that the learning dynamics can end in two
possible states, depending on the initial preferences (pi ,1, pj ,1) individuals have for each action. If
individuals have a high enough initial probability to play Cooperate, then both PRL will learn
to cooperate ( pˆi = 1, pˆ j = 1) at equilibrium of learning (Fig. 3.1A, Appendix B.4). For other
initial conditions, both PRL learn to defect ( pˆi = 0, pˆ j = 0). The interaction between two PIL
gives a different result: irrespective of initial conditions, both PIL will learn to defect (Fig. 3.1B).
Finally, when a PRLmeets a PIL, both individuals learn to defect regardless of initial conditions,
which means that PRL does not get exploited by PIL (Fig. 3.1C).
ESS analysis
Using the above results on equilibrium action play, we can now compute the fitnesses of both
types (eq. 3.8). This gives8<:WI = ↵  k ,WR = ↵+ q(B  C ) if i.c. is in the basin of (1,1),
WI = ↵  k ,WR = ↵ otherwise,
(3.10)
where i.c. refers to the initial conditions of learning in the PRL vs. PRL interaction. Under the
replicator dynamics (eq. 3.9), the frequency of the PRL type increases whenWR >WI. In the
first case of eq. 3.10 (i.e., when we start close enough to the equilibrium (1,1)), this means that
PRL invades PIL if
q(B  C )+ k > 0. (3.11)
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Figure 3: Solution orbits of the learning dynamical system in the three average games for
the one-shot matching model. Top row (a, b, and c): Prisoner’s Dilemma (B = 5 and
C = 3). Middle row (d, e, and f): Hawk-Dove (B = 5 and C = 4). Bottom row (g, h, and i):
Coordination Game (B = 5). In each row, the left panel represents the interaction between
two PRLs, the center one between two PILs, and the right one between a PRL and a PIL.
A white-filled circle denotes an unstable node (both associated eigenvalues are positive), a
gray-filled circle is a saddle (one positive and one negative eigenvalue), and a black circle is
a locally stable equilibrium. In (a) the gray shaded area represents the initial conditions for
which all trajectories go to the (Cooperate, Cooperate) (1, 1) equilibrium. In (d) the gray
shaded area represents the initial conditions for which all trajectories go to the (Dove, Dove)
(0, 0) equilibrium.
Figure 3.1: Solution orbits of the learning dynamical system in the three average games for the one-shot
matching model. Top row (A, B, and C): Prisoner’s Dilemma (B = 5 and C = 3). Middle row (D, E,
and F): Hawk-Dove (B = 5 and C = 4). Bottom row (G, H, and I): Coordination Game (B = 5). In each
row, the left panel represents the interaction between two PRLs, the center one between two PILs, and
the right one betwee a PRL and a PIL. A white-filled circl denotes an unstable node (both associated
eigenvalu s ar positive), a gray-filled circle is a sa dle (one positive an one egative eigenvalue), and a
black circle is a locally stable equilibrium. In panel A th gray shaded ar a represents the initial conditions
for which all traj ctories go to the (Cooperate, Cooperate) (1,1) equilibrium. In panel D the gray shaded
area represents the initial conditions for which all trajectories go to the (Dove, Dove) (1,1) equilibrium.
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Because the left-hand side is always positive, PRL is the evolutionarily stable learning rule
(ESLR); that is, it cannot be invaded by PIL and can invade PIL. Note that, even when k = 0,
PRL is still the ESLR.
In the second case of eq. 3.10, i.e., when the learning dynamics start in the basin of (Defect,
Defect) of the PRL vs. PRL interaction, both PRL and PIL learn to defect. Here, WR > WI
always holds when k > 0, hence PRL is also the ESLR. For k = 0, we have neutrality (WR =WI
for all q).
Individual-based simulations
In order to see whether the above analytical approximation reflects accurately the underly-
ing stochastic model of learning and evolution, we performed individual-based simulations. The
main question we ask in these simulations is: can we find parameters such that the above approx-
imation based on deterministic linear stability analysis is robust enough to predict the outcome
of natural selection? In Appendix B.5, we provide a detailed description of these simulations.
Simulations: dynamic learning rate
Since the analytical prediction in the Prisoner’s Dilemma depends on whether individuals
have an initial preference for Cooperation or Defection, we run a set of simulations for each
type of initial preference (see Appendix B.6 for a detailed description of results for both dynamic
learning rate and constant learning rate for all games).
Both players initially prefer Cooperation. For this case, simulations results are similar to the
analytical results. In particular, two PRL can learn to cooperate with each other but always
learn to defect against the defector PIL, which favors PRL and leads to the fixation of PRL
(Fig. 3.2A,B,C). However, it is noteworthy that the simulations slightly differ from the analysis:
pairs of PRL can sometimes learn to defect (Fig. 3.2A), which is a consequence of the possibility
of escaping the basin of attraction of cooperation due to stochastic fluctuations. But this does not
affect our evolutionary prediction, because it suffices to have a small probability to cooperate
with itself in order to outperform the defector PIL (Table 3.3).
Both players initially prefer Defection. For these initial preferences, the simulations results differ
from the analytical results because PRL individuals sometimes learn to cooperate with each
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other despite their initial tendency to defect. Hence, simulations for the present case are very
similar to the simulations of the previous case where individuals initially prefer cooperation.
Namely, some pairs of PRL individuals learn to cooperate and some other pairs learn to defect,
while the interactions involving PIL always lead to Defection (Fig. 3.2D,E,F). As a consequence,
we indeed observe that PRL fixes in the population in our evolutionary simulations (Table 3.3).
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Figure 3.2: Behavioral equilibrium of learning in the average Prisoner’s Dilemma for the one-shot match-
ing model with dynamic learning rate for pairs of opponents. This represents the frequency of pairs
having reached a given probability to play action 1 (p1,T , p2,T ) at the end of lifespan, T . We used a to-
tal of 1000 individuals of each type in each simulation. First line: initial preference for Cooperation
(pi ,1 = 0.85). Second line: initial preference for Defection (pi ,1 = 0.15). Left column: interaction between
two PRLs. Middle column: interaction between two PILs. Right Column: interaction between PRL
(player 1) and PIL (player 2).
Simulations: constant learning rate
Both players initially prefer Cooperation. There, the same qualitative results are obtained as in
the dynamic learning rate situation, where ERL can learn to cooperate with itself (Fig. B.1A,B,C)
and fixes in the population in the evolutionary long run (Table 3.3).
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Both players initially prefer Defection. In this situation there is only one (but important) dif-
ference compared to dynamic learning rate. Namely, ERL individuals do not learn full de-
fection and converge to a positive probability of cooperating against the defector BL, which
gives an evolutionary advantage to the latter when present in high frequency in the population
(Fig. B.1D,E,F). This implies that in our simulations of evolution we observe that ERL fixes in
the population when initially frequent, but it is EIL that fixes when itself initially frequent in
the population (Table 3.3).
3.3.2 Hawk-Dove Game
Equilibrium behavior
We proceed exactly as in the PD in order to analyze the dynamics of learning (eqs. 3.5–3.6),
but we now use the payoffs of the HD game (Table 3.2). Here, action 1 corresponds to “Dove”
and action 2 to “Hawk”.
In the PRL vs. PRL interaction, the learning dynamics has three stable equilibria: (Hawk,
Dove), (Dove, Hawk), or (Dove, Dove). In other words, depending on the initial conditions, in-
dividuals will either reach a Nash equilibrium or the “cooperative” outcome where both individ-
uals choose Dove, a result similar to the one obtained in the average PD game above (Fig. 3.1D,
Appendix B.4). When two PIL interact (Fig. 3.1E), they end up playing one of the two Nash
Equilibria (Hawk, Dove) or (Dove, Hawk). Finally, when a PRL meets an IL, there are two
possible endpoints: the equilibrium where PRL plays Hawk and PIL plays Dove; or the reverse
situation where PRL learns to play Dove and PIL learns to play Hawk (Fig. 3.1F). Hence, in
this heterogeneous interaction, depending on the initial conditions, either PRL or PIL will get
exploited by its opponent.
ESS analysis
While the interactions between two individuals of the same type (PRL vs. PRL and PIL
vs. PIL), always lead to a payoff of B2 because both individuals have equal chances of learning to
become a Hawk or a Dove, the payoffs in the PRL vs. PIL interaction depend on whether the
initial condition is in the basin of attraction of (0,1) or (1,0). Thus, the reproductive output is8<:WI = ↵+ qB + (1  q)B2   k ,WR = ↵+ q B2 if i.c. in basin of (0,1)
WI = ↵+ (1  q)B2   k ,WR = ↵+ q B2 + (1  q)B if i.c. in basin of (1,0),
(3.12)
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where i.c. is the initial condition of the PRL vs. PIL interaction.
In the first case of eq. 3.12, PRL increases in frequency when rare (WR >WI) if
k   B
2
> 0. (3.13)
This implies that when k > B/2, PRL is the ESLR; when k = B/2 evolution is neutral; when
k < B/2, PIL is the ESLR.
In the second case of eq. 3.12, PRL increases in frequency if
B
2
+ k > 0, (3.14)
which is always true because B > 0 and k   0. In this case, PRL is the only ESLR.
Simulations: dynamic learning rate
PRL initially prefers to play Hawk and PIL prefers Dove. In this case, the simulation results agree
qualitatively well with the analytical results. The only difference is that in the simulations, we
observe some pairs of PRL that learn the outcome (Dove, Dove) (Fig. 3.3A,B,C). This is due to
stochasticity and (as occurred above for the PD) is not possible with initial preferences for Hawk
in the analytical model. Consequently, PRL fixes in the population in the long run (Table 3.3).
PRL initially prefers to play Dove and PIL prefers Hawk. Because this situation is the exact
opposite of the previous initial conditions, the analysis predicts that behavior should be the
same for homogeneous interactions but should be inverted under the heterogeneous interaction
(PRL vs. PIL), and this is what we observe. The PIL individuals learn Hawk against the PRL
who learn Dove (Fig. 3.3D,E,F), and the former thus fixes in the population at an evolutionary
equilibrium (Table 3.3).
Simulations: constant learning rate
ERL initially prefers to play Hawk and EIL prefers Dove. Here the results are the same than
under dynamic learning rate and ERL fixes in the population in the long run (Fig. B.2A,B,C,
Table 3.3).
ERL initially prefers to play Dove and EIL prefers Hawk. This case displays the same situation
as dynamic learning rate, where EIL individuals outcompete ERL and fix to a frequency close
to 1 at equilibrium of evolution (Fig. B.2D,E,F, Table 3.3).
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Figure 3.3: Same as in Fig. 3.2 but for the behavioral equilibrium under the average Hawk-Dove game.
First line: RL initially prefer Hawk (pR,1 = 0.15) and IL prefers Dove (pI,1 = 0.85). Second line: RL
initially prefer Dove (pR,1 = 0.85) and IL prefers Hawk (pI,1 = 0.15). Left column: interaction between
two RLs. Middle column: interaction between two ILs. Right Column: interaction between RL (player
1) and IL (player 2).
3.3.3 Coordination Game
Equilibrium behavior
If we use the payoffs of the CG (Table 3.2) in eqs. 3.5–3.6, we obtain the learning dynamics of
a pair of opponents in the coordination game. In the labeling of Table 3.2, action 1 corresponds
to Left and action 2 corresponds to Right. In this game, all three types of pairs succeed in
learning to coordinate in the long run (Fig. 3.1G,H,I), and depending on the initial preferences
for Right or Left, the equilibrium reached will either be (Right, Right) or (Left, Left).
ESS analysis
In the three interactions, the players coordinate on a single action and get a payoff at equilib-
rium of B . The fitness of type PRL is thenWR = ↵+B and the fitness of PIL isWI = ↵+B  k.
Trivially, PRL is the ESLR for all positive k; for k = 0, evolution is neutral.
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Simulations: dynamic learning rate
In this game, our analytical results predict that evolution does not favor one type over the
other for any initial condition because both types always coordinate on a single action, which
should lead to a neutral evolutionary dynamics where both types co-exist in equal frequency
(q = 1/2). In the simulations, we thus set initial preferences of individuals close to the outcome
(Left, Left) and we observed that all types of pairs of individuals succeed in coordinating on
a given action (but the particular action learned depends on the pair, Fig. 3.4). This learning
behavior corresponds to our analytical prediction but simulations of evolution do not match as
we observe a stable polymorphism dominated by PIL (Table 3.3). This result may be explained
by the variance in convergence time of PRL individuals. Our criterion for convergence of learn-
ing behavior was indeed based on the average time needed for individuals to converge, but this
disregards the possibility that different PRL individuals may converge in different times. Be-
cause certain PRL fail to converge to a pure action at time T , they do not coordinate on certain
interaction rounds and hence get the payoff 0 (Table 3.2) more often than PIL.
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Figure 3.4: Same as in Fig. 3.2 but for the behavioral equilibrium under the average Coordination game.
Left column: interaction between two RLs. Middle column: interaction between two ILs. Right Col-
umn: interaction between RL (player 1) and IL (player 2).
Simulations: constant learning rate
Learning in this case also leads to coordination of all pairs (Fig. B.3). However, here evolu-
tionary simulations give a result closer to what is expected with a frequency of ERL of q ⇡ 0.56
at equilibrium of evolution (Table 3.3).
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Table 3.3: Summary of results in the one-shot matching model. The column “Predicted q⇤” shows
the frequency of RL expected at evolutionary equilibrium under the deterministic approximation. The
column “Simulated q⇤” gives the approximate equilibrium frequency of RL obtained in the corresponding
evolutionary simulation. The simulation results represent the average over simulation runs with different
initial compositions of the population (see Appendix B.5 for details).
Average Game Initial condition of learning Predicted q⇤ Learning rate Simulated q⇤
Prisoner’s Dilemma Basin of (Cooperate, Cooperate) of RLvsRL 1 Dynamic 0.99
Constant 0.98
Basin of (Defect, Defect) of RLvsRL 1/2 Dynamic 0.98
Constant 0.5‡
Hawk-Dove Game Basin of (Hawk, Dove) of RLvsIL 1 Dynamic 0.97
Constant 0.98
Basin of (Dove, Hawk) of RLvsIL 0 Dynamic 0.01
Constant 0.01
Coordination Game Basin of (Left, Left) 1/2 Dynamic 0.27
Constant 0.56
‡ In this case, the different simulation runs give disparate results with either type getting fixed depending on the
initial conditions (see main text).
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3.4 Results: repeated matching
We now assume that individuals in the population are randomly paired at every time t of
lifespan, but otherwise keep all previous assumptions. An individual will now meet different
partners during its lifespan. Its learning dynamics may then depend on the distribution of be-
haviors of all individuals in the population because anybody can be met for a one-shot interac-
tion.
Unfortunately, we could not find an analytic approximation to the evolutionary dynamics
for this matching model, so we used exclusively individual-based simulations to investigate the
evolutionary stability of RL and IL. As for the one-shot matching model, we performed simu-
lations of only the learning process on one hand and a full evolutionary analysis on the other
hand. All parameters were set as for the one-shot matching model. In particular, to make possi-
ble the comparison between the two matching rules, we used the same type of initial conditions
for the learning dynamics.
For the simulations of the learning dynamics, we cannot simply take pairs of individuals out
of the population since the dynamics of learning of an individual depends on all other individu-
als in the population. In particular, the learning dynamics is sensitive to the types’ frequencies.
Thus, the learning simulations were performed by simulating one generation in a large pop-
ulation (10000 individuals) and by setting manually the frequencies of RL and IL in order to
understand the effect of the types’ frequencies on the learning behavior.
3.4.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
Dynamic learning rate
All individuals initially prefer Cooperation. For this case, we obtain that PRL individuals can
learn to cooperate when very common in the population (precisely, when q   0.8), while PIL
individuals always learn to defect for all compositions of the population (Fig. 3.5A). This implies
that, at the evolutionary timescale, the population will move neutrally through all the states such
that q < 0.8 but is repelled from the states where q   0.8. As a consequence we observe in our
simulations that the equilibrium frequency of PRL is small but positive (Table 3.4).
All individuals prefer Defection. Here, both types always converge to Defection, so no one has
an advantage (Fig. 3.5B). When we simulate evolution, the result is qualitatively in agreement
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with this even if the frequency of PIL is slightly above 0.5 (Table 3.4). This can be explained
by the variance in convergence time of PRL individuals. Some of them might converge more
slowly to full Defection and will be exploited on some interaction rounds when they meet the
defector PIL.
Constant learning rate
All individuals initially prefer Cooperation. Here ERL players learn to cooperate with a small
probability for all frequencies, while EIL learn to defect as usual (Fig. 3.5C). As a consequence,
the frequency of EIL in evolutionary simulations is close to 1 at equilibrium (Table 3.4).
All individuals initially prefer Defection. The result is here the same as in the previous section:
ERL individuals learn to cooperate with a positive probability (Fig. 3.5D) which leads to the
evolutionary superiority of EIL observed in our evolutionary simulations (Table 3.4).
3.4.2 Hawk-Dove Game
Dynamic learning rate
PRL initially prefers to play Hawk and PIL prefers Dove. Here, we obtain that individuals using
the PRL rule learn to play Dove with a higher average probability than PIL does. As the fre-
quency of PRL increases, their probability to play Dove also increases, while PIL plays Hawk
more and more often (Fig. 3.5E). Consequently, when we perform simulations of evolution,
we observe a stable polymorphism with a clear domination of PIL (Table 3.4). The reason is
that playing Hawk with a higher probability than the opponent is beneficial in one-to-one in-
teractions (which favors PIL in interactions against PRL) but playing Hawk too often renders
susceptible to invasion by individuals who play the nicer Dove action (which favors PIL).
PRL initially prefers to play Dove and PIL prefers Hawk. The learning behavior of the types is
similar to the previous case but now the average probability that PRL plays Dove is less affected
by its frequency, and is always relatively high. Individuals using PIL still have a tendency to
increase their probability to playHawk as q increases (Fig. 3.5F), which gives them an advantage.
This is confirmed by our evolutionary simulations where PIL dominates the population at a
polymorphic evolutionary equilibrium (Table 3.4).
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Hawk-Dove
Game
Coordination
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Figure 3.5: Average probability of choosing action 1 at the behavioral equilibrium for different frequencies q of
RL in the population in the repeated matching model. Red line is for RL, and blue line is for IL. Panels A,B,C,D:
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Panels E,F,G,H:Hawk-Dove Game. Panels I,J: CoordinationGame. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma
panel: first line: dynamic learning rate. Second line: constant learning rate. Left column: Individuals start with an
initial preference for Cooperation (pi ,1 = 0.85). Right column: initial preference for Defection (pi ,1 = 0.15). In the
Hawk-Dove panel: First line: dynamic learning rate. Second line: constant learning rate. Left column: RL initially
prefer Hawk (pR,1 = 0.15) and IL prefers Dove (pI,1 = 0.85). Right column: RL initially prefer Dove (pR,1 = 0.85) and
IL prefers Hawk (pI,1 = 0.15). In the Coordination panel: left: dynamic learning rate. Right: constant learning rate.
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Constant learning rate
ERL initially prefers to play Hawk and EIL prefers Dove. Here the results are similar to the case
with dynamic learning rate so ERL learns to play Dove more often than PIL (Fig. 3.5G) such
that simulations of evolution lead to a polymorphic equilibrium where PIL constitutes almost
all the population (Table 3.4).
ERL initially prefers to play Dove and EIL prefers Hawk. The results for the learning behavior
are not different from the case with dynamic learning rate (Fig. 3.5H) so we also observe in
our simulations of evolution that EIL constitutes almost all the population at an evolutionary
endpoint (Table 3.4).
Table 3.4: Summary of results in the repeated matching model. This is the same table as for the one-shot
matching case but without analytic prediction.
Average Game Initial condition of learning Learning rate Simulated q⇤
Prisoner’s Dilemma All individuals prefer Cooperation Dynamic 0.2
Constant 0.05
All individuals prefer Cooperation Dynamic 0.48
Constant 0.04
Hawk-Dove Game RL prefers Hawk, IL prefers Dove Dynamic 0.18
Constant 0.11
RL prefers Dove, IL prefers Hawk Dynamic 0.07
Constant 0.05
Coordination Game All individuals prefer Left Dynamic 0.01
Constant 0.06
3.4.3 Coordination Game
Dynamic learning rate
The results for the learning behavior show here that PRL individuals fail to all coordinate
on a given action. The PIL individuals are efficient in doing this (Fig. 3.5I) and thus fix in the
population at the endpoint of evolution (Table 3.4).
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Constant learning rate
The learning behavior of both types is qualitatively similar to the dynamic learning rate case
(Fig. 3.5J) and this explains why EIL almost fix in the population at an evolutionary equilibrium
in our simulations (Table 3.4).
3.5 Discussion
In order to assess whether selection favors cognitively more sophisticated individuals than
simple reinforcement learners in social interactions, we analyzed an evolutionary model of the
competition between reinforcement and inference-based learning. Reinforcement learners only
use information about realized payoffs, while inference-based learners in our model also use
information about the forgone payoffs of playing alternative actions. This learning mode can be
thought of as one step up in the cognitive hierarchy and is further related to standard belief-based
learning (see eq. B.6 in Appendix B.1).
We assumed that individuals in a large population are genetically programmed to be either
reinforcement learners or inference-based learners and interact repeatedly in a two-player, two-
action stochastically fluctuating games. We defined two matching schemes, that is, two ways
in which individuals meet to play the games. In the one-shot matching model, individuals are
paired at the beginning of the fluctuating game and each pair interacts for the rest of the game. In
the second model, we used repeated matching: here, a random matching is realized at each time
t of the game so that an individual has a negligible probability of playing twice against the same
partner (since we also consider that the population is very large). Payoffs are evaluated at equi-
librium of the learning process, and this defines the number of offspring produced (fecundity)
by an individual.
We applied stochastic approximation theory to analyze learning during lifetime, and ob-
tained that the equilibrium behavior of the learners could be characterized in terms of an average
game of the fluctuating game (i.e., a game whose payoffs are averages of the sub-games payoffs of
the original fluctuating game). We thus analyzed three standard cases of average game: the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove game, and the Coordination game, and checked our analytic
approximations with simulations of the exact process.
Overall, the presupposed domination of inference-based learning over reinforcement learn-
ing is not complete in our results. In other words, the ability to infer forgone payoff by sim-
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ulating payoff outcomes of unchosen actions does not necessarily leads to a selective advantage
in social interactions. Rather, we actually observed three main types of results, which hold
regardless of the learning rate (constant or dynamic), and that we now describe.
(1) In simple social interactions, where the average game faced by individuals just require that
two partners coordinate on the same action or “anti-coordinate” on two different actions,
reinforcement and inference-based learning do not produce different behaviors at the behav-
ioral equilibrium, in which case natural selection is neutral and does not favor one rule over
the other.
(2) In social dilemmas like the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the ability of two reinforcement learners to
generate cooperative pairwise interactions by reinforcement of actual rewards, rather than to
play a Nash equilibria, can give it an evolutionary advantage over inference-based learning.
Importantly, we obtained this result even when inference-based learning payed no cost for
cognitive complexity.
(3) Overall, we observed many examples where belief-based learning dominates the popula-
tion at an evolutionary endpoint (i.e., it either gets to fixation or the population reaches
a polymorphism where belief-based learning is at a high frequency), especially when two
individuals cannot interact more than once (thereby eliminating the possibility for recipro-
cation). Since belief-based learning produces rational behavior at the level of the one-shot
average game, this makes perfect sense, because it is the type of behavior that is selected
when individuals cannot interact more than once.
Across all these results, the interaction between the learning rule and the initial preferences,
which can be interpreted as an innate predisposition for a certain type of action, also plays an
important role. We observed that like any predisposition in a learning context, this predisposi-
tion can be overcome or reversed in the long run, but this is much constrained by the dynamic
properties of the interacting learning rules (e.g., size of the basin of attraction of the behavioral
equilibria). This should be kept in mind in the following discussion about the more specific
effect on evolutionary outcomes of the two different matching models.
In the one-shot matching model, we either observed results of type (1) or type (2) but we
never observed results of type (3). The one-shot matching model allows to capture situations
where the same animals interact many times together so that each animal has the possibility to
tune its behavior to the actions of its partner. Examples where repeated interactions are likely to
occur include many cooperatively breeding species that live in relatively small stable groups, or
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if the home range of solitary animals overlap. In this situation, results of type (1) were obtained
when the average game was either a Hawk-Dove game or a Coordination game. In these two
games, the two learners did not differ from one another at a behavioral equilibrium, which leads
to the absence of an advantage of one type of learner over the other. In this game, we found
that both types of learners generally succeeded in coordinating on a single action, because it is
only necessary to repeat the action that leads to positive payoffs, and both the reinforcement
and inference-based learning rules are capable of this.
The Hawk-Dove game favors one learning rule or the other depending on the initial condi-
tions, so no type always wins in this game, because both types of learners are able to reach the
optimal (Nash equilibria) outcomes (Hawk, Dove) and (Dove, Hawk). This game actually illus-
trates well the interaction effect between genetic predisposition and learning rule, because we
found that it was the learning rule that had the biggest predisposition for aggression (big initial
probability of choosing “Hawk”) that was evolutionarily stable. Besides, it is noteworthy that
the behavior of reinforcement learners was slightly more cooperative in the sense that pairs of
this type could also learn to play the socially peaceful outcome (Dove, Dove). This did not give
an advantage nor a disadvantage compared to inference-based learners in this particular game,
but this suggests that reinforcement learners tend to avoid aggression by staying away from the
“Hawk” action.
In the average Prisoner’s Dilemma, we also observed that reinforcement learners could reach
the socially beneficial outcome where both partners cooperate (i.e., they “solve” the dilemma),
but this time this ability made reinforcement evolutionarily stable. Indeed, pairs of reinforce-
ment learners are able to learn to cooperate together. On the other hand, inference-based
learning always leads to defection. Interestingly, reinforcement learners do not get exploited
by inference-based learners as they succeed in learning to defect against them. We note that rein-
forcement learning behaves somehow similarly to the Tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy (Rapoport and
Chammah, 1965; Axelrod, 1980; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981): reinforcement learning coop-
erates with itself a high proportion of the time (but not always) and defect against the defector
belief-based learning. The repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma has been the topic of many studies aim-
ing at understanding the evolution of cooperation, but most of the time no learning rules are
used in evolutionary analysis, but qualitative strategies consisting of finite state automaton like
TFT (or Win-stay-lose-shift, Grim, etc.). Learning rules may actually represent a more appro-
priate way of conceptualizing animal behavior because it describes several realistic features of
animals, like incremental adaptation, forgetting, habituation. Moreover, learning rules provide
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a quantitative approach (in our case through the motivations for actions) that can potentially
be linked to neuronal decision making (Dayan and Abbott, 2005; Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2005;
Niv, 2009). It is thus interesting to see that a fairly simple learning rule based on the widely
accepted principle of trial-and-error produces qualitatively similar behavior as TFT, although
reinforcement learning is much less domain specific than TFT.
In the repeated matching setting, individuals meet different partners at each interaction
round. The learning task is here more complicated because an individual must adapt to an
entire population composed of different types of learners who themselves adapt their behavior.
Here, we mainly observed results of type (3), i.e., inference-based learning generally dominated
the population at an evolutionary equilibrium. The most representative example is the aver-
age Hawk-Dove game, where we found that inference-based learning was able to exploit the
tendency of reinforcement learners to play the “Dove” action too often, especially when rein-
forcement learners are in a high frequency in the population. Besides, we also observed in this
repeated matching model an interaction between genetic predisposition for actions and learning
rule in the average Prisoner’s Dilemma. When individuals initially prefer “Defection”, we ob-
tained a neutral situation where both types learn full defection. However, when individuals had
an initial preference for “Cooperation”, reinforcement learning could lead to cooperation when
in high frequency in the population, and get exploited by inference-based learning which always
lead to defect.
The primary goal of this paper was to provide some intuition as to when a learning rule being
located one step up in the cognitive hierarchy than reinforcement learning can be favored by se-
lection in simple situations of social interactions. In comparative cognition (Shettleworth, 2009),
trial-and-error learning is often the null hypothesis against which one tests hypotheses regard-
ing more advanced cognition, and we adopted the same approach here by letting reinforcement
compete with inference-based learning. Our findings illustrate that learning rules using more
information do not necessarily outcompete reinforcement learning in social interactions, so the
advantage of “complex cognition” is not automatic, unlikely to be gradual, and depends on the
type of games played by the individuals in a population.
It might be difficult to assess the payoff structure of the games played by real animals, but our
results show that when individuals cannot condition their actions on the type of games they are
are playing, the results only depend on the average game over the entire lifespan of an individual,
which can thus be used to produce prediction about the psychological capacities of that species.
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More generally, being able to condition behavior on the type of game requires to detect features
of the environment and combine them correctly in order to compute game payoffs accordingly,
which is cognitively more demanding and requires more inference than we have assumed in
this paper. Here we only assumed that individuals had access to limited information on missed
opportunities. This is based on the observation that in nature, it is difficult to assess the value
of actions before trying them (e.g., assessing the quantity of resource available on a food patch)
but trying them can give cues not only about the actions themselves, but also about alternative
related options (e.g., noticing that a food patch has been exploited by others is a cue that nearby
patches have probably also been exploited).
Our paper also contributes to modeling in behavioral ecology, where researchers acknowl-
edge the need for describing animal behavior in terms of general rules that are used to face
several decision problems an individual may face (McNamara and Houston, 2009; Dijker, 2011;
Hammerstein and Stevens, 2012; Fawcett et al., 2013). By modeling an environment where
individuals face different social games and partners, but use the same behavioral rule (either
reinforcement or belief-based learning), a learning rule can only works well on average. We
concentrated here in this context on social behaviors only under the simplest games, but this
approach can also be applied for studying rules of behavior that can serve under a variety of
ecological contexts, or under more complex social structures. This may help to better delineate
the possible evolutionary paths from simple to more sophisticated decision-making processes.
Chapter4
Environmental complexity, reaction
norms, and the evolution of learning
Abstract
Learning is a specific form of phenotypic plasticity and as such it may enhance fitness in changing envi-
ronments. But learning is also different from simpler forms of plasticity, like innate responses to stimuli.
However, classical models of the evolution of learning do not clearly distinguish between learning and
other forms of plasticity. Thus, it remains unclear in what sense learning provides a fitness advantage. In
this work, we consider explicitly the evolutionary transition from innate responses to stimuli to learning,
by modeling an environment where an animal can encounter a large number of stimuli (or situations) in
the course of its lifespan. In ourmodel, animals are assumed to have amaximal brain size and the genotype
of an individual codes for the proportion of memory “slots” dedicated to innate responses vs. dynamic
slots used for learning. We argue that a reliance on a dynamic memory can help in dealing with a very
large number of stimuli, thanks to the ability to forget past information. We study the validity of our
argument in two special cases of the model. First, if an animal encounters environmental stimuli totally
randomly, we find that learning does not provide a fitness advantage because the probability to encounter
the same stimulus twice in a short period of time is too low. Second, in environments where a minimum
memory size is required to remember interactions with stimuli, it is shown that reliance on a dynamic
memory can evolve as long as the environment is complex enough, i.e. if the environment contains a
sufficiently large number of stimuli. We conclude that environmental complexity could be an important
but overlooked factor driving the evolution of learning and memory.
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4.1 Introduction
Phenotypic plasticity, the ability of an organism with a given genotype to produce different
phenotypes as a function of environmental conditions, is a universal biological feature that is
favored by natural selection (Pigliucci, 2001). Its evolutionary advantage is due to the fact that
it allows to express appropriate phenotypes under environmental variability (be it spatial or
temporal), a fact supported theoretically and empirically (Gomulkiewicz and Kirkpatrick, 1992;
Gavrilets and Scheiner, 1993; Pigliucci, 2005).
In the field of animal behavior, learning is probably the most studied form of phenotypic
plasticity (Dukas, 2004; Shettleworth, 2009). Behaviorally speaking, learning may be defined
as the change of actions as a function of experience, i.e., the use of environmental information
to gradually change behavior. There is an important body of research within the field of evo-
lutionary biology that focuses on the question of when natural selection would favor learning.
Surprisingly, this work seems to be relatively independent from the work on the adaptive value
of plasticity, despite the fact that the conditions under which learning is found to be selected for
are qualitatively similar to the conditions favoring the evolution of general phenotypic plastic-
ity. Indeed, there is a certain consensus in evolutionary biology on the idea that learning tends
to be favored under (mainly between-generation) fluctuating environments (Boyd and Richer-
son, 1988; Stephens, 1991; Feldman et al., 1996; Kerr and Feldman, 2003; Wakano et al., 2004;
Dunlap and Stephens, 2009). This result looks similar to the above idea that plasticity is favored
under varying environments and, accordingly, the intuitive explanation of the adaptiveness of
learning is the same as the one for the adaptiveness of plasticity. Namely, individuals who can
adapt their phenotype (or behavior) to the present environmental conditions must have a fit-
ness advantage over individuals who only express genetically determined actions inherited from
their parents (who might have lived in different environmental conditions). In view of the two
bodies of literature (general phenotypic plasticity on one hand, learning on the other hand) one
might then ask: if learning is just a particular form of phenotypic plasticity and is selected under
similar conditions than general phenotypic plasticity, why then formulate specific models of the
evolution of learning (Hollis and Guillette, 2011)?
This question can be answered by realizing that learning has its mechanistic specificities, that
distinguishes it from other forms of plasticity. For example, learning may be selected against in
environments that change too fast within an individual’s lifespan, because learning takes time:
an individual must be able to reuse information gathered from past actions, and this is impos-
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sible in environments that change too often. This is a difference with certain other (reversible)
reaction norms, where an organism can readily change its phenotype as soon as the environment
changes (e.g., temperature in ectotherms), because it has a genetically encoded program to tune
the phenotype to environmental conditions.
This distinction between learning and other reaction norms leads to an important conceptual
point: while learning is certainly a form of plasticity (and in this sense, it is not surprising that
it is selected under somehow similar environmental conditions than general phenotypic plastic-
ity), there are other, simpler, forms of plasticity in animal behavior that would also allow to deal
with environmental fluctuations, but their evolutionary relevance have rarely been modeled and
compared with learning in the specific context of animal behavior (Kerr, 2007). From an empir-
ical standpoint, there are many examples in nature showing that individuals tend to have innate,
hard-wired responses to certain stimuli (e.g., Mery and Kawecki, 2004; Riffell et al., 2008; Gong,
2012) and these responses are likely to be favored by natural selection (Dorosheva et al., 2011).
As noted above, since time is a valuable resource for living organisms, why then take time and
bother learning to adapt to a stimulus when an innate reaction could a be more direct way to
cope with it?
An answer can be found in models for the evolution of learning (e.g., Wakano et al., 2004;
Dunlap and Stephens, 2009), where it is argued that the fitness consequences of actions taken
in response to a given stimulus might change because of environmental fluctuations. Under
these circumstances, learning is favored over innate responses because it allows to change an
animal’s reaction to this particular stimulus. But, while being convincing, this argument does
not settle the debate for two reasons. First, this argument gives one particular reason for why
natural selection favors learning over innate reaction norms, but there may be other conditions
that favor learning (in other words, one must make the distinction between a necessary and a
sufficient condition). Second, models of the evolution of learning almost never take into account
several stimuli or situations at the same time, but only focus on a given situation and ask what
happens if the fitness consequences of actions applied to this situation change. In order to justify
the evolution of learning on realistic grounds, one should rather take into account the full range
of stimuli or situations an individual may face in the course of its lifespan, and the present paper
proposes to do so.
When trying to account for the full range of situations an animal has to face, one quickly real-
izes that this number must be astronomical. The world is constituted of an enormous amount of
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different situations, where each of these situations triggers a particular combination of sensory
perceptions in an animal’s brain. It seems then impossible to encode (even with the abstract en-
coding provided by neural networks, Dayan and Abbott, 2005; Enquist and Ghirlanda, 2005) in
a finite brain the whole amount of environmental stimuli. This leads us to propose that learning
and forgetting might be useful to deal with environmental complexity. The idea is that forget-
ting allows to remove from memory past situations, in order to encode and learn new situations
as they are encountered by an animal, and thus makes possible to react to an arbitrarily large
number of situations. The adaptive value of forgetting has already been discussed in previous
research, but (again) on the grounds of environmental variability (Kraemer and Golding, 1997;
Kerr and Feldman, 2003). According to these researchers, forgetting allows to face the same
situation at distinct instants and if the optimal behavior for that situation has changed, an indi-
vidual will be able to generate different behavior. We propose here a different role for forgetting:
it allows to encode different situations, or different stimuli, because different stimuli may be en-
countered at distinct instants of time. Even in the absence of environmental fluctuations, an
individual is likely to encounter in the course of its lifespan a large number of environmental
stimuli and learning to interact with new stimuli should give a fitness advantage.
A model is presented below that formalizes this verbal argument. In this model, an ani-
mal is seen as having a maximum amount of memory at its disposal for brain functioning. The
genotype of an individual prescribes to allocate different amounts of memory either to innate re-
sponses to stimuli or to a dynamic memory that can encode, learn about, and forget stimuli. The
world is comprised of a finite (but possibly very large) number of stimuli (or situations), where
each stimulus is characterized by its own set of optimal and suboptimal actions. Importantly,
environmental fluctuations are not explicitly considered, because the goal here is precisely to as-
sess the effect of environmental complexity per se. It is asked whether a large number of stimuli
in the environment (a measure of environmental complexity) creates an evolutionary pressure
in favor of a greater allocation of memory to learning.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Environment
Consider animals acting during a finite decision period of length T . At each decision step
t (t = 1,2, . . . ,T ), an animal has to choose an action among a fixed set A = {1, . . . ,n}. The
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action chosen is a response to the currently faced and environmentally determined stimulus, st .
There is a set of stimuli S = {1, . . . ,k}, and at each time t a stimulus st is drawn in S according
to a homogeneous and irreducible Markov chain {st }Tt=1 with transition probabilities ⇢s s 0 =
P{st+1 = s 0|st = s}. Thus ⇢s s 0 is the probability to encounter stimulus s 0 a time t + 1 given
that stimulus s was met at time t . Moreover, it will be assumed that this Markov chain in its
stationary distribution, and that the stationary distribution is uniform, which can be written
µs = 1/k for all s 2 S, where µs is the stationary probability that stimulus s obtains. This has
the consequence that the proportion of lifetime an individual will spend interacting with any
one stimulus is equal to 1/k.
As a result of taking action a in response to stimulus s , an individual receives payoff ⇡(a, s ),
which increments (or decrements) its fecundity by a proportional amount. For the sake of
simplicity, action a applied in response to a given stimulus s is assumed to be either optimal and
give payoff xs , or be suboptimal and give payoff ys . In other words, for each stimulus s , the
action set can be divided into two sets: a set of optimal actions, and a set of suboptimal actions.
Each stimulus s is characterized by its own set of optimal actions, so that ✓s is the number of
optimal actions associated to stimulus s . The other n  ✓s are suboptimal for stimulus s . Even
if this is an oversimplification of reality, this allows to associate to each stimulus two important
characteristics: the difficulty of learning the optimal action for the stimulus, measured by ✓s ,
and the importance of a stimulus on fitness, given by xs   ys . The closer ✓s is to n, the easier
it is to learn the optimal action for stimulus s . The bigger xs   ys is, the bigger is the effect of
learning a correct action for this stimulus on fitness.
4.2.2 Behavioral rule
The decision system of the animal is modeled as a finite number of associations between
stimulus and action. It is assumed that the animal has a memory of size m, i.e., it can encode
only m associations between stimulus and action. From these m memory “slots”, the genotype
prescribes to have j fixed associations. These j associations are present at birth and hold j
templates of stimuli together with the innate response of the animal to these stimuli. It will
be called the behavioral reaction norm of the animal. Note that if j = 0, the animal is born
with a blank slate, with absolutely no innate tendency to respond to any stimulus (Kerr and
Feldman, 2003). Let G be the set of stimuli to which the animal has an innate response (|G| =
j , G ⇢ S). For each stimulus s 2 G, the animal has a genetically determined mixed strategy
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z(s ) = (z(1, s ), . . . , z(n, s )) 2 A (withPa2A z(a, s ) = 1, where z(a, s ) is the probability to take
action a when stimulus s is encountered). The collection (z(s ))s2G constitutes what is called the
behavioral reaction norm of the animal.
The rest of the memory (m  j slots) is dynamic and can encode new stimuli encountered in
the course of lifespan. Let denote by F the set of dynamic memory slots, which can be occupied
by stimuli. In this “flexible” memory, new stimuli can replace old ones and the animal is assumed
to respond to the stimuli in F . With this, a stimulus st encountered at time t can either be
genetically encoded in the memory (the event {st 2 G} obtains), be located in the dynamic
memory (event {st 2 F } obtains), or is unknown and this is denoted by {st 2 U }. Actions
associated to the dynamic part of the memory are updated according to a learning process, and
qt (a, s ) denotes the probability that action a is taken at time t if stimulus s in the dynamic
memory is encountered in the environment.
In summary, the probability that an animal takes action a at any time t , when stimulus st is
faced, can be written as
pt (a) =
8>><>>:
z(a, st ), if st 2G,
qt (a, st ), if st 2 F ,
1/n, if st 2 U ,
(4.1)
where in the third case, when an unknown stimulus is met, a random behavior is applied. One
can then introduce the following shorthand notation for the expected payoff obtained in each
of these three cases,
E[⇡(at , st )|st ] =
8>><>>:
⇡G(st ) =
P
a2A z(a, st )⇡(a, st ), if st 2G,
⇡F (st ) =
P
a2A qt (a, st )⇡(a, st ), if st 2 F ,
⇡U (st ) =
P
a2A 1n⇡(a, st ), if st 2 U .
(4.2)
4.2.3 Stimulus replacement mechanism
What does happen when a new, unknown stimulus, st 2 U , is encountered? It was just said
that the first action in response to a new stimulus is randomly chosen. But the next question
is: should the animal store in memory the outcome of the interaction with that new stimulus?
One possibility is to assume that, when an unknown stimulus is met, the animal always wants
to encode it in its memory F . Consequently, the new stimulus st will either take a free slot,
or will replace another stimulus. For the first m   j encounters with non-innately encoded
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stimuli, the new stimuli will take free slots in F and there is nothing to specify further. But
for subsequent decision steps, new stimuli will have to replace other ones in F . This is done
via a replacement rule. It is assumed the following replacement rule, which is taken from Kerr
and Feldman (2003). A stimulus has a lifespan in memory of m   j time steps (i.e., the size of
the dynamic memory), starting from the last encounter with the stimulus. This means that if a
stimulus is not met more than once in m  j steps, it is forgotten. Otherwise, the stimulus stays
in memory. This is a simplified view of forgetting, but the details of the forgetting mechanism do
not influence the qualitative results of the model. However, note that the presence of forgetting
is key for a learning system, because it allows to encode new stimuli as they are encountered by
an individual. With this rule, the dynamic memory will never contain more than m  j stimuli
at the same time as required by the definition of the model. Importantly, it is assumed that
when a stimulus is removed from memory, all the associated information is lost. If this stimulus
is encountered later, then the individual will have to re-learn to interact with it.
The details of the learning rule are not critical for our main purpose but an example of
how the learning rule could be implemented may help to give a better grasp of the model.
For this, one could simply consider that the animal uses a linear operator updating rule for
preferences (motivations) over actions, and take the action that maximizes these preferences
with some perturbation due to exploration or error, as is described in eqs. 2.1–2.4 of Chapter
2, which leads to expressions for the vector (qt (a, s ))(a,s )2A⇥F of taking actions associated to the
stimuli in the dynamic memory.
4.2.4 Model summary
Summarizing the description of this model, the genotype of an individual is
g= (m, j ,G, (z(s ))s2G , , ), (4.3)
which belongs to the spaceG of possible genotypes. In the analysis of the model, we will mainly
be interested in the optimal value of j (how blank should the slate be at birth?), thus the other
genotypic values will be considered as parameters of the model. One can also describe succinctly
the state of an individual at time t of lifespan as its dynamics probabilities (qt (a, s ))(a,s )2A⇥F of
taking learned actions.
The number of offspring produced by an individual (fecundity) will be assumed to depend on
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the average payoff it acquires during lifespan, and we will be interested in the long term average
f = lim
T!1
1
T
TX
t=1
⇡(at , st ), (4.4)
which can be thought of as the expected number of offspring produced by an individual. Hence,
natural selection favors the individuals with genotype g that have maximum reproductive out-
put, that is the genotype that solve the maximization problem
max
g2G f (g). (4.5)
4.3 Evolution of the optimal j value
Here, a number of additional assumptions are described that will simplify the model in order
to focus on the main point of this model: environmental complexity, that is the number, k, of
stimuli in the environment, can select for having an intermediate value of j (i.e., 0 < j < m),
which corresponds to individuals who have behavioral reaction norms but are also able to learn
to react to several stimuli.
4.3.1 Homogeneous environment
It is assumed that the environment is completely homogeneous, whereby
— ✓s = ✓s 0 = ✓,
— xs = xs 0 = x and ys = ys 0 = y,
for all s , s 0 2 S. This assumption of homogeneity greatly simplifies the model because the con-
tent of G is now irrelevant: we do not need to know which stimuli are innately recognized by
the animal, since all stimuli are equivalent in terms of effect on fitness. Note, however, that the
stimuli are still different, because the ✓ actions that are optimal for stimulus s can be different
from the ✓ actions that are optimal for stimulus s 0. Hence, a behavioral reaction norm is still the
minimum requirement; playing always the same action (purely genetic behavior) is not adapted
to this environment.
4.3.2 Optimal reaction norms
Further, it will be assumed that the behavioral reaction norms are optimal. This assumption
might seem strong, but since our goal is to look for the conditions that favor the evolution of
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learning as opposed to behavioral reaction norms, it is obvious that if learning can evolve in
the presence of optimal reaction norms, it will a fortiori evolve in the presence of suboptimal
reaction norms.
4.4 Analysis
It is now assumed that only j evolves, that is, an individual is characterized by the number of
memory slots dedicated to innate vs. learned responses to stimuli.
4.4.1 Simplifications for payoffs
Letting an individual interact a very long time with its environment (T !1), the behavioral
dynamics will eventually enter into a stationary state and we will evaluate expected payoffs in
this state. Because the optimal reaction norm is independent of the stimulus, we can write the
expected payoffs when a response to a stimulus is innate as ⇡G = E[⇡(at , st )|st 2 G] = x.
The expected payoff obtained by taking actions randomly (independently of time t ) is ⇡U =
E[⇡(at , st )|st 2 U ] = (✓/n)x + (1   [✓/n])y. Finally, let ⇡F = E[⇡(at , st )|st 2 F ] be the
expected payoff obtained when a stimulus is in the dynamic memory. This expression is very
complicated to evaluate explicitly, but under reasonable assumptions on the learning system,
the payoff for learning will be higher than the one by taking actions at random ⇡F > ⇡U .
Another reasonable assumption is that ⇡F < x, because the average learning payoff must be a
convex combination of x and y. It is also noteworthy that ⇡F will generally depend on the
genotype j , because the number of memory slots dedicated to learning affects the number of
time steps that a stimulus stays in memory (and the more a stimulus stays in memory, the
greater the opportunities to learn the optimal action for that particular stimulus). However,
we will generally ignore this effect of j on ⇡F . This assumption might restrict the conditions
under which learning can evolve, but the results presented below suggest that it unlikely totally
impedes the evolution of a learning ability.
In the stationary state, we also have a constant probability PG = P{st 2 G} that a current
stimulus, st , is innately encoded, a constant probability PF = P{st 2 F |st /2G} that the current
stimulus is remembered, given it is not innate (i.e., st is present in the dynamic memory), and
1  PF = P{st /2 F |st /2 G} is the probability that st is not remembered, given it is not innate.
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With the above, the expected payoff to a focal individual with memory j is
f ( j ) = PG⇡G + (1  PG)⇥PF⇡F + (1  PF )⇡U⇤ . (4.6)
As will be seen below, the expression for PF depends on the size of the dynamicmemory (m 
j ) as well as on the details of the environmental pattern of encounters with stimuli. However,
PG is always the same because of the assumption that the environment is Markovian and is in a
stationary uniform distribution, i.e.,
PG =
j
k
, (4.7)
whereby (1  PG) = (k   j )/k. Thus, the expected payoff is
f ( j ) =
j
k
x +
k   j
k
⇥
PF⇡F + (1  PF )⇡U⇤ . (4.8)
In order to be able to maximize f ( j ), one must find an explicit expression for PF . Two special
cases of environmental pattern of encounters with stimuli are studied now (which are special
cases of the general Markovian environment postulated in this paper) and the probability PF is
derived in each case.
4.4.2 Case 1: i.i.d. stimulus draw
Let us first consider that the stimuli are generated according to a simple random process
where, conditional on a given stimulus sent by the environment, each stimulus has the same
probability 1/k to be met at the next time step. This will be called an “i.i.d. process” (where
“i.i.d.” stands for “independently and identically distributed”), and thus there are no temporal
correlations in stimuli.
In order to obtain the expression for PF , one must look at the history of interactions with
stimuli. Since our condition for forgetting a stimulus is similar to Kerr and Feldman (2003), this
probability is given by their eq. 10, i.e.,
1 
Ç
k   1
k
åmin[m  j ,t 1]
. (4.9)
Because we consider only the asymptotic limit of payoffs (eq. 4.4), the first m  j steps of inter-
action with stimuli can be ignored, and the above expression simplifies and gives
PF = 1 
Ç
k   1
k
åm  j
. (4.10)
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A justification for this equation is as follows. Considering that t is bigger than m   j , our
implementation of memory described above implies that the stimulus st met at time t is in F
if and only if it has been encountered in one of the last m   j steps. On the other hand, st is
not in F if it was not met in the last m  j steps. It is easier to compute the probability of this
last case, st /2 F . For st to not be in F , one needs that st is not met during the last m  j steps.
The probability that st is not met on one of these steps is (k  1)/k. Since we need that st is not
met on m  j such steps and since stimulus draws are independent across time steps (because of
the assumption of i.i.d. stimulus draw), the probability that st is not in F is 1 PF =
Ä
k 1
k
äm  j
.
The probability to remember st is obtained by taking the complementary probability, hence
eq. 4.10. We see that provided that t > m   j , the probability to remember a stimulus does
not depend explicitly on time, as required by the assumption used to derive the equation for
expected average payoff (eq. 4.6).
Using eq. 4.10, the average payoff can be written as
f ( j ) =
j
k
x +
k   j
k
 
(1  PF )⇡U + PF⇡F   ,
=
j
k
x +
k   j
k
24Çk   1
k
åm  j
⇡U +
 
1 
Ç
k   1
k
åm  j!
⇡F
35 . (4.11)
The j value satisfying the first order condition d f ( j )/d j = 0 for a maximum can be expressed
in terms of a Lambert function, but there is no real value of j between 0 and m that satisfies this
equation. Consequently, there are no local optima in f ( j ), so it is either monotonically increas-
ing or decreasing. A simple derivation shows that f (m) > f (m  1), hence f is monotonically
increasing, thus the optimal j is j ⇤ = m (Fig. 4.1).
This model thus yields a negative result: learning does not evolve when the encounters with
environmental stimuli are totally random. In the next section, a simple, but abstract condition
for natural selection to favor an intermediate value of j (i.e., 0< j ⇤ < m) is provided.
4.4.3 Case 2: where a minimum memory size is required to remember stimuli
In the previous section, it was shown that when the stimuli follow an i.i.d. process, the prob-
ability PF to remember a stimulus on a second encounter is a decreasing function of j . Here,
leaving out the details of the pattern of encounters with environmental stimuli, this probability
is assumed to be a threshold function of j .
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Figure 4.1: Average payoff, f ( j ), in the i.i.d. model (eq. 4.11) as a function of the number of innate
responses to stimuli, j , the average payoff for learned responses to stimuli, ⇡F , and the complexity of the
environment, k. Parameter values: m = 30,⇡U = 1, x = 10.
Formally, the assumption here is that there is a certain i (0< i < m) such that
PF =
8<:0, if j > i ,
c , if j  i ,
(4.12)
where c is a constant (0 < c < 1). In other words, an individual must have a dynamic memory
(F ) of size at least m  i slots in order to have a chance to remember interactions with a stimulus;
and there is no memory gain in increasing the size of the dynamic memory provided it is of size
at least m   i (a possible example where such a condition might be verified is a cyclic environ-
ment, where interactions with a given stimulus are separated by relatively long incompressible
intervals). With this, it shall be shown that there exists a k sufficiently large such that j ⇤ = i .
The first step is to notice that the total payoff for an individual with j > i simplifies to
f ( j ) =
j
k
x +
k   j
k
⇡U , (4.13)
because of the assumption that PF = 0 if j > i (eq. 4.8). Among all individuals who have a j > i ,
f ( j ) is strictly increasing, thus the best possible j is simply j = m, that is an individual should
use all its memory for behavioral reaction norms.
For an individual with j  i , the total payoff is
f ( j ) =
j
k
x +
k   j
k
 
c⇡U + (1  c)⇡F   . (4.14)
Among all individuals who have a j  i , again the relation f ( j + 1) > f ( j ) holds, thus the
individual with f (i ) has the optimal payoff among those. In order to show that j ⇤ = i , it now
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remains to prove that the inequality f (i ) > f (m) has a solution. Solving this inequality for k
yields
k >
i (c⇡U + (1  c)⇡F )+ (m  i )x  m⇡U
(1  c)(⇡F  ⇡U ) . (4.15)
The right hand side of this expression will be called kmin so that this inequality becomes k >
kmin. This condition describes the minimum value of k for j ⇤ to be equal to i , as a function
of the parameters of the model. In particular, kmin is decreasing in i , which means that more
complex environments select for a greater reliance on learning. In Fig. 4.2, the dependence of
kmin on the model parameters is shown. In particular, it is a decreasing function of ⇡F , because
this parameter can be thought as measuring the efficiency of the learning rule of the animal.
The closer is ⇡F to the optimal payoff x, the more efficient the learning rule is and the easier
it is for learning to evolve. The probability PF = c represents the difficulty of the environment
in terms of pattern of encounters with stimuli (low values of c correspond to a small chance
to remember stimuli and thus a “difficult” environment), and thus kmin is decreasing in c . The
abrupt dependence of PF on j seems to be important for the evolution of learning (Fig. 4.3).
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Figure 4.2: Dependence of kmin (eq. 4.15) on the model parameters in Case 2. When not varied, parame-
ter values are: m = 30, i = 15,d = 1, x = 10,⇡F = 5, c = 0.5.
4.5 Summary of results
In this work, the question of the evolution of learning as an alternative to innate responses
to variable stimuli has been investigated. The distinguishing feature of the present research is
that it tries to account for a wide range of situations/stimuli faced by an organism, in contrast to
previous models for the evolution of learning that considered only one situation (or stimulus)
under many environmental conditions. In the model, the decision system of an animal is viewed
as a limited number of associations between stimulus and action. Our goal was to show that
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Figure 4.3: Probability, PF , to recall a stimulus as a function of the number of memory slots, j , dedicated
to innate responses to stimuli. Red: Case 1 (eq. 4.10); Black: Case 2 (eq. 4.12). Parameter values: k =
30,m = 20,⇡U = 1, x = 10,⇡F = 5, c = 1/3, i = 20.
given this limit on memory (the parameter m), a process of learning and forgetting could allow
to deal with a great number of environmental stimuli (the parameter k), and would thus be
selected for.
Several simplifying assumptions were made in order to obtain analytical tractability. Most
importantly, it was assumed that all stimuli had an equal effect on fitness, and we considered that
lifespan was long enough so that an individual has interacted with a great number of environ-
mental stimuli and reached a behavioral equilibrium. Finally, it was postulated that individuals
had optimal innate reactions norms, and this assumption was made on the ground that in the
absence of learning, optimal reaction norms was the only possible evolutionary endpoint in the
modeled environment.
Two particular cases of environmental pattern of encounters with stimuli were studied. In
the first case, it was assumed that there was no particular structure to the environment so that
an individual encounters stimuli at random. The result obtained in this case is negative: learning
does not evolve, because the benefit of investing one slot of memory to learning was too small
compared to the effect of obtaining the optimal payoff for one innately encoded stimulus, even
if only a small number of stimuli-response situations can be genetically encoded. The low effect
of investing a slot to the dynamic memory in complex environments is due to the fact that in our
random setting of encounters with stimuli, the bigger is k the smaller is PF (and limk!1 PF = 0),
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whatever the value of j is.
In a second case, an abstract leap was taken, and no explicit environmental dynamics was
considered, but rather a general assumption on the relation between the probability to recall a
stimulus in memory and the size of the dynamic memory was used. Namely, in this case an
individual must have a minimum size of the dynamic memory in order to be able to remember
interactions with stimuli. This assumption allowed to derive a general result on the evolution
of learning: as long as the environment is complex enough (i.e., if k is big enough), then any
combination of reliance on learning vs. innate reaction norms can be achieved. The empirical
significance of this result remains to be demonstrated however, because we could not find an
example of environmental dynamics supporting it.
Looking ahead, many additional features of real environments would be interesting to study
in relation to the evolution of learning in this model. First, it would be informative to see what
happens if one considers more heterogeneous environments, where stimuli vary in their quality,
and their frequency in an animal’s environment. It seems indeed reasonable to think that fre-
quent stimuli having an important effect on fitness should have an innate, immediate response,
while for other less important stimuli, an animal can take the risk to lose time and energy in
learning. However, the stimuli less frequently met are more difficult to learn because an individ-
ual usually needs to experiment many actions to find a good one. How these two effects interact
to generate the evolution of learning and memory? Another important area of study would be
to investigate how environmental complexity (the magnitude of k) interact with environmental
fluctuations. It is well established that environmental fluctuations can select for the evolution of
learning. In the present model, environmental fluctuations could be implemented by changing
the fitness consequences of actions applied to stimuli. Does environmental complexity enhance
or inhibit the evolution of learning under fluctuating environments? All these questions open
the road to more general models of the evolution of learning that take into account relevant
features of real environments.
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Chapter5
Conclusion
This thesis began with the aim to assess the evolutionary significance of specific learning
mechanisms, based on observed behavior of animals, that can be used to cope with a wide range
of ecologically relevant situations. A special focus was given to social interactions, because bio-
logical fitness very often depends on the actions of other population members. We also tried to
find an extended set of conditions under which one can expect learning abilities to be favored by
natural selection.
5.1 Summary of results and discussion
5.1.1 Specificities of learning rules
Because animals and humans use the same brain to cope with all the decisions they face, it
is argued in this thesis (following a recent trend of research in animal behavior, McNamara and
Houston, 2009; Fawcett et al., 2013; Lotem, 2013) that the learning abilities of a given organ-
ism must share common features to deal with the variety of social and non-social circumstances
proposed by its ecological niche. In Chapter 2, mathematical results from game theory and
stochastic approximation were used to follow this approach. The goal of this part of the thesis
was to contribute to building a mapping from cognitive abilities to produced behavior. Empiri-
cists interested in animal behavior generally face the inverse problem: given observed actions of
a species, what can be said about its psychological, cognitive, and computational abilities? Years
of field observations and experimental investigations have led behavioral ecologists to propose
a variety of mechanisms, from simple ones like the law of effect, to more involved ones like
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Bayesian learning, but it remains difficult to assess the plausibility of these mechanisms unless
one studies what they really entail in terms of the shape of learning curves and endpoints of
behavioral dynamics. Moreover, evolutionary biologists also need to know the phenotypes pro-
duced by these rules so that they can formulate statements about their evolutionary significance.
A number of learning rules from behavioral ecology and game theory were thus considered
in the context of general social (and also non-social) decision problems. The learning rules stud-
ied were members of a general class of rules parametrized by several psychological characteristics
or cognitive abilities. That is, we considered that animals could vary in their tendency to explore
or be impulsive, in their abilities to infer payoffs of actions not tried, and also in their memory
capacities. It was assumed that environments were fluctuating so that the specific situation en-
countered by an individual was possibly different at every decision step. The features of the
environment that produced these variations were considered to be undetectable by the individu-
als. All information individuals could get was related to the payoffs of actions in their behavioral
repertoire. To illustrate the predictive power of this approach, it was applied to two particular
questions: (1) What is the behavioral outcome of the Hawk-Dove game played by learners of
different types? (2) Does the sophisticated Bayesian Learning rule outcompete reinforcement
learning in a foraging task, in the presence of scroungers (producer-scrounger game)? Question
(1) was behavioral only, while question (2) was evolutionary, as we modeled natural selection on
these two learning rules.
Equations approximating the long-run behavior of individuals interacting in social games
were obtained and these equations provided a decomposition of behavior into the tendency of
individuals to exploit actions leading to high payoff and the tendency to explore novel actions
(eq. 2.13). Importantly, the “average game” played by individuals in the fluctuating environ-
ment determined long-run behavior. Comparison of approximation equations with simulations
in the Hawk-Dove game showed that the approximation was quite good for individuals who
have only a small tendency to explore, i.e., it works better for impulsive individuals. We also
showed that the approximation concords to real stochastic behavior of the rules when time is
large, especially if individuals display preference reversal in the course of learning. Preference
reversal is defined by the fact that an action for which an animal has a genetic predisposition
becomes less preferred after the animal acquires knowledge of current payoffs during learning.
In the producer-scrounger model (question (2) above), the role of the exploration tendency of
individuals was shown to be critical to determine the fate of co-evolving learning rules.
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One of the psychological features modeled in the rules of Chapter 2 is the ability to infer
payoffs (or rewards) of actions not tried by an individual. This entails that an animal is able
to imagine (or mentally simulate) situations not physically perceived, in order to reason about
alternative behaviors (Emery and Clayton, 2001, 2004; Taylor et al., 2012). The sophisticated
strategies of food caching in corvids provide an example, where it is thought that animals can
imagine that others may pilfer their caches (Emery and Clayton, 2001). More generally, it re-
mains controversial to what extent animals can reason and deduce from environmental cues the
rewards of actions that they do not explicitly try.
Chapter 3 thus focused on what may be called inference-based learning and reinforcement
learning. In inference-based learning, an individual is able to compute the payoffs of actions it
did not explicitly try and updates its motivations (or preferences over actions) accordingly. In re-
inforcement learning, an animal can only know payoffs associated to experienced actions. Since
social interactions are thought to have driven the evolution of advanced cognition (Humphrey,
1976; Alexander, 1979; Gavrilets and Vose, 2006), we tested the idea that pairwise social inter-
actions favor the ability to infer missed payoffs. These pairwise games varied in the same way
as in Chapter 2, and we analyzed three cases of average game: Prisoner’s Dilemma, Hawk-Dove
game, and Coordination game. Natural selection on the two learning rules (inference-based and
reinforcement learning) was modeled and it was asked what is the equilibrium frequency of these
rules in a large population.
Results depended on the type of average game faced by individuals and also on the matching
scheme (i.e., the presence or absence of repeated interactions between the same individuals). Of
the different cases of environment and matching investigated, a majority led to the evolution
of inference-based learning to a high equilibrium frequency. This suggests that the capacity to
infer missed payoffs indeed gives a fitness advantage in most situations modeled in the Chapter
3, but several examples showed that reinforcement learning could also be the evolutionarily
stable learning rule. For instance, when the average game was a Prisoner’s Dilemma, pairs of
repeatedly interacting reinforcement learners were able to learn to cooperate and extract the
maximal mutual payoffs out of this social dilemma. Empirical investigation is needed to assess
what are the ecological situations faced by animals among the variety of situations we tried
to capture, but our model gives intuition about why trial-and-error learning is so common in
animals, since it often resisted invasion by the sophisticated inference-based learning strategy.
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5.1.2 Origins of learning
In the last part of this thesis (Chapter 4), a broader view of the evolution of learning was
adopted, and the question of how learning abilities can emerge from other simpler forms of
phenotypic plasticity was tackled. Because learning is a special type of reaction norm, it might
be justified by appealing to the general conditions that favor the evolution of reaction norms
(West-Eberhard, 1989; Gavrilets and Scheiner, 1993; Pigliucci, 2001). However, because of its
specificities that distinguish it from lower levels of plasticity, learning requires special environ-
mental patterns in order to be selected for. Previous research largely ignored this evolutionary
transition, because in theoretical models, learning is generally opposed to purely genetically
determined behavior. The intermediate step that consists of innate responses to stimuli is not
accounted for. It is difficult to know why this step is not modeled: it might be because re-
searchers just focus on a particular stimulus or situation, and implicitly consider that learning
evolves from these innate responses; or because there is a conceptual misunderstanding on the
levels of plasticity.
It was argued in Chapter 4 that because of this conceptual fuzziness, an important factor in
the evolution of learning and forgetting has been overlooked, namely environmental complex-
ity. What is meant by “environmental complexity” is the fact that biological organisms may
interact with a very large number of stimuli (or situations) in the course of their lifespan. Im-
portantly, the number of potential situations in one’s environment may be larger than what can
be encoded in a single brain, so individuals must resort to a higher level of plasticity than innate
responses to stimuli. This higher level is learning, which, combined with forgetting (Kraemer
and Golding, 1997; Kerr and Feldman, 2003), allow a dynamic process where stimuli enter and
leave memory sequentially. In this way an individual can respond to an arbitrarily high num-
ber of stimuli as long as it has the time to learn the optimal solution for each single stimulus
encountered. A mathematical model was developed to test the validity of this verbal argument
where the genotype of an individual was conceptualized as the proportion of total memory size
dedicated to learning vs. innate responses to stimuli.
It was found that an ability to learn to associate stimuli with optimal actions evolves only
under special assumptions on the environment and the learning system. Importantly, an envi-
ronment where stimuli are encountered completely randomly, without any particular structure,
cannot select for learning. The reason is that when the number of stimuli is larger than the size
of the animal’s memory, the probability to interact with a stimulus twice in a short period of
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time is low and learning hardly happens. On the other hand, an abstract condition was derived
in a second environmental pattern. When a minimum memory size is required to remember
interactions with stimuli, the corresponding amount of memory size dedicated to learning can
be made evolutionarily stable as long as the environment is complex enough.
5.2 Essential contributions and outlook
The contributions described above were informative, but many questions and problems re-
main open for future research. A glimpse of the possible follow-up for each part of the present
work is now presented.
The main contribution of Chapter 2 was to show that it is possible to analyze the behav-
ioral dynamics produced by many learning rules relevant to evolutionary biology and animal
behavior. In previous work in evolutionary theory, these rules were mainly studied via agent-
based computer simulations, so the generality of these results is hard to assess (Groß et al., 2008;
Josephson, 2008; Hamblin and Giraldeau, 2009; Arbilly et al., 2010, 2011a,b; Katsnelson et al.,
2011). With analytical approximations, more can be said but one must be cautious regarding
a number of elements. First, the method of stochastic approximation (Ljung, 1977; Fudenberg
and Levine, 1998) used to derive equations of motion for learning dynamics only guarantee
asymptotic convergence, but do not say much about finite time behavior. This is problematic
since learning in a short time is likely to provide a selective advantage, but this effect cannot be
tested with the method used in this work (Hopkins, 2002; Leslie and Collins, 2005; Izquierdo
et al., 2007). Second, social learning, whereby an individual copy the actions of conspecifics,
is an important related mechanism that we did not include, but may be relevant to compare
to individual learning rules since it can allow to acquire information at a lower cost (Schlag,
1998; Laland, 2004; Rendell et al., 2010), for example when scroungers follow producers on food
patches (Hamblin and Giraldeau, 2009).
Chapter 3 showed that reinforcement learning (or trial-and-error) is not necessarily outcom-
peted by sophisticated learning rules, and can generate cooperation in social dilemmas like
the Hawk-Dove (or Snowdrift) game, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma. However many cases dis-
played a superiority of inference-based learning over reinforcement learning and this suggests
that there might be an evolutionary arms race in social cognition, because more complex rules
than inference-based learning can be imagined, for instance rules that try to also infer the type
of game under the fluctuating environment (Mengel, 2012). Where this arms race will stop is a
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question for future research even if recent developments in evolutionary game theory indicate
that individuals with low cognitive abilities may co-exist with more sophisticated types (Mohlin,
2012), even when sophisticated types pay no cost for cognitive complexity.
The evolutionary transition from behavioral reaction norms to learning was addressed in
Chapter 4 and it was found that a large number of stimuli (or situations) in an animal’s environ-
ment can drive the evolution of learning. But, it remains an open challenge to fully understand
the interaction between environmental fluctuations and complexity, since these factors are likely
to co-occur in nature. Moreover, we made several simplifying assumptions, such as equal effects
on fitness of all environmental stimuli, that should be relaxed in future research to test the ro-
bustness, applicability, and generality of the results.
Overall, this thesis proposes a detailed view of the evolution of learning, integrating at the
same time mechanisms and natural selection. In particular, we accounted for both behavioral
and generational time scales because this is necessary in order to have a more complete picture
of biological dynamics occurring in nature. We saw that the way in which organisms gather and
use information cannot be overlooked in evolutionary arguments on the usefulness of a learning
ability, and we laid the basis for bridging the gap that separates research on general phenotypic
plasticity from studies of learning, memory, and advanced cognitive abilities.
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AppendixA
(Chapter 2)
A.1 Stochastic approximation
A.1.1 Expected motion of motivations
Here, we derive eq. 2.10 of themain text from eq. 2.7. To that end, we callMi ,t = (Mi ,t (1), . . . ,Mi ,t (m))
the vector collecting the motivations of individual i at time t andMt = (M1,t , . . . ,MN ,t ) the vec-
tor of motivations in the whole population at time t . We also denote byM i ,t the motivations
of all individuals except individual i at time t . With this, the expectation of Ri (a,ai ,t ,a i ,t ,!t )
(eq. 2.9) given current motivational state can be written as
R¯i ,t (a,Mt ) =E
î
Ri (a,ai ,t ,a i ,t ,!t ) |Mt
ó
=
X
h2A
X
a i2A N 1
X
!2⌦
Ri (a, h,a i ,!)
⇥ pi ,t (h |Mi ,t )p i ,t (a i |M i ,t )µ(!), (A.1)
where pi ,t (h | Mi ,t ) is the probability that individual i takes action h given its current moti-
vations Mi ,t , p i ,t (a i | M i ,t ) is the joint probability that the opponents of individual i play
action profile a i when they have motivational state M i ,t , and µ(!) denotes the probability
of state ! under the stationary distribution of environmental states (we will reason in terms of
the long run behavior of the learning dynamics in the following).
For simplicity of presentation, we will use the notation of eq. 2.4, i.e., pi ,t (k |Mi ,t ) = pi ,t (k)
and p i ,t (a i | M i ,t ) = p i ,t (a i ). Actions are taken independently by each individual in the
population according to eq. 2.4, whereby
p i ,t (a i ) =
Y
i 6= j
p j ,t (aj ), (A.2)
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where aj denotes the j -th element of the vector a i .
With the above definitions, we can write eq. 2.7 as
Mi ,t+1(a) Mi ,t (a) =
1
nt+1
î ✏iMi ,t (a)+ R¯i ,t (a,Mt )+Ui ,t+1(a,at ,!t )ó , (A.3)
where the termUi ,t+1(a,at ,!t ) = Ri (a,at ,!t ) R¯i ,t (a,Mt ) is called the “noise” term in stochas-
tic approximation algorithm. The expression Ui ,t+1(a,at ,!t ) is subscribed by t + 1 (and not
t ) in the stochastic approximation literature because it determines the value of the state vari-
able at time t + 1. It follows from the definition of the noise that {Ui ,t (ai ,at ,!t )}t 1 is a se-
quence of martingale differences adapted to the filtration generated by the random variables
{Mt }t 1. That is, E[Ui ,t+1(a,at ,!t )|Mt ] = 0. Since the payoffs are bounded, we also have
E[Ui ,t (a,at ,!t )2] <1. We further assume that the choice probability (eq. 2.4) is continuous
in the motivations of the players, such that the expected reinforcement R¯i ,t (a,Mt ) is Lipschitz
continuous in the motivations. With this,  ✏iMi ,t (a) + R¯i ,t (a,Mt ) is a well-behaved vector
field and standard results from stochastic approximation theory (Benaim, 1999; Benaim and
El Karoui, 2005, p. 173) allow us to approximate the original stochastic process (eq. A.3) with
the deterministic differential equation
M˙i (a) = ✏iMi (a)+ R¯i (a,M). (A.4)
The solutions of the original stochastic recursion (eq. 2.1) asymptotically track solutions of
this differential equation. In particular, it has been established that the stochastic process almost
surely converges to the internally chain recurrent set of the differential equation A.4 (Benaim,
1999, Prop. 4.1 and Th. 5.7). The simplest form of a chain recurrent set is the set of equilibrium
points of the dynamics (the particular applications of our model that we study do not go beyond
these cases). Note that in continuous time the equations are deterministic and we remove the
subscript t toMt for ease of presentation.
A.1.2 Differential equation in terms of mean payoff
Here, we show that it is possible to simplify the expression of the expected reinforcement
R¯i ,t (a,Mt ) for our explicit learning model (eq. 2.1). First, recall from eq. 2.9 that for action a of
player i , the realized reinforcement has the form
Ri (a,ai ,t ,a i ,t ,!t ) =
î
 i + (1  i ) (a,ai ,t )
ó
⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ). (A.5)
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We see that
Ri (a,ai ,t ,a i ,t ,!t ) =
8<:⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ) if ai ,t = a,
 i⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ) if ai ,t 6= a.
(A.6)
In order to find an expression for the expected reinforcement R¯i ,t (a,Mt ), it is useful to rewrite
eq. A.5 as
Ri (a,ai ,t ,a i ,t ,!t ) =
î
 i + (1  i ) (a,ai ,t )
ó X
a i2A N 1
⇡i (a,a i ,!t ) (a i ,a i ,t ), (A.7)
since (a i ,a i ,t ) = 1 if a i = a i ,t , 0 otherwise. Now, given that the event a= (a1, . . . ,ai 1,a,ai+1, . . . ,aN )
occurs with probability pi ,t (a)p i ,t (a i ) at time t , we deduce that the expected reinforcement
of the motivation of action a is
R¯i ,t (a,Mt ) =
X
!2⌦
µ(!)
h
pi ,t (a)
X
a i2A N 1
p i ,t (a i )⇡i (a,a i ,!)
+ i (1  pi ,t (a)){
X
a i2A N 1
p i ,t (a i )⇡i (a,a i ,!)}
i
. (A.8)
Factoring out, we have
R¯i ,t (a,Mt ) =
X
!2⌦
µ(!)[{pi ,t (a)+ i (1  pi ,t (a))}
X
a i2A N 1
p i ,t (a i )⇡i (a,a i ,!)]. (A.9)
Define the average payoff
⇡¯i (a,a i ) =
X
!2⌦
µ(!)⇡i (a,a i ,!). (A.10)
Taking expectation, then produces
R¯i ,t (a,Mt ) = [pi ,t (a)+ i (1  pi ,t (a))]
X
a i2A N 1
p i ,t (a i )⇡¯i (a,a i ), (A.11)
and substituting into eq. A.3 shows that we can write the differential equation for the motiva-
tions (eq. A.4) as
M˙i (a) = ✏iMi (a)+ [pi (a)+ i (1  pi (a))]
X
a i2A N 1
p i (a i )⇡¯i (a,a i ). (A.12)
A.1.3 Differential equation for the choice probabilities
Logit choice
Here, we derive the ODE for the choice probabilities (eq. 2.13) by combining the ODE for
the motivations (eq. 2.10) with the choice rule (eq. 2.4), under the assumption that the choice
rule is the logit choice function (eq. 2.6).
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Differentiating the left and right member of eq. 2.4 with respect to time t , we have by the
the chain rule
p˙i (a) =
X
k2A
dpi (a)
dMi (k)
M˙i (k), (A.13)
and substituting eq. 2.4 gives
p˙i (a) =
d f (Mi (a))
dMi (a)
M˙i (a)P
k2A f (Mi (k))
  pi (a)
X
k2A
d f (Mi (k))
dMi (k)
M˙i (k)P
h2A f (Mi (h))
. (A.14)
Using f (M ) = exp
 
 iM
 
in the choice function (eq. 2.4) gives eq. 2.6, which implies
d f (Mi (a))
dMi (a)
⇥ 1P
k2A f (Mi (k))
=  i pi (a), (A.15)
whereby eq. A.14 can be written as
p˙i (a) =  i pi (a)
 
M˙i (a) 
X
k2A
M˙i (k)pi (k)
!
. (A.16)
Using the explicit expression for the differential equation of the motivations (eq. A.4), this is
1
 i pi (a)
p˙i (a) = ✏i
 X
k2A
{Mi (k) Mi (a)}pi (k)
!
+ R¯i (a) 
X
k2A
R¯i (k)pi (k). (A.17)
But, from the choice probabilities (eq. 2.6) we have the identity
pi (k)
pi (a)
=
exp
⇥
 iMi (k)
⇤
exp
⇥
 iMi (a)
⇤ , (A.18)
which gives
log
Ç
pi (k)
pi (a)
å
=  i
 
Mi (k) Mi (a)  (A.19)
and on substitution into eq. A.17 produces
p˙i (a) = pi (a)
24✏i X
k2A
log
Ç
pi (k)
pi (a)
å
pi (k)+ i
 
R¯i (a) 
X
k2A
R¯i (k)pi (k)
!35 . (A.20)
Power choice
Here, we perform the same derivation as in the last section but assume that f (M ) = M  i in
eq. 2.4. In this case,
⇥
d f (Mi (a))/dMi (a)
⇤
/
P
k2A f (Mi (k)) =
î
 iMi (a) i 1
ó
/
P
k2A f (Mi (k)) =
 i pi (a)/Mi (a), whereby using M˙i (a) = ✏iMi (a)+ R¯i (a) in eq. A.14 yields
p˙i (a) =  i pi (a)
24 ✏i + R¯i (a)Mi (a)  
X
k2A
pi (k)
 
 ✏i +
R¯i (k)
Mi (k)
!35 . (A.21)
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Since  ✏i cancels from this equation and for non-negative motivations we have the equality
pi (a)/pi (k) =
⇥
Mi (a)/Mi (k)
⇤ i , we can write
p˙i (a) =
⇥
 i pi (a)/Mi (a)
⇤264R¯i (a) X
k2A
pi (k)
Ç
pi (a)
pi (k)
å1/ i
R¯i (k)
375 . (A.22)
A.2 Learning to play Hawk and Dove
Here, we analyze qualitatively the vector fields of eqs. 2.15–2.16 with an average Hawk-Dove
game. We used Mathematica (Wolfram Research, Inc., 2011) to compute equilibria, eigenvalues
and complicated algebraic expressions. We first study the interaction between two PRL and then
the interaction between PRL and IL.
A.2.1 PRL vs. PRL
Pure Reinforcement Learning corresponds to  i = 0. Thus, replacing  1 =  2 = 0 in
eqs. 2.15–2.16 and using the payoffs of the Hawk-Dove game (Table 2.2) produces
p˙1 = p1(1  p1) 1

p1 p2
B
2
+ (1  p1){p2B + (1  p2)
✓B
2
 C
◆
}
 
,
p˙2 = p2(1  p2) 2

p2 p1
B
2
+ (1  p2){p1B + (1  p1)
✓B
2
 C
◆
}
 
. (A.23)
This dynamical system has eight different equilibria. In addition to the four at the corners
of the state space [(0,0), (1,1), (0,1), (1,0)], we have two interior equilibria and two symmetric
(w.r.t. the line p1 = p2) equilibria on the edges p1 = 0 and p2 = 0 (Table A.1). Performing
a linear stability analysis (Hirsch et al., 2004) near each equilibrium, we find that the vector
field can be divided in three regions, each one being the basin of attraction of a locally stable
equilibrium. The first one is the region where all trajectories tend to the equilibrium (0,0). This
equilibrium has negative eigenvalues. Its basin of attraction is delimited by the stable manifolds
of the equilibria situated on the edges, precisely situated at
Ä
0, 13
ä
and
Ä
1
3 , 0
ä
. The nullclines
give the limits of a subset of this basin: the gray shaded area in Fig. 2.2A corresponds to all
the points such that p˙1 < 0, p˙2 < 0, p2,1 <
B
2B p2B(B C ) , p2,1 <
B
2B p2B(B C ) . These are the
points below the equilibrium
✓
B
2B p2B(B C ) ,
B
2B p2B(B C )
◆
and where the vector field points
south-west. Excluding this specific region, all points below the diagonal line p1 = p2 are in the
basin of (0,1) and all points above this line pertain to the basin of (1,0). The points on this line
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p1 = p2 (again excluding the points that are in the basin of (0,0)) are on the stable manifold of
the interior equilibrium
✓
B
2B p2B(B C ) ,
B
2B p2B(B C )
◆
.
Table A.1: Local Stability analysis of the equilibria for the PRL vs. PRL interaction in the average Hawk-
Dove game. (Expressions of the eigenvalues associated to the interior equilibria are too long to fit in the
table.)
Equilibrium Associated Eigenvalues Eigenvalues’ sign
(0,0)
Ä  B2 ,  B2 ä ( , )
(0,1) ( B , 0) ( , 0)
(1,0) ( B , 0) ( , 0)
(1,1)
Ä  B2 +C ,  B2 +Cä (+,+)
(0, 13 )
Ä  B3 , B3 ä ( ,+)
( 13 , 0)
Ä  B3 , B3 ä ( ,+)✓
B
2B+
p
2B(B C ) ,
B
2B+
p
2B(B C )
◆
(+,+)✓
B
2B p2B(B C ) ,
B
2B p2B(B C )
◆
( ,+)
A.2.2 PRL vs. IL
Payoffs-Informed Learning (IL) corresponds to  i = 1. Thus, replacing  1 = 0 and  2 = 1
in eqs. 2.15–2.16 and using the payoffs of the Hawk-Dove game (Table 2.2), one obtains the
dynamical system describing learning between PRL (player 1) and IL (player 2) as
p˙1 = p1(1  p1) 1

p1 p2
B
2
  (1  p1){p2B + (1  p2)
✓B
2
 C
◆
}
 
,
p˙2 = p2(1  p2) 2

p1
B
2
  {p1B + (1  p1)
✓B
2
 C
◆
}
 
. (A.24)
This determines six equilibria and three of them have at least one positive eigenvalue. We are left
with (0,1), (1,0) and one interior at ( B2C ,
3B 2C
2B ). The latter equilibrium has eigenvalues ( B +
3B2
8C +
C
2 , B(B 2C )4C ) where the first one is always negative and the second one always positive.
This equilibrium thus admits a stable manifold that splits the vector field in two regions: above
the stable manifold, this is the basin of attraction of (1,0) and below it trajectories go to (0,1)
(Fig. 2.2B).
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A.3 Exploratory Reinforcement Learning
Here we analyze the equilibria of eq. 2.20 in the producer-scrounger model when  E is very
large, in which case the second term in eq. 2.20 (R¯E(1) 
î
R¯E(1)pE+ R¯E(2)(1  pE)
ó
) dominates
the first [(1  pE) log [1  pE]/pE ], which we neglect. We then find that there are three equi-
libria to this differential equation: pˆE = 0, pˆE = 1 and pˆE = V (2)/(V (1) +V (2)). The interior
equilibrium [V (2)/(V (1)+V (2))] is unstable since
d
dpE
¶
pE
Ä
R¯E(1) 
î
R¯E(1)pE+ R¯E(2)(1  pE)
óä©     
pE=V (2)/(V (1)+V (2))
> 0 (A.25)
for V (1) > V (2)   0. Thus, an ERL will learn to go on patch type 1 if its initial probability
to go on it is greater than V (2)/(V (1) +V (2)), and it will learn to go on patch 2 otherwise. If
one draws the initial condition at random from a uniform distribution on [0,1], the expected
equilibrium probability to go on patch type 1 for an ERL is
pˆE = 0⇥
V (2)
V (1)+V (2)
+ 1⇥
Ç
1  V (2)
V (1)+V (2)
å
=
V (1)
V (1)+V (2)
. (A.26)
More generally, eq. 2.20 is characterized by several stable equilibria and in order to define the
expected equilibrium behavior of ERL we follow the same argument by having a distribution
over the initial conditions. We call E the set of stable equilibria, pˆ eE the value of stable equilib-
rium e , and e the size of the basin of attraction of equilibrium e . Then, we define the expected
probability to go on patch 1 of ERL as
pˆE =
X
e2E
 e pˆ
e
E, (A.27)
where, by a slight abuse of notation, we still use pˆE to denote the average.
For instance, when we are in equilibrium regime I (Fig. 2.6), i.e., when there is one stable
equilibrium, there is only one term in the sum of eq. A.27. When we are in equilibrium regime
II and III, there are two terms in the sum.
A.4 Tit-for-Tat from EWA
Here, we derive the Tit-for-Tat strategy (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965; Axelrod, 1980; Ax-
elrod and Hamilton, 1981) from EWA. This is not a learning rule, but it is interesting that it can
be derived from the EWA framework by appealing to the concept of aspiration levels, which
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are often used in learning models (Gale et al., 1995; Wakano and Yamamura, 2001; Macy and
Flache, 2002; Cho and Matsui, 2005; Izquierdo et al., 2007; Chasparis et al., 2010). This provides
a payoff-based (i.e., quantitative) version of TFT, which is easier to justify in terms of neuronal
decision-making than the traditional version based on actions of opponent (which is more qual-
itative). To that aim, we need that the parameters are  i = 0, ⇢i = 0,  i = 1, ni ,1 = 1, and
 i =1 (Table 2.1), and we subtract aspiration levels to the original motivations, that is,
Mi ,t+1(a) =⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t )  Li (a), (A.28)
where Li (a) is the aspiration level of individual i for action a.
In order to prove that eq. A.28 combined with eq. 2.6 are indeed Tit-for-Tat, consider an in-
dividual i who is engaged in the repeated play of the Prisoner’s Dilemma with a fixed opponent
playing a i ,t . The payoff matrix is 0B@ R ST P
1CA ,
with the traditional assumptions that T >R >P >S and (T +S )/2<R .
For eq. A.28 and eq. 2.6 with  i =1 to produce TFT behavior, one needs that8<:Mi ,t+1(C)>Mi ,t+1(D), if a i ,t =C,
Mi ,t+1(C)<Mi ,t+1(D), if a i ,t =D,
(A.29)
where a i ,t denotes here the action of the single opponent of individual i . Substituting the
definition of the motivations (eq. A.28) into eq. A.29, we have8<:⇡i (C,C)  Li (C)>⇡i (D,C)  Li (D), if a i ,t =C,
⇡i (C,D)  Li (C)<⇡i (D,D)  Li (D), if a i ,t =D.
(A.30)
where Li (C) is the aspiration level of individual i for cooperation, Li (D) its aspiration level
for defection, and where we removed the dependence of the payoffs on the environmental state
!t , because we consider a fixed game. Substituting the payoff from the payoff matrix, eq. A.28
produces TFT behavior if8<:R   Li (C)> T   Li (D), if a i ,t =C,S   Li (C)<P   Li (D), if a i ,t =D, (A.31)
which can be expressed as the single condition
T  R < Li (D)  Li (C)<P  S . (A.32)
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We remark that this payoff-based version of TFT needs that individual i has a bigger aspiration
level for defection, i.e., individual i expects more of defection than of cooperation (because
T  R > 0). Also, clearly not all Prisoner’s Dilemma games satisfy condition A.32. More
precisely, this condition entails that defection needs to risk dominate cooperation (T  P <
R  S ) for our version of TFT to be implementable.
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AppendixB
(Chapter 3)
The reader might notice similarities between this Appendix and the Appendix for Chapter
2 above. The reason is that Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are conceived as two independent articles
submitted separately to two different journals, so that the papers could be read independently
and their appendix must be self-contained.
B.1 Reinforcement and inference-based learning
In this appendix, we give the stochastic recursions for the motivations for the four learning
rules studied in this paper. We have defined two forms of reinforcement learning: PRL and ERL,
and two forms of inference-based learning: PIL and EIL.
B.1.1 Reinforcement learning
Dynamic learning rate
Substituting  i = 0,  i ,t = (1/t )+ 1 into eq. 3.3, we obtain PRL with updating rule
Mi ,t+1(a) =Mi ,t (a)+
1
t + 1
(a,ai ,t )⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ). (B.1)
Every new experienced payoff is thus divided by the total number of previous interactions (t+1)
and added to the previous motivation. In the long run, the effect of new payoffs on motivations
goes to zero. Note that when action a is not played, the motivation is not updated. Moreover,
the learner does not forget information from the past. It is even the payoffs obtained in the first
rounds of interaction that have the biggest effect on the motivations at time t .
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Constant learning rate
Substituting  i = 0 and  i ,t = 1 into eq. 3.3 gives ERL, which has updating rule
Mi ,t+1(a) =
t
t + 1
Mi ,t (a)+
1
t + 1
(a,ai ,t )⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ). (B.2)
This rule looks like a time average of the payoffs obtained when playing action a but it is actually
a biased average. Indeed, in a non-biased average, the motivation of action a should not be
updated when action a is not played at time t . However, here when action a is not played at
time t , the motivation is still updated but it is as if the payoff obtained for action a at time t
was zero. Hence, depending on the signs of the payoffs in the game, the non-played actions have
a tendency to lose weight (e.g., when all payoffs in the game are positive) or gain weight (e.g.,
when all payoffs in the game are negative).
B.1.2 Inference-based learning
Dynamic learning rate
Substituting  i = 1 and  i ,t = (1/t )+ 1 into eq. 3.3 yields the PIL updating rule
Mi ,t+1(a) =Mi ,t (a)+
1
t + 1
⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ), (B.3)
where imagined payoffs have no effect on the motivations for large t .
Constant learning rate
Substituting  i = 1 and  i ,t = 1 into eq. 3.3 gives EIL, which is the standard Belief-based
learning rule (Camerer and Ho, 1999), with motivation updating given by
Mi ,t+1(a) =
t
t + 1
Mi ,t (a)+
1
t + 1
⇡i (a,a i ,t ,!t ). (B.4)
Contrary to the ERL rule, this equation represents a proper time average: this is the average
payoff that would have been obtained by individual i if he was constantly playing action a up
to time t , given the history of actions by his opponents {a i ,⌧}t⌧=1.
Belief-based learning
We now show that eq. B.4 can also be interpreted in terms of updating average payoffs given
beliefs over the action play probabilities of partners like in Camerer and Ho (1999). For ease
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of presentation, but without loss of generality, we consider that individual i interacts only with
one other individual in the population, which plays action a i ,t 2A at time t . We then write
for t   2
B i ,t+1(a) =
t
t + 1
B i ,t (a)+
1
t + 1
(a,ai ,t ), (B.5)
where B i ,t+1(a) is the frequency of times the partner of individual i has played action a up to
time t , and which is the belief of individual i that its partner plays a at t + 1 given the initial
belief B i ,1.
Let us now write
Mi ,t+1(a) =
X
k2A
X
!2⌦
⇡i (a,k ,!)µ(!)B i ,t+1(a), (B.6)
which can be interpreted as the expected payoff to individual i given its beliefs over the action
distribution of its partner and the current state of the environment. Substituting eq. B.5 into
eq. B.6 shows that the motivation dynamics still satisfies eq. B.4. Hence, when individual is an
inference-based learner and expresses action by using the logit choice rule (eq. 3.2), it behaves as
if it tries to maximize its expected current reward given its beliefs.
B.2 Stochastic approximation
Here, we show the main steps to derive eqs. 3.5–3.6 from eqs. 3.2-3.3. First, an application
of stochastic approximation theory (e.g., Benaim, 1999) shows that eqs. 3.2-3.3 can be approxi-
mated by the set of differential equations
p˙i (a) = pi (a)
24✏i X
k2A
log
Ç
pi (k)
pi (a)
å
pi (k)+ 
 
R¯i (a) 
X
k2A
R¯i (k)pi (k)
!35 , (B.7)
where
R¯i (a) = [pi (a)+ i (1  pi (a))]
X
a i2A N 1
p i (a i )⇡¯i (a,a i ) (B.8)
and
⇡¯i (a,a i ) =
X
!2⌦
µ(!)⇡i (a,a i ,!) (B.9)
(Dridi and Lehmann, 2013, eqs. 11-13). Here, R¯i ,t (a,Mt ) is the expectation of the reinforcement
to the motivation of action a, i.e., the expectation of the numerator of the second term of
eq. 3.3 over the distribution of environmental states and the distribution of choice probabilities,
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p i (a i ) is the probability of the joint action profile of other individuals than i , and ⇡¯i (a,a i )
represents the payoff of the average game in which individual i is involved.
In our context, the parameter ✏i in eq. B.7 takes the value ✏i = 1+ t (1  i ,t ) (Dridi and
Lehmann, 2013, eq. 8 with ni ,t = t and ⇢i = 1). Since we assumed that  i ,t = (1/t ) + 1,
this gives ✏i = 0 and the exploration term (the first term in square brackets in eq. B.7) cancels.
Moreover, we are interested in 2⇥ 2 games so there are only two actions (A = {1,2}) and two
players. Let the two players be denoted i and j , pi be the probability that individual i take
action 1, and pj be the probability that individual j take action 1. With this, we can write the
differential equation for the probability that individual i takes action 1 using eq. B.7 as
p˙i = pi 
Ä
R¯i (1)  [R¯i (1)pi + R¯i (2)(1  pi )]
ä
, (B.10)
where
R¯i (1) = [pi + i (1  pi )]
X
a i2A N 1
p i (a i )⇡¯i (1,a i ) (B.11)
R¯i (2) = [(1  pi )+ i pi]
X
a i2A N 1
p i (a i )⇡¯i (2,a i ). (B.12)
Further, in the 2⇥ 2 games that we study here (one-shot matching model), the single opponent
of individual i is individual j so a i 2 {1,2} and p i (1) = pj . Replacing these in eq. B.11, we
can write eq. B.10 as
p˙i = pi (1  pi ) [{pj ⇡¯i (1,1)+ (1  pj )⇡¯i (1,2)}{pi + i (1  pi )}
  {pj ⇡¯i (2,1)+ (1  pj )⇡¯i (2,2)}{ i pi + (1  pi )}]. (B.13)
Using the definition of the payoffs of the average game in Table 3.2, we have ⇡¯i (1,1) =R , ⇡¯i (1,2) =
S , ⇡¯i (2,1) = T , ⇡¯i (2,2) =P , and on substitution into eq. B.13 yields
p˙i = pi (1  pi ) [{pjR + (1  pj )S }{pi + i (1  pi )}
  {pjT + (1  pj )P }{ i pi + (1  pi )}]. (B.14)
For player j , the differential equation for its probability to take action 1 is the exact symmetric
(because i is the single opponent of j ), whereby
p˙ j = pj (1  pj ) [{piR + (1  pi )S }{pj +  j (1  pj )}
  {piT + (1  pi )P }{  j p j + (1  pj )}]. (B.15)
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B.3 Fecundity at behavioral equilibrium
In this section, we derive an expression for fecundity (eq. 3.7) under the assumption that the
learning process (eqs. 3.5–3.6) has reached an equilibrium during lifespan. Indeed, if the individ-
uals interact for a long enough time, the action probabilities pi ,t (a) may reach an equilibrium
for all i and a, and the fecundity of player i will be its average payoff at equilibrium. Then, the
fecundity of individual i is
bi =
X
!2⌦
X
a2A
X
a i2A N 1
µ(!) pˆi (a) pˆ i (a i )⇡i (a,a i ,!), (B.16)
where pˆi (a) denotes the equilibrium probability with which individual i chooses action a, while
pˆ i (a i ) is the equilibrium probability with which the opponents of individual i choose action
profile a i . This equilibrium is obtained by setting p˙ j (a) = 0 in eq. B.7 for all j and a.
Equation B.16 should be understood as a long run average payoff in the game taken over
three distributions. The first distribution gives the probability µ(!) to play game !; the sec-
ond distribution gives the equilibrium probability pˆi (a) that player i takes action a; the third
distribution tells the probability pˆ i (a i ) that the opponents of individual i take action profile
a i . The distribution µ(!) is already provided as a parameter of the model. The two other
distributions have to be computed by studying the equilibria of the choice probabilities pˆi (a)
for all i in the population. Using eq. B.9, the average payoff can be simplified to
bi =
X
a2A
X
a i2A N 1
pˆi (a) pˆ i (a i )⇡¯i (a,a i ). (B.17)
Since we are concerned with 2⇥ 2 games, and since the single opponent of individual i is
individual j (eqs. 3.5–3.6), we have a 2 {1,2} and a i 2 {1,2}. If we further call pˆi the probability
that individual i plays action 1 at a behavioral equilibrium and pˆ j the corresponding probability
for individual j , eq. B.17 can be developed as
bi = pˆi pˆ j ⇡¯i (1,1)+ pˆi (1  pˆ j )⇡¯i (1,2)+ (1  pˆi ) pˆ j ⇡¯i (2,1)+ (1  pˆi )(1  pˆ j )⇡¯i (2,2). (B.18)
Factoring out and replacing the the average payoffs, ⇡¯i (·, ·), by their values in Table 3.2, we
finally obtain
bi = pˆi ( pˆ jR + (1  pˆ j )S )+ (1  pˆi )( pˆ jT + (1  pˆ j )P ), (B.19)
where in the main text we used bi j = bi in order to emphasize that in the one-shot matching
case, the payoff of individual i depends only on its single opponent ( j ).
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B.4 Qualitative analysis for the one-shot matching model
Here, we carry out the stability analysis of the equilibrium points of the learning dynamics
presented in the main text (eqs. 3.5–3.6). Before starting the analysis, let us make a technical
remark. The dynamical systems we will analyze can display hyperbolic equilibria that admits
stable manifolds (with one positive and one negative eigenvalue). We will completely discard
the possibility that an initial condition is on a stable manifold because doing so leads to a locally
unstable equilibrium, which is not robust to small perturbations under the original stochastic
process (Pemantle, 1990). Equilibria and eigenvalues were calculated using the Mathematica
software. The payoffs of the average games are defined in Table 3.2.
B.4.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma
• PRL vs. PRL. The dynamical system obtained by setting gi = 0, g j = 0, R= B C , S = C ,
T = B , and P = 0 into eqs. 3.5–3.6 admits seven equilibria (Table B.1). Four are at the corners of
the state space, two are on the edges and one is completely interior. The first egde equilibrium is
situated on the line pi = 1 and the other one is symmetric with respect to the line pj = pi . The
interior equilibrium is
Ä
pˆi =
B+C
2B , pˆ j =
B+C
2B
ä
.
Evaluating the Jacobian matrix at each equilibrium and computing the eigenvalues (Table
B.1) reveals that all equilibria are characterized by at least one positive eigenvalue, except the two
equilibria (0,0) (both players defect) and (1,1) (both players cooperate). These two latter equilib-
ria are thus the only possible endpoints of the learning dynamics (Hirsch et al., 2004). Fig. 3.1A
shows some solution orbits for this dynamical system. There, we can see that the interior equi-
librium
Ä
B+C
2B ,
B+C
2B
ä
is an unstable node, i.e., its eigenvalues are both positive. Moreover, the
two equilibria on the edges admit a stable and unstable manifold because they have one positive
eigenvalue and one negative eigenvalue. All this implies that the equilibria (0,0) and (1,1) have a
basin of attraction that is delimited by these stable manifolds. Since solutions along the nullcline
defined by p˙i = 0 verify p˙ j > 0 and solutions along the other nullcline ( p˙ j = 0) verify p˙i > 0,
solving the inequalities p˙i > 0, p˙ j > 0 for pi and pj (the region above the nullclines) gives a
subset of the basin of attraction. In other words, trajectories are increasing in this region and
cannot escape it. Using Mathematica, we find that these inequalities are satisfied in two cases:8<:
Å
B
2B C < pj ,1  B+C2B and
C pj ,1
 B+2B pj ,1 < pi ,1 < 1
ã
orÅ
B+C
2B < pj ,1 < 1 and
B pj ,1
 C+2B pj ,1 < pi ,1 < 1
ã
.
(B.20)
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Table B.1: Local Stability analysis of the equilibria in the PRL vs. PRL case when the average game is the
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Equilibrium Associated Eigenvalues Eigenvalues’ sign
(0,0) (0,0) (0,0)
(0,1) ( B ,C ) ( ,+)
(1,0) ( B ,C ) ( ,+)
(1,1) (C  B ,C  B) ( , )
(1, B2B C )
Ä
C + B
2
C 2B ,B +
B2
C 2B
ä
( ,+)
( B2B C , 1)
Ä
C + B
2
C 2B ,B +
B2
C 2B
ä
( ,+)Ä
B+C
2B ,
B+C
2B
ä ⇣ (B C )2(B+C )
4B2
, (B C )(B+C )
2
4B2
⌘
(+,+)
• PIL vs. PIL. The dynamical system obtained by setting gi = 1, g j = 1, and the PD game
payoffs into eqs. 3.5–3.6 admits the four corners of the state space [(0,1), (1,1), (1,0), (1,1)] as
equilibria. The only locally stable equilibrium is the point (0,0) because it has negative eigenval-
ues ( C , C ). Hence, two players using belief learning will end up always defecting (Fig. 3.1B).
• PRL vs. PIL. Setting gi = 0, g j = 1, and the PD game payoff into eqs. 3.5–3.6, we find five
equilibria. The four corner equilibria and one on the edge pI = 1 situated at
Ä
pˆR =
B
2B C , pˆI = 1
ä
.
The linearization shows that all equilibria are characterized by at least one positive eigenvalue,
except the equilibrium (0,0) which has eigenvalues ( C , 0), implying, by elimination, that it is
the only stable equilibrium. Both players will tend to defect in the long run (Fig. 3.1C).
B.4.2 Hawk-Dove Game
• PRL vs. PRL. In this case (gi = 0, g j = 0, R= B/2 C , S = B , T = 0, and P = B/2), eqs. 3.5–
3.6 has eight different equilibria. In addition to the four at the corners, we have two interior equi-
libria and two symmetric (w.r.t. the line pi = pj ) equilibria on the edges pi = 0 and pj = 0 (Table
A.1). The vector field can be divided in three regions, each one being the basin of attraction of
an asymptotically stable equilibrium. The first one is the region where all trajectories tend to the
equilibrium (0,0). This equilibrium has negative eigenvalues. Its basin of attraction is delimited
by the stable manifolds of the equilibria situated on the edges, precisely situated at
Ä
0, 13
ä
andÄ
1
3 , 0
ä
. The nullclines give a good approximation of the limits of this basin: the gray shaded
area in Fig. 3.1D corresponds to all the points such that p˙i < 0, p˙ j < 0, pj ,1 <
B
2B p2B(B C ) ,
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pj ,1 <
B
2B p2B(B C ) . These are the points below the equilibrium
✓
B
2B p2B(B C ) ,
B
2B p2B(B C )
◆
and where the vector field points south-west. Excluding this specific region, all points below the
diagonal line pj = pi are in the basin of (0,1) and all points above this line pertain to the basin
of (1,0). The points on this line pi = pj (again excluding the points that are in the basin of (0,0))
are on the stable manifold of the interior equilibrium
✓
B
2B p2B(B C ) ,
B
2B p2B(B C )
◆
.
• PIL vs. PIL. Here, eqs. 3.5–3.6 admits only two equilibria (0,1) and (1,0), which are asymp-
totically stable in the region below the diagonal line pi = pj and above this line, respectively.
This represents the stable manifold of the equilibrium ( B2C ,
B
2C ). On pi = pj , we have the single
population replicator dynamics (Fig. 3.1E), hence the stable point on this line is the ESS of the
Hawk-Dove game, ( B2C ,
B
2C ).
• PRL vs. PIL. We have six equilibria and three of them have at least one positive eigenvalue.
We are left with (0,1), (1,0) and one interior at ( B2C ,
3B 2C
2B ). The latter equilibrium has eigen-
values ( B + 3B28C + C2 , B(B 2C )4C ), where the first one is always negative and the second one
always positive. This equilibrium thus admits a stable manifold that splits the vector field in
two regions: above the stable manifold, this is the basin of attraction of (1,0) and below it tra-
jectories go to (0,1) (Fig. 3.1F). This stable manifold is a curve passing through the points (0, 13 ),
( B2C ,
3B 2C
2B ), and (1,1).
B.4.3 Coordination Game
This game provides the simplest dynamics, where the equilibria (0,0) and (1,1) are always
the only two asymptotically stable states.
• PRL vs. PRL. Here, we set gi = 0, g j = 0, R = B , S = 0, T = 0, and P = B in eqs. 3.5–
3.6, which then admits four trivial corner equilibria plus all the points on the line pj = 1  pi .
The equilibria (0,0) and (1,1) both have negative eigenvalues and are thus locally stable. The
two other corners equilibria ((0,1) and (1,0)) have eigenvalues (0,0). The equilibria on the line
pj = 1  pj have eigenvalues (0,2B pi (1  pi )), where the second eigenvalue is 0 when pi = 0
or pi = 1 and positive otherwise. This all implies that the equilibrium (0,0) is asymptotically
stable in the region below the line pj = 1  pi and the equilibrium (1,1) is asymptotically stable
above this line (Fig. 3.1G).
As mentioned in the main text, the unstable line pj = 1  pi is not an interesting set of initial
conditions.
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• PIL vs. PIL. The system eqs. 3.5–3.6 admits five equilibria in this situation: the four corners
and one interior at
Ä
1
2 ,
1
2
ä
. The equilibria (0,0) and (1,1) are both asymptotically stable because
they both have eigenvalues ( B , B)while the equilibria (0,1) and (1,0) have eigenvalues (B ,B).
The interior equilbrium
Ä
1
2 ,
1
2
ä
is a saddle with eigenvalues
Ä B2 , B2 ä and consequently admits
a stable and an unstable manifold. It is easy to see in Fig. 3.1H that the stable manifold is the
diagonal line pj = 1  pi while the unstable manifold is the other diagonal pj = pi . Every
trajectory starting above pj = 1  pi will tend to (1,1) while if it starts below this line it will
tend to (0,0).
• PRL vs. PIL.Here, eqs. 3.5–3.6 has again five equilibria: the four corners plus one interior atÄ
1
2 ,
1
2
ä
. The points (0,0) and (1,1) are both asymptotically stable having eigenvalues ( B , B).
The interior equilibrium is a saddle with eigenvalues
Ä B4 , B2 ä. Hence a stable manifold passing
through this saddle splits the vector field in two regions, which correspond respectively to the
basin of attraction of (0,0) and (1,1). Here the stable manifold is situated no more on the
diagonal because we lost the symmetry property of the PIL vs. PIL case (compare Fig. 3.1I with
Fig. 3.1H).
B.5 Simulations
B.5.1 Individual based simulations
Here, we present the algorithm of our individual based simulations. Each individual i 2
{1,2, ...,N} take a genotypic value  i 2 {0,1}. In each generation, each individual i obtains
fecundity bi =
PT
t=1⇡i (ai ,t ,a i ,t ,!t ) (eq. 3.1, but we do not use the normalization factor
1
T
in the simulations), where the actions (ai ,t , a i ,t ), which are random variables, are calculated
by implementing eqs. 3.2–3.3. The environmental state in each period (!t ) is drawn from a
uniform distribution, which entails that µ(PD) = µ(HD) = µ(CG) = 1/3. The average game
is parametrized according to the B and C parameters as in Table 3.2 (we always used B = 5 and
C = 3), but the payoffs of the three sub-games (PD, HD, and CG) are randomly generated at the
beginning of each generation so that they average up to the desired average game and satisfy the
inequalities described in Table 3.2. This implies that there are between-generation fluctuations,
and we used them to represent the conditions where a learning ability gives an advantage over
innate behavior. Under one-shot matching, individuals were paired only at the beginning of
the generation (t = 1) and each pair played together until T , while under repeated matching
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individuals were rematched at each time period t = 1,2, . . . ,T .
The next generation is sampled with replacement according to the relative fecundity of in-
dividuals (i.e., bi/
PN
i=1 bi , a Wright-Fisher process). An offspring inherits the genotype of its
parent with probability 1  ⌘ or mutates with probability ⌘ to the other genotype. The muta-
tion rate was set to ⌘= 10 3. We ran simulations with N = 1000 and we use a value of T bigger
than the average time needed for learning to converge to a stable value (where this average time
was computed separately for each game and initial condition, and we did not use values smaller
than T = 500). Each case described in the main text (i.e., each game and each type of initial pref-
erences of the learners) was run in three different replicates: one with an initial population (at
the first generation) composed of half PRLs and half PILs; one with an initial population of only
PRLs; one with an initial population of only PILs. This was to check that our simulation results
are independent of initial conditions. Moreover, we waited for each run that the dynamic mean
frequency of types converge to a stable value, at which point we stopped the simulation. Our
convergence criterion was met when the time average of the types’ frequencies did not change
by more than 10 6 for 100 successive generations. We used k = 0 and varied   from 10 1 to 103
(see below).
We also carried out simulations only of the learning phase. To that aim, we implemented, in
the one-shot matching case, pairs of individuals playing outside a population setting using the
same parameters as in the full evolutionary simulations. We shall remark at this point that, con-
trary to the evolutionary simulations (which implement a Markov Chain admitting a stationary
distribution), the learning dynamics does not admit a stationary distribution; stochastic approx-
imation theory shows that the dynamics of learning will converge to one of the equilibrium
points under the deterministic differential equation (see for example Borkar, 2008, Chap. 2,
Corollary 4). In particular, the stochastic process will not necessarily converge to a linearly
stable equilibrium point (this is the criterion of stability we used in the above analysis). To un-
derstand the simulations, just note that the learning dynamics should converge to one of the
equilibria but that it need not converge to the same equilibrium for two different replicates of a
simulation, hence the necessity to run many replicates of the same parameter set.
For repeated matching, learning simulations consisted of running only one generation but
setting the frequencies of PRL and PILmanually. We took the same cases (i.e., the three different
average games (PD, HD, and CG) and the different initial preferences over actions of the learn-
ers) as in the one-shot matching model and simulated learning behavior for 11 different values
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of the frequency q of PRL in the population ranging from 0 to 1 by steps of 0.1.
B.5.2 Tuning parameters
In order to find parameters that reproduce our analytical results, the process of running simu-
lations consisted of two steps. First, we ran simulations between pairs of learners (PRL vs. PRL,
PRL vs. PIL, and PIL vs. PIL) for each game, in order to establish the accuracy of the approxi-
mation of the equilibrium action play probabilities. It has been previously found that the time
t needed for the simulated learning process to converge to the predicted equilibrium critically
depends on the sensitivity to motivations,  , and on the initial difference between motivations
of action 1 and 2, Mi ,1 ⌘Mi ,1(1) Mi ,1(2) at time t = 1 (Dridi and Lehmann, 2013). Since our
analytic prediction is asymptotic, it tells nothing about the values of  ,  Mi ,1, and T . Hence,
we first ran several simulations of learning with different values of   and  Mi ,1, and waited
for the learning process to “converge” (based on a numeric convergence criterion). This gives
us the parameter T needed for convergence to happen during lifespan. We then compared the
equilibrium behavior in these simulations with the predicted equilibrium, and chose the values
of  Mi ,1 and   that give the best match to prediction. In order to reduce our search in param-
eter space, we fixed the value of pi ,1(a) to 0.85 for the initially preferred action a (see below)
and only vary  . This automatically changes the initial value of motivations  Mi ,1, such that
we do not require to vary them explicitly. We used five different values of   of the form 10↵
for ↵ =  1,0,1,2,3. In the second step, we simulated the evolutionary process of selection on
PRL vs. PIL. To this end, we used the values of  ,  M , and T found in step 1 which give the
best match between stochastic learning process and deterministic approximation. The idea is
that, since we chose parameters of learning where the approximation works well, the evolution-
ary simulations should also match the evolutionary predictions based on our approximation of
learning. In order to further investigate the model under the alternative condition that  i is
constant, we also performed the same set of simulations but with  i = 1. This changes the type
of the learning rules, which are now the counterpart to PRL and PIL when  i = 1; that is, Ex-
ploratory Reinforcement Learning (ERL) and Belief-based learning BL). We used the parameter
values for   and Mi ,1 applied in the case with dynamic learning rate.
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B.6 Detailed simulation results
In this appendix, we describe in greater detail the results of our individual-based simulations
B.6.1 One-shot matching
Prisoner’s Dilemma: dynamic learning rate
Both players initially prefer Cooperation. Here, the simulations give results close to what is ex-
pected under our approximation when  = 10. Regarding learning, we find the following results
for the three possible interactions between types. When PRL plays against PRL, most pairs
learn to cooperate, but some pairs learn to defect (Fig. 3.2A): this is not surprising because un-
der the stochastic learning process, individuals can escape basins of attractions and reach the
locally stable equilibrium where both players defect. In the interaction between PILs, all pairs
learn to defect (Fig. 3.2B), as predicted by the analysis. In the interaction between PRL and PIL,
both types learn to defect: PRL does not get exploited by PIL (Fig. 3.2C). Overall this gives an
advantage to PRL because this type cooperates with itself but defects with the defector PIL. As
a consequence, in the evolutionary simulations, PRL fixes in the population irrespective of the
initial composition of the population (Table 3.3).
Both players initially prefer Defection. In this case, we also find that   = 10 gives the best fit to
deterministic analysis. Surprisingly at first sight, we also observe that PRL individuals some-
times learn to cooperate when paired with themselves (Fig. 3.2D; while the analysis predicts
that they will always defect in this case). This is actually perfectly possible, and is explained (as
above) by the fact that initial conditions do not constrain absolutely the equilibrium behavior:
individuals with initial preference for defection can still learn to cooperate because this is also
a stable equilibrium for the dynamics. PIL individuals do not deviate from perfect defection
(Fig. 3.2E). For the interaction between PRL and PIL, we find again that both types learn to
defect (Fig. 3.2F). Since learning behavior is somehow similar to the case where individuals pre-
fer cooperation, we find as expected that PRL fixes in the population when we simulate natural
selection. This is due to the tendency of PRL to sometimes cooperate with itself (Table 3.3).
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Prisoner’s Dilemma: constant learning rate
Both players initially prefer Cooperation. In this situation, the results are very similar to the
case with a dynamic learning rate. Namely, ERL is able to learn to cooperate against itself, a
behavior that BL cannot express, and this gives a fitness advantage to ERL because ERL learns
to defect against BL (Fig. B.1A,B,C). As a consequence, the frequency of ERL at an evolutionary
equilibrium is very close to 1 (Table 3.3).
Both players initially prefer Defection. Here ERL individuals display the same behavior as with
a dynamic learning rate when paired together: namely some pairs learn to defect and some
other pairs learn to cooperate (Fig. B.1D). BL individuals on the other hand, still learn to defect
whatever their opponent is (Fig. B.1E). The interactions between ERL and BL display a different
outcome than previously. Here we observe that ERL individuals converge to a state where they
have a positive probability to cooperate, and hence get exploited on some interaction rounds
(Fig. B.1F).
As a consequence of this learning behavior, the evolutionary simulations show that BL fixes
in the population in the long run when they are initially in high frequency but otherwise this is
ERL that invades (Table 3.3). Such a result is possible if there is an interior unstable equilibrium
in the evolutionary dynamics: when ERL are common in the population, they have a tendency
to increase in frequency; when they are in low frequency they have a tendency to further de-
crease in frequency. This situation corresponds to observed learning behavior: while ERL in-
dividuals have the advantage of cooperating with themselves, this does not seem to compensate
the fitness loss due to sometimes cooperating against the defector BL when BL constitutes most
of the population.
Hawk Dove game: dynamic learning rate
PRL initially prefers to play Hawk and PIL prefers Dove. In the analysis, we predict that with
these initial preferences, PRL individuals will learn to play half of the time Hawk and half of
the time Dove when paired against themselves. However, in the simulations, we observe that a
high proportion of PRL learned to play Dove (Fig. 3.3A; the best value found for sensitivity is
here  = 10). As before, this can be explained by the possibility of escaping a basin of attraction:
the outcome (Dove, Dove) is also an equilibrium for the dynamics and some pairs of individuals
converge to this equilibrium. When a PIL plays against a PIL, we find as predicted that approxi-
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Figure B.1: Distribution of behavior at equilibrium of learning in the average Prisoner’s Dilemma for
the one-shot matching model with constant learning rate for pairs of opponents. This represents the fre-
quency of pairs having reached the probability to play action 1 (p1,T , p2,T ) at the end of lifespan, T . We
used a total of 1000 individuals of each type in each simulation. First line: initial preference for Cooper-
ation (pi ,1 = 0.85). Second line: initial preference for Defection (pi ,1 = 0.15). Left column: interaction
between two PRLs. Middle column: interaction between two PILs. Right Column: interaction between
PRL (player 1) and PIL (player 2).
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matively half PILs learn Hawk and half learn Dove (Fig. 3.3B). Finally, for PRL vs. PIL, things
go as predicted with a vast majority of PRL learning Hawk and a vast majority of PIL learning
Dove: PIL gets “exploited” by PRL here (Fig. 3.3C).
When we run simulations of natural selection in a population of PRL and PIL we obtain that
PRL fixes for all initial compositions of the population (Table 3.3). Since learning behavior is
in conformity with our analytic prediction, this is not a surprise. The important interaction
between PRL and PIL turns to the advantage of PRL. The latter is more prompt to learn the
Hawk strategy and PIL is penalized by its initial preference for Dove. One unpredicted outcome
of learning, namely the fact that PRL will learn to play Dove against itself even if it initially
prefers Hawk, gives no special advantage to PRL with the payoff structure of our Hawk-Dove
game.
PRL initially prefers to play Dove and PIL prefers Hawk. This initial condition is mirroring the
previous case, and the analysis thus predicts that PIL should be the one that learns to play Hawk
against PRL (the sensitivity that gives the best match to prediction is   = 100 for this case).
This is indeed what we observe (Fig. 3.3F). For the interactions between the same types (PRL
vs. PRL and PIL vs. PIL), we have the same behavior as in paragraph (a): most PRL learn to play
Dove (Fig. 3.3D), and PIL learn half of the time to play Hawk and half of the time to play Dove
(Fig. 3.3E). With this learning behavior, PIL invades and fixes in the population for all initial
compositions of the population, and this happens very fast (in the first generations; (Table 3.3)).
Hawk Dove game: constant learning rate
PRL initially prefers to play Hawk and PIL prefers Dove. In this situation, we observe qualita-
tively the same learning behaviors as with a dynamic learning rate. In particular, ERL learns
Hawk against BL and the latter learns Dove (Fig. B.2A,B,C). As a consequence, ERL fixes to a
frequency of 1 at an evolutionary equilibrium (Table 3.3).
PRL initially prefers to play Dove and PIL prefers Hawk. The result is again very similar to the
case with dynamic learning rate. Namely, in ERL vs. BL interactions, ERL learn Dove and BL
learnHawk (Fig. B.2D,E,F) and this implies that BL rapidly take over and fixes in the population
under the evolutionary simulations (Table 3.3).
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Figure B.2: Distribution of behavior at equilibrium of learning in the average Hawk-Dove game for
the one-shot matching model with constant learning rate for pairs of opponents. This represents the
frequency of pairs having reached the probability to play action 1 (p1,T , p2,T ) at the end of lifespan, T .
We used a total of 1000 individuals of each type in each simulation. First line: RL initially prefer Hawk
(pR,1 = 0.15) and IL prefers Dove (pI,1 = 0.85). Second line: RL initially prefer Dove (pR,1 = 0.85) and
IL prefers Hawk (pI,1 = 0.15). Left column: interaction between two RLs. Middle column: interaction
between two ILs. Right Column: interaction between RL (player 1) and IL (player 2).
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Coordination game: dynamic learning rate
In this average game, we give to all individuals a preference for the “Left” action and find that
all individuals succeed in coordinating at time T . Pairs of PRL individuals coordinate mostly on
action 2 (“Right”) while pairs of PIL coordinate mostly on action 1 (“Left”) (Fig. 3.4A,B). The
heterogeneous pairs (PRL vs PIL) coordinate mostly on the Right action (Fig. 3.4C). This result
is difficult to explain because individuals had an initial preference for “Left” but since the anal-
ysis demonstrates that (Right, Right) is also a stable equilibrium of the associated deterministic
system, this result does not contradict our qualitative analysis.
Interestingly, the evolutionary simulations give an outcome different than what we expected.
While the above learning behavior suggests that both types should co-exist in equal frequency
in the long-run, we find that the population converges to a mixed state with domination of PIL
individuals (Table 3.3). Again, it is difficult to know why this happened, but a possible reason
for this might be that some PRL individuals converge more slowly to the equilibrium. Even if
we chose T big enough, our criterion was based on the average time needed for all individuals to
converge in the population. Some individuals might converge more slowly than in T time steps,
and fail to coordinate at this time, giving an advantage to PIL.
Coordination game: constant learning rate
The results of learning dynamics under constant learning rate are very similar to the above,
with ERL pairs coordinating on Right, BL pairs coordinating on Left and heterogeneous pairs
coordinating on Right (Fig. B.3A,B,C).
Regarding evolution, the result is in conformity to our analysis since the population con-
verges to a mixed state where the frequency of both types is close to 0.5 but with a slight domi-
nation of ERL individuals (q ⇡ 0.56; Table 3.3).
B.6.2 Repeated matching
Prisoner’s Dilemma: dynamic learning rate
All individuals initially prefer Cooperation. In the average PD game, we use the value   = 10
that gives the best correspondence between analysis and simulation in the one-shot matching
(OM) model. We find that PIL learns to defect irrespective of the frequency of the types in
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Figure B.3: Distribution of behavior at equilibrium of learning in the average Coordination game for
the one-shot matching model with constant learning rate for pairs of opponents. This represents the
frequency of pairs having reached the probabilities to play action 1 (p1,T , p2,T ) at the end of lifespan, T .
We used a total of 1000 individuals of each type in each simulation. Left column: interaction between
two RLs. Middle column: interaction between two ILs. Right Column: interaction between RL (player
1) and IL (player 2).
the population. However, PRL individuals can learn to cooperate when in sufficiently high
frequency in the population (precisely, the average probability of cooperating at equilibrium of
learning of PRL is above 0 for q   0.8; Fig. 3.5A). This result is not surprising given the OM
results. Indeed, when in high frequency, there is a positive probability that an PRL individ-
ual meets only other PRLs and the dynamics of those individuals will likely be similar to the
dynamics of pairs of PRL in the OMmodel.
This learning behavior implies that evolution leads to an interior equilibrium with the coex-
istence of PRL and PIL. Indeed, when PRL are in lower frequency than 0.8, evolution is neutral
because everybody defects. However, when the population reaches a state where the frequency
of PRL is above 0.8, PRL starts to cooperate so the latter has a disadvantage compared to PIL
and have thus a tendency to decrease in frequency. The population thus visits all the states such
that the frequency of PRL is less than 0.8 equally often, and in our evolutionary simulations we
obtain a stable average frequency of PRL around q ⇡ 0.19 (Table 3.4).
All individuals initially prefer Defection. In this game and with these initial preferences, indi-
viduals of both types learn to defect for all frequencies of PRL in the population (Fig. 3.5B).
This leads to think that evolution is neutral here and that the evolutionary simulations should
converge to a state where q = 0.5. Our simulations give a result close to this prediction but we
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also find that PIL slightly dominates the population at an evolutionary equilibrium (Table 3.4).
Prisoner’s Dilemma: constant learning rate
All individuals initially prefer Cooperation. At all frequencies, ERL individuals converge to a
state where their average probability of cooperation is above 0, which gives a complete advantage
to the defector BL in this repeated matching model (Fig. 3.5C). As a consequence, the evolution-
ary dynamics display a state where the domination of BL is almost total as they nearly fix in the
population at an evolutionary equilibrium (Table 3.4).
All individuals initially prefer Defection. In the same vein as when individuals initially prefer
Cooperation, ERL players also converge to an average probability of Cooperation that is pos-
itive for all values of q , while BL always learn to defect (Fig. 3.5D). This situation makes BL
almost fix in the population in an evolutionary long run (Table 3.4).
Hawk Dove game: dynamic learning rate
ERL initially prefers to play Hawk and BL prefers Dove. Even though we implement an initial
preference for Hawk to PRL individuals, we find here that, in their learning behavior, PRL
converge to a state where their probability of playing Dove is always higher than that of PIL.
Moreover, PRL have a tendency to increase their probability of playing Dove as they increase
in frequency while we observe the inverse tendency among PIL individuals, who decrease their
learned probability of playing Dove as the frequency of PRL increases (Fig. 3.5E).
As a result, the evolutionary simulations of natural selection give the result that both types
co-exist in the long-run with a domination of PIL individuals. Indeed, we observe that at low
frequencies q , PIL are playing Hawk a little more often than prescribed by the ESS (which is
here 1 B/2C ⇡ 0.17 because we use B = 5 and C = 3), and PRL are playing Dove with a high
average probability. This gives an advantage to PRL at low frequencies since they perform better
against PIL than PIL perform against themselves (because they play Hawk too often). However,
when the frequency of PRL increases, the latter gets exploited more often by PIL because PRL
plays more and more Dove while PIL plays more and more Hawk, which gives an advantage to
PIL. Hence at high enough frequencies of PRL, PIL has a higher fitness than PRL. This explains
the interior equilibrium with a domination of PIL in the evolutionary simulations (Table 3.4).
136 APPENDIX B. APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 3
ERL initially prefers to play Dove and BL prefers Hawk. This initial condition was favoring PIL
in the one-shot matching model, and we have the same situation here. We observe that PRL
learns to play Dove with high average probability (not smaller than 0.6) for all q , while PIL
learns to play Hawk with a high average probability, and this probability even decreases as PRL
increases in frequency (Fig. 3.5F).
Hence, PIL obtains a higher payoff against PRL than PRL against PRL which gives it an
advantage for high q . However, for low q , PRL against PIL cannot obtain a much better payoff
than PIL against PIL since the latter plays close to the ESS at low q . This is why we observe
in the evolutionary simulations that PIL dominates the population in an interior equilibrium
(Table 3.4).
Hawk Dove game: constant learning rate
ERL initially prefers to play Hawk and BL prefers Dove. The results for this case resemble the
case with dynamic learning rate above. Namely, ERL individuals have for all q a learned prob-
ability of playing Dove above that of PIL. Moreover, the probability to play Dove of ERL in-
creases as q but this probability decreases for q (Fig. 3.5G).
For the same reason as in the case with dynamic learning rate, natural selection leads to a
interior equilibrium with a large domination of PIL (Table 3.4).
ERL initially prefers to play Dove and BL prefers Hawk. Again this situation is very similar to
the one with dynamic learning rate above. ERL always has an average probability to play Dove
higher than PIL, while the latter plays close to the ESS when frequent in the population and
plays almost always Hawk when rare (Fig. 3.5H).
This learning behavior favors BL over ERL and simulations of evolution confirm this by
showing that the frequency of ERL at evolutionary equilibrium is around q ⇡ 0.05 (Table 3.4).
Coordination game: dynamic learning rate
In this game, PRL has difficulties in coordinating on the same equilibrium as PIL for all
frequencies q , while PIL always succeeds in learning to coordinate on a single action (that can
be Left or Right depending on stochastic events in the simulations; Fig. 3.5I).
This learning behavior implies that PRL has lower fitness for all q . Indeed simulations of
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natural selection show that PIL fix in the population in the long run (Table 3.4).
Coordination game: constant learning rate
In this case, the learning behavior of BL is similar to the situation with dynamic learning
rate, namely, all BL learn to coordinate on a single action. On the other hand, ERL have still
difficulties to coordinate for sufficiently high q , but coordinate efficiently for low q (Fig. 3.5J).
This learning behavior implies that evolution should be neutral for low q but should favor BL
for higher q . This is indeed consistent with what we obtain when we simulate natural selection,
where we observe an interior equilibrium with a large domination of BL (q ⇡ 0.06; Table 3.4).
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